The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University
Jonathan Edwards [1749], Ethical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 8) , Ed. Paul Ramsey [word count] [jec-wjeo08].
DISSERTATION I: Concerning the End for which God Created the World
INTRODUCTION. CONTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS, AND GENERAL POSITIONS
TO avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and performs any work, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same signification; and though the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end. A chief end is opposite to an inferior end; an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. A subordinate end is something that an agent seeks and aims at in what he does; but yet don't seek it, or regard it at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to some other thing which it is considered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of some disease, and restore his health, the obtaining that medicine is his subordinate end; because 'tis not an end that he seeks for itself, or values at all upon its own account; but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health: separate the medicine from that further end, and it is esteemed good for nothing; nor is it at all desired. An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does for its own sake; that he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end: as when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste, which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of. Some ends are subordinate ends not only as they are subordinated to an ultimate end, but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate end: yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another, one sought for another: the first for the next; and that for the sake of the next to that, and so on in a long series before you come to anything that the agent aims at and seeks for its own sake: as when a man sells a garment to get money— to buy tools— to till his land— to obtain a crop— to supply him with food— to gratify his appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite on its own account, as what is grateful in itself.For the meaning of "grateful in itself" see Intro., p. 13 above, n. 4. Here the end of his selling his garment is to get money; but getting money is only a subordinate end: 'tis not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying husbandry tools: and his obtaining these is only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land: and the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced: and the crop produced is not an ultimate end, or an end sought for itself, but only for the sake of making bread: and the having bread is not sought on its own account, but for the sake of gratifying the appetite. Here the gratifying the appetite is called the ultimate end; because 'tis the last in the chain, where a man's aim and pursuit stops and rests, obtaining in that the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at anything further. So that an end which an agent has in view may be both his immediate and his ultimate end, his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end; it is ultimate or last, as it has no other beyond it for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself: so that here, the aim of the agent stops and rests (without going further) being come to the good which he esteems a recompense of its pursuit for its own value.JE's language— distinguishing "subordinate" ends from an "ultimate" end— is roughly the same as our distinction between means and ends, or between "instrumental" goods and "final" goods. Subordinate ends may be intermediate, in a sequence.
Here it is to be noted that a thing sought may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end, as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because 'tis in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others' esteem and love: and partly, because he hopes through the friendship of that person to have his assistance in other affairs; and so to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.Aristotle acknowledged such "mixed cases," even while affirming that happiness or well-being was men's "absolutely final" end which "we choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further." There are other excellences, however, that are mixed ends and means, not means only: "Honour, pleasure, intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for their sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these even if no result were to follow), but we choose them also with a view to happiness, conceiving that through their instrumentality we shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a view to them, nor in fact with a view to any other thing whatsoever" Nicomachaean Ethics, 1097b (New York, E. P. Dutton, 1911; reprint ed., 1934). A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is most valued; and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does. 'Tis evident that to be an end more valued than another end is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own sake. This will appear, if it be considered 1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than another: thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other: and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new-invented and extraordinary optic glass: both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another; and therefore both may be ultimate ends: but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon, and so be properly the chief end of his journey. 2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey; one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of money that lies ready for him, at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the sum of money, may be but a subordinate end: he may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, gratifications and honor; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so an higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of seeing his friends; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.God's ultimate or last end in creation, of course, must also be his highest end as well. But here several things may be noted: First, that when it is said that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, 'tis not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate; because a subordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: for that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for its own sake or its own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance: if a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of— inFirst ed. begins new sentence. this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz. his having the money, should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means: but yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end to which it is not subordinate and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit, which was one end of his journey. Secondly, not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end to which it is subordinate, but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate, so that he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it— then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit: the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite; the obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit, and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite.I. e., an indispensable means, there being no alternative, will be ascribed a value equal to the ultimate end to which it is subordinate. ButFirst ed., no paragraph. otherwise, it will not be so: if she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification; which is in effect frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it— then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end. Hence it rarely happens among mankind that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.The conditions are rarely fulfilled— JE says— for esteeming a subordinate end as highly as its last end. While JE's ethics, and his examples here, are teleological, this may be compared with Kant's assertorial hypothetical imperative. No means are categorically required, even if the end is determined and unvarying. Given that all men, for example, desire happiness as their only, highest, and ultimate end, no "single, uncompounded means" will be found "infallibly connected" with that end. See Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics (New York, D. Appleton-Century, 1938), pp. 31–35. A better statement of the uncertainty in ethics, according to Kant, is in his Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals, Fourth Reflection, sec. 2, trans. Lewis W. Beck (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press [1949], pp. 282–85). Under this section, entitled "The Primary Grounds of Morals Are, in Their Present State, Not Yet Capable of All Requisite Evidence," Kant wrote:
Thirdly, if any being has but one ultimate end in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end; for in such a case, every other end but that one is an end to that end, and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued than the end to which it is subordinate. Moreover, the subordinate effects, events or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.See below, par. "Eighthly," on God's ultimate end in "providence in general." From what has been said to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained. Fourthly, whatsoever any agent has in view in anything he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature, and is agreeable to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said of avoiding of that which is in itself painful or disagreeable: for the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any, bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake; a subordinate, that which is sought only for the sake of something else. Fifthly, from hence it will follow that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, that are agreeable to him, considered in themselves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account— then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account: then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.See below, paragraph beginning "Ninthly." But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves considered in two senses. (1) What is in itself gratefulSee above, p. 406, n. 1; and Intro., p. 13, n. 4. to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, simply and absolutely considered, and is so universally and originally, antecedent to and independent of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And (2) what may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, hypothetically and consequentially: or, on supposition or condition of such and such circumstances or on the happening of such a particular case. Thus, for instance: a man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature: and society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances: and this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his last end in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and mutual justice and friendship in his family may be agreeable to him, and what he delights in for their own sake: and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family.
ButFirst ed., no par. they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of a family was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In like manner we must suppose that God before he created the world had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence, that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the universe with various intelligent creatures into existence in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion, the subject being supposed and the occasion given: but we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order the occasion. So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfill his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could such a fulfillment of his promises to his creatures be his last end in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition which is called his faithfulness may move him in his providential disposals towards them: and this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises. And may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation. So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an originalEd. italics. and independent ultimate end; the other consequentialEd. italics. and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: because, though their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose that to a righteous Being,Word capitalized in first ed. I retain the first ed. 's capitalization a total of 273 times where, in context in Two Dissertations, this word obviously refers to God. Nineteen of these instances are in End of Creation; 254, in True Virtue. Changes will continue to be noted, but not my retention of either B or b in the first ed. See Intro., pp. 116–19. the doing justice between two parties with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: and yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given. Therefore I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is consequential, and a subordinate end. It may be observed that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz. the original ultimate end.Thus JE specifies the meaning of the term "ultimate end" as he will use it. Even so, there could be more than one ultimate end in that sense, one "fellow" with another, and of the same rank. JE's language is carefully chosen in adducing scriptures that show "God's glory is an ultimate end of the creation" (Ch. II below, Sec. III. Ed. italics) and scriptures that show "communication of good to the creature was one thing which God had in view as an ultimate end of the creation of the world" (Ch. II, Sec. V. Ed. italics). Then it remains for the plurality of original ultimate ends to be rejected by Sec. VII of Ch. II. Sixthly, it may be further observed that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is alone that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with respect to everything that he does towards his creatures. And therefore, Seventhly, if we use the phrase "ultimate end" in this highest sense, then the same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in everything he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose that in the use which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he must evermore have a regard to the end for which he has made them. But if we take "ultimate end" in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence,In distinction from "providence in general." The next paragraph states the position that God's ultimate end in his general providence is the same as his ultimate end in creation; and this, in the original, highest sense of "ultimate." which could not in any proper sense be his last end in creating the world. Eighthly, on the other hand, whatever appears to be God's "ultimate end" in any sense of his works of providence in general, that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. For though it be so that God may act for an end that is an ultimate end in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world: yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may justly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the same is also an ultimate end of the creation of the world; for God's works of providence in general are the same with the general use that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the world to the general end for which he designed the world. Though there may be some things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent circumstances; and so are last ends in an inferior sense: yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making them last ends don't depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe. Ninthly, if there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense: but if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are, absolutely and independently on the supposition of any future given cases, agreeable to the Divine Being,Words lowercase in first ed. I have capitalized the first edition's use of lowercase "being" only eight times in Two Dissertations (seven instances in End of Creation; one in True Virtue), where— as here— the word obviously refers to God. Each editorial change— from b to B or from B to b will be footnoted. Retention of either case will not hereafter be footnoted. See Intro., pp. 116–19. which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ultimate ends of the creation, in that highest sense.The paragraph beginning "Ninthly" deliberately holds open the possibility that there could be a plurality of ends equally "original" and "ultimate" in the "highest" sense. There are many matters to be probed— in consideration of what reason and Scripture teach— before JE's conclusion is prepared, namely, that God's end in creation was "but one" (Ch. II, Sec. VII below).
CHAPTER ONE: Wherein Is Considered What Reason Teaches Concerning This Affair
SECTION I. SOME THINGS OBSERVED IN GENERAL WHICH REASON DICTATES
HAVING observed these things which are proper to be taken notice of to prevent confusion in discourses on this subject, I now proceed to consider what may, and what may not, be supposed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world. And in the first place, I would observe some things which reason seems to dictate in this matter. Indeed, this affair seems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determined what was aimed at or designed in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to and rely on what he has told us who was the architect that built it. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind, who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the author of the world was, would ever have obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated and wonderful a work of his hands. And though it be true that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in the world as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to use their reason (in which regard, notwithstanding the nobleness and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they seemed to be in themselves almost helpless); andFirst ed. begins new sentence. though mankind now, through the long continual assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exercise of reason, which are far beyond what otherwise they would have arrived to: yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason to determine the affair of God's last end in the creation of the world, only by our own reason, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions concerning this matter. Nevertheless, as in the disputes and wranglings which have been about this matter, those objections, which have chiefly been made use of against what I think the Scriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reason— I would in the first place soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair; and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it.This announcement of the twofold division of End of Creation italicized in first ed. (Ordinarily I do not note every reduction made in the first ed. 's use of italics. That edition is available to scholars for comparison in Charles Evans' American Bibliography, #E6940.) As to the first of these, viz. what seems in itself rational to be supposed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason: 1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world is agreeable to reason which would truly imply or infer any indigence, insufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy: that he stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive anything from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the subject of any sufferings or impair of his glory and felicity from any other being.Italics in original. An obsolete meaning of "impair" is "to grow or become worse, less valuable, weaker, or less; to suffer injury or loss; to deteriorate, fall off, or decay." The Oxford English Dictionary (hereafter O. E. D.) gives the following illustration of eighteenth-century usage: "When years increase, and perhaps your health impairs." Our current meaning of "to make worse, less valuable, or weaker; to lessen injuriously; to damage, injure" was already used in the text above in stating that God cannot be truly hurt. JE adds that to say that God impairs of his glory from some other being is as absurd as his being truly hurt by some other being. I need not stand to produce the proofs of God's being such a one, it being so universally allowed and maintained by such as call themselves Christians. TheFirst ed., no par. 2. notion of God's creating the world in order to receive anything properly from the creature is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation; which implies a being's receiving its existence, and all that belongs to its being, out of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that it should have anything to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator become dependent on the creature?
2. Whatsoever is good and valuable in itself is worthy that God should value for itself, and on its own account; or which is the same thing, value it with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately sought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; because they do not remain to be attained; but their existence in all possible respects must be conceived of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in themselves, and infinitely valued by God, yet can't be supposed to be the end of any divine operation. For we can't conceive of them as in any respect consequent on any works of God: but whatever is in itself valuable, absolutely so, and that is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation. Therefore, 3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, that must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation; and also worthy to be his highest end. In consequence of this, it will follow 4. That if God himself be in any respect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to himself as his last and highest end in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of beings.Word capitalized in first ed. I have reduced the first ed. 's "Being(s)" to "being(s)" a total of 143 times where, in context in Two Dissertations, this word refers to a plurality of beings (as here), to a being among others, to a metaphysical property, or where it is an ontological notion. Five of these instances are in End of Creation; 138, in True Virtue. In a few cases it is difficult to distinguish "being" as a metaphysical concept from "Being" as a title to honor or even to "name" God. Each editorial change is footnoted. See Intro., pp. 116–19. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And therefore if God esteems, values, and has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do everything that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is disposed to everything that is fit, suitable and amiable in itself, consists in his having infinitely the highest regard to that which is in itself infinitely highest and best; yea, it is in this that it seems chiefly to consist. The moral rectitude of God's heart must consist in a proper and due respect of his heart to things that are objects of moral respect: that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due; yea, infinitely most, and in effect all. For God is infinitely and most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to his: so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of the respect that any moral agent, either God or any intelligent being,Word capitalized in first ed. is capable of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitness and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be paid to God; and the denying supreme regard here would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being is what the fitness of regard does infinitely most consist in. Hence it will follow that the moral rectitude and fitness of the disposition, inclination or affection of God's heart does chiefly consist in a respect or regard to himself infinitely above his regard to all other beings: or in other words, his holiness consists in this. And if it be thus fit that God should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is fit that this supreme regard should appear, in those things by which he makes himself known, or by his word and works; i.e. in what he says, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God that he should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should act as having a chief regard to himself; or act in such a manner, as to show that he has such a regard; that what is highest in God's heart, may be highest in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reason to think it was, that his works should exhibit an image of himself their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper representation of his divine excellencies, and especially his moral excellence, consisting in the disposition of his heart; then 'tis reasonable to suppose that his works are so wrought as to show this supreme respect to himself wherein his moral excellency does primarily consist. When we are considering with ourselves, what would be most fit and proper for God to have a chief respect to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater ease and satisfaction to consider what we can suppose would be judged and determined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude, neither the Creator nor one of the creatures, that should be perfectly indifferent and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition that wisdom itself, or infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct disinterested person, whose office it was to determine how things shall be most fitly and properly ordered in the whole system, or kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should prevail and govern in all proceeding— nowFirst ed. begins new sentence. such a judge in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard that every part of existence is to have, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care that greater, or more existence should have a greater share than less, that a greater part of the whole should be more looked at and respected than the lesser in proportion (other things being equal) to the measure of existence, that the more excellent should be more regarded than the less excellent: so that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion compounded of the proportion of existence and proportion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatness and goodness considered conjunctly.Cf. the comparative natural meanness and the comparative moral meanness that, considered "conjunctly," comprise the nature of humility in Charity and Its Fruits, Sermon Six. And cf. also the compounded degrees of greatness and goodness in the definition of "spiritual beauty" or "true virtue," Dissertation II, p. 548 below and JE's statement that from pure benevolence a person "will naturally... other things being equal, love particular beings in a proportion compounded of the degree of being and the degree of virtue, or benevolence to being, which they have," Dissertation II, p. 571 below. Such an arbiter, in considering the system of created intelligent beings by itself, would determine that the system in general, consisting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater share of regard, than only one individual. For however considerable some of the individuals might be, so that they might be much greater and better, and have a greater share of the sum total of existence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others so much as to countervail all the rest of the system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but the system of being in general,Here, where first introduced, the expression "being in general" should not be capitalized. The arbiter contrasts "the system of being in general" comprehending both Creator and creatures with the system of created beings. comprehending the sum total of universal existence, both Creator and creature; still every part must be considered according to its weight and importance, or the measure it has of existence and excellence. To determine, then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance; the Supreme Being, with all in him that is great, considerable, and excellent, is to be estimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation: and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings in comparison of the Creator would be found as the light dust of the balance (which is taken no notice of by him that weighs) and as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the degree in which God should be regarded by all intelligent existence, and the degree in which he should be regarded in all that is done through the whole universal system; in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the first and supreme, and as his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme headFirst ed. 's lowercase retained here. "Head" is a common reverent reference to God or Christ, but this is not so in the arbiter's argument, where the arbiter functions as a metaphysician! This nonspecific use of the word is similar to "being in general" above, and to the word author in JE's reflections on how men "destitute of revelation... could come to no clear and established determination who the author of the world was" (beginning of the present section). with absolute and universal dominion; so it is fit that he should be so regarded by all and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system: that this universality of things in their whole compass and series should look to him and respect him in such a manner as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and that regard to creatures should universally be subordinate and subject. When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, or sum total of existence, I mean the regard of the sum total; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent existence, created, and uncreated. For 'tis fit that the regard of the Creator should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we must conclude such an arbiter as I have supposed would determine in this business, being about to decide how matters should proceed most fitly, properly, and according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine that the whole universe, including all creatures animate and inanimate, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed from a regard and with a view to God, as the supreme and last end of all: that every wheel, both great and small, in all its rotations, should move with a constant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly as if the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul: or, as if such an arbiter as I have before supposed, one possessed of perfect wisdom and rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions.For the par. on satisfaction of sin omitted at this point from the "Controversies"— draft of the supreme arbiter argument, see Intro., p. 8, n. 9. Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither Creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act according to the greatest fitness, in his proceedings; and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As therefore there is no third being beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested. For being interested unfits a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise than as interest tends to blind and mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either is contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerningInstead of "discerning" as a gerund, we might say "discernment." Cf. "omnipercipient" in the description of the "ideal observer," Intro., p. 47, n. 6. and justice absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so, to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done. I should think that these things might incline us to suppose that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends (however he is self-sufficient, immutable, and independent) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.In Miscell. no. 1208. END OF THE CREATION. GLORY OF GOD. NATURE OF REDEMPTION. SATISFACTION OF CHRIST. NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE AND RELIGION (c. 1752–53, five or six years before his death), JE wrote out the entirety of his "impartial arbiter" argument. I find no themes in par. 4 above that are not in this entry in the "Miscellanies," which runs to sixteen pages in Schafer's typescript. The entry does have the arbiter consider two additional matters: what satisfaction for sin would be appropriate if the Supreme Being determined upon a redemption, and the fitness of Christ's satisfaction. See Intro., p. 8, n. 9. Just before the "satisfaction" themes, the impartial arbiter argument ends with an interlinear insertion of the words: "See papers on the End of Creation p. 22, 23, 24." Schafer's judgment is that this reference to the now lost MS, or to some further draft of it, was added later than the composition of the entry. Objections and answers appended to Miscell. no. 1208 are reflected in Sec. IV below. This Miscellany is the most complete penultimate draft we have of Ch. I of End of Creation. The entry uses "true virtue" and "religion" interchangeably; and because of the final one of its titles, it is the only listing under "Virtue" in JE's Table: "Virtue makes God its supreme end, 1208." 5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, which facts and events show that God aimed at it in the creation of the world, must be supposed to be regarded or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose from the perfection of God's nature that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; 'tis agreeable to him absolutely on its own account; because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its own account, then 'tis the ultimate object of his value; he don't value it merely for the sake of a further end to be attained by it. For to suppose that he values it only for some further end is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows that if that which God values ultimately, and for itself, appears in fact and experience to be what he seeks by anything he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, 'tis an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step further, and assert 6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself,Four senses in which this is the case are discriminated in the next section. The meaning of the term consequence in the sentence above, and in the following section, is crucial in any interpretation of JE's argument in this first dissertation. The meaning must be consistent with JE's rejection, in par. "Fifthly," p. 413 above, of an end that is "consequential and dependent." And see below, Sec. III, p. 440, n. 3. that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; because he has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may justly infer what God intends by what he actually does, because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatsoever God intends to attain from a value for it, or in other words, whatever he aims at in his actions and works, that he values; he seeks that thing in those acts and works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by means he uses is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his end in those means. Now it being by the supposition what God values ultimately, it must therefore, by the preceding position, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.
SECTION II. SOME FARTHER OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THOSE THINGS WHICH REASON LEADS US TO SUPPOSE GOD AIMED AT IN THE CREATION OF THE WORLD, SHOWING PARTICULARLY WHAT THINGS THAT ARE ABSOLUTELY GOOD ARE ACTUALLY THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE CREATION OF THE WORLD
FROM what was last observed it seems to be the most proper and just way of proceeding, as we would see what light reason will give us respecting the particular end or ends God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, to consider what thing or things are actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world that are simply and originally valuable in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphysical inquiries wherein fitness, amiableness, or valuableness consists; or what that is in the nature of some things which is properly the foundation of a worthiness of being loved and esteemed on their own account. In this I must at present refer what I say to the sense and dictates of the reader's mind, on sedate and calm reflection. I proceed to observe, 1. It seems a thing in itself fit, proper and desirable that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the production of such effects as might manifest the infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness,In Miscell. no. ww. FOUR BEASTS (c. 1723), "wisdom, power, goodness, and justice" are "the four attributes of God that have [to do] with the world, and these only; the rest concerns himself." These are the four living creatures, and the four faces, that manage the wheels of providence (Ezekiel 1:5–20); but only goodness moved God to create the world. So it is again in Miscell. nos. 3, 87, and in other early entries. (See also App. III, at n. 1, on the wheels on earth that move heaven.) The theme of the present section does not require JE to ask which of these attributes moved God to make the others known and shared; or to say that such a question cannot properly be asked of "goodness." In the next section (and increasingly throughout the dissertation), goodness does not serve this function of "unmoved mover" of God's act of will in creation. Instead, "fullness," "glory," "name," and "mercy" gain predominance in the argument of Dissertation I as a whole. The same was the movement in JE's exploratory theological investigations of this perplexing question in numerous "Miscellanies." He probes one solution, then another. One term or theme is never dropped entirely but is, as it were, folded or assumed into another. In JE's final resolution, God's goodness is simply displaced from centrality by more biblical language. etc., which are in God. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must forever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding or disposal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness and truth. Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attributes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects are in themselves excellent, the exercises of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any act or work is no further valuableThe words "no further valuable" do not entail that God's "sufficiency" is rendered more or additionally valuable when the work is done and the effect obtained. This is the case whichever perfection is the attribute in whose exercise and expression God delights; and also whether the attribute singled out goes more toward God or toward man. God delights in the expression of himself that he delights in. JE argued this with respect to God's glory or the creature's happiness in Miscell. no. 1151. END OF THE CREATION (c. 1750–51). Cf. No. 679. Then, in Miscell. no. 1218. END OF THE CREATION, GLORY OF GOD &c (c. 1751–52), JE objected to the propriety of using the term God's goodness for "a notion of a bountiful disposition in the heart of God disposed to increase the sum of happiness to be found in the universality of existence" by "giving being to capable subjects of it." "There is no such thing" in God, he wrote. "Man's benevolence and bounty, taking his own good and the good of the person benefited by him, increases the sum of good; and therefore 'tis more easy to conceive of a benevolent disposition in a creature wishing for the being of new subjects of kindness, because the goodness of his nature causes him to love to see a great deal of happiness. But God sees no more by making creatures that they may be happy. He hath in his Son an adequate object for all the desires of this kind that are in his heart, and in his infinite happiness he sees as much happiness as can be. When new beings are made that are infinitely less, and there is opportunity to do them good, God sees not the sum of happiness increased." This entry was marked for use or when used. Its chief argument is against the view that "there are parallel coordinate ends of God's creating the world, one to exercise his perfections ad extra, another to make his creatures happy." In God's exerting himself in order to an effect, "the exertion and the effect ought not to be separated as though they were two ends. One is so related to the other and they are so united that they are most properly taken together, for 'tis not an ineffectual exertion that God aims at or inclines to... 'Tis himself exerted and himself communicated, and both together are what is called God's glory." Such a disposition to communicate himself can only "in a less proper sense or in a more extensive manner" be called his goodness. than the work or effect is valuable.As we must conceive of things, the end and perfection of these attributes does as it were consist in their exercise: "The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia) is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections not to be exerted, would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what use would God's wisdom be, if it had nothing to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness, if it never brought anything to pass? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good?"— JE's Footnote. therefore esteems these attributes themselves valuable, and delights in them, so 'tis natural to suppose that he delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason as he delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things according to truth and just proportion, so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself. 2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by other beings besides himself. If it be fit that God's power and wisdom, etc., should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, as since. If therefore it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually expressed and exhibited in their correspondent effects; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections, and the expressions and discoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that 'tis desirable that this knowledge should exist. As God's perfections are things in themselves excellent, so the expression of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent, and the knowledge of these excellent perfections, and of these glorious expressions of them, is an excellent thing, the existence of which is in itself valuable and desirable. 'Tis a thing infinitely good in itself that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity is an existence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs in order that it be, which, of all things possible, is fittest and best. If existence is more worthy than defect and nonentity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge or understanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. The existence of the created universe consists as much in it as in anything: yea, this knowledge is one of the highest, most real and substantial parts, of all created existence most remote from nonentity and defect. 3. As it is a thing valuable and desirable in itself that God's glory should be seen and known, so when known, it seems equally reasonable and fit, it should be valued and esteemed, loved and delighted in, answerably to its dignity. There is no more reason to esteem it a fit and suitable thing that God's glory should be known, or that there should be an idea in the understanding corresponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding disposition or affection in the will. If the perfection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. And as 'tis fit that God should love and esteem his own excellence, 'tis also fit that he should value and esteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and esteemed: and if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. If the idea of God's perfection in the understanding be valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be more especially valuable, as moral beauty especially consists in the disposition and affection of the heart.Par. 2 and 3 above correspond respectively to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Trinitarian correspondences become clearer in Dissertation I as a whole, especially as JE moves through what Scripture teaches. They may as well be anticipated at this point— most succinctly by referring these paragraphs, respectively, to logos and agape in Scripture. "I don't remember that any other attributes are said to be God, and God to be them, but λογος and ἀγάπη, or reason and love," JE wrote in Miscell. no. 146 (136). TRINITY (c. 1725), "I conclude, because no other are in that (a personal) sense." We can't conceive of any further real distinctions than God, and his idea, and his love or delight. Besides these three, God's "power" is "a mere relation" to an effect; his "goodness" and "mercy" are "his love with a relation," etc. (Miscell. no. 259. TRINITY, c. 1726). Trinitarian reflection on God's end in creation, it is true, is never as prominent in the present work as in JE's "Miscellanies," from the beginning to the end of those notebooks, alongside JE's reflection on the four "faces" or attributes of God respecting the creation— power, wisdom, justice (righteousness), and goodness— and alongside his constant quest for better language in which to express his vision of God and the creation. The reader of Two Dissertations needs to be aware of this in order not to overlook references to the Trinity in both End of Creation and True Virtue. 4. As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God, a fullness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness. And as this fullness is capable of communication or emanationThe word emanation— here where first used in the dissertation, and throughout— is in the context of "communication." The same is the case in the "Miscellanies." A crucial question is whether "communication" governs the meaning of emanation, "flowing forth," and the images of fountain and light that JE uses; or whether emanation governs the meaning of communication and those images. If the first, one's reading of End of Creation will be more biblical, communication expressing an action, disposition, or will in God. If the second, one's reading will be more Neoplatonic, emanation meaning some sort of procession of or from God. See Related Correspondence. ad extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine BeingWords lowercase in first ed. must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition; such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it; so far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as anything besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fullness of good that is in the fountain is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding: and as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fullness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun. From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that there should be such things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: this appears I say in another way, viz. as these things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holiness and joy. Thus it appears reasonable to suppose that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fullness of good; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness of good ad extra, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate himself or diffuse his own fullness,I shall often use the phrase "God's fullness," as signifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness: partly because I know of no better phrase to be used in this general meaning; and partly because I am led hereto by some of the inspired writers, particularly the apostle Paul, who often used the phrase in this sense.— JE's Footnote. originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as possible to avoid confusion, I observe that there is some impropriety in saying that a disposition in God to communicate himself to the creature, moved him to create the world. For though the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself to the creature when the creature exists; yet this can't be all: because an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fullness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communicate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.
SECTION III. WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED HOW, ON THE SUPPOSITION OF GOD'S MAKING THE FOREMENTIONED THINGS HIS LAST END, HE MANIFESTS A SUPREME AND ULTIMATE REGARD TO HIMSELF IN ALL HIS WORKS
IN the last section I observed some things, which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in this work. I now proceed to inquire, how God's making such things as these his last end is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works. Because this is a thing I have observed as agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest— thereforeFirst ed. begins new sentence. I would endeavor to show with respect to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himself his end, so as in all to show a supreme and ultimate respect to himself; and how his infinite love to himself and delight in himself will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: or rather how a value to these things is implied in his love to himself, or value of that infinite fullness of good that is in himself.The "forementioned things" distinguished are the four paragraphs of the previous section. JE now begins to call them "particulars," and I follow his practice.
Now with regard to the first of the particulars mentioned above, viz. God's regard to the exercise and expression of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations, 'tis not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections; and that a love to them will dispose him to love their exhibition and exertment: inasmuch as their excellency consists in their relation to use, exercise and operation; as the excellency of wisdom consists in its relation to, and sufficiency for, wise designs and effects. God's love to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that which is the use, end and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, etc., that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues: so if God both esteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he can't but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in his own perfections themselves: or in other words, he manifests a delight in himself; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself his end. And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit that the other should be beloved, and his qualification prized. And therefore thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies: and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, 'tis fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies' being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied inJE's frequent use of this expression should be noted. With one exception (p. 440 below, text at n. 1), nowhere in End of Creation does JE attempt to explain the meaning of "implied in" to the extent this was done in Charity, Sermons Twelve and Six. See n. 2 above. Instead JE counts on the context to manifest the meaning of each such usage. Since strict logical implication is not a likely meaning, a first approach might be to point out persons' tendency to move from observing an effect to be always conjunctive with or promoted by a certain cause or condition, to supposing it to be some sort of conclusion. There is, indeed, a rough parallel between (1) what is said about God's propensity to diffuse, manifest and communicate his fullness and God's love to himself diffused, manifested, communicated, i.e., enjoyed as an effect implied in that, and (2) divine love and its fruits in heart and life in Charity as a whole, and in particular in the sixth and twelfth sermons. And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. God's being disposed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fullnessJE's notion of the "fullness" of God is decisive for the remainder of this section. See p. 433 above, n. 7. Insofar as this biblical, and especially Pauline, concept is used here in the first chapter as a concept in philosophical theology referring to one of the metaphysical perfections of Deity, it displaces "goodness" in JE's lifelong attempts to express adequately his vision of God's end in originally giving creatures being. The same overriding importance must be ascribed to God's "love" or "benevolence" in its larger sense, introduced just below in the text. Notably, both fullness and God's benevolence are introduced in context with God's "glory"— anticipating Ch. II, Sec. III. of good which he possesses in himself; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner which he does; if we thoroughly and properly consider the matter, it will appear that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself. Merely in this disposition to diffuse himself, or to cause an emanation of his glory and fullness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of creation, or giving existence to other beings, God can't so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself. For the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This disposition or desire in God must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground of the existence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreseen existence of the creature. God's love, or benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a largerThe "larger" sense of "benevolence" corresponds to the "highest" sense of "ultimate," i.e., original, independent ultimate end, which JE said he would "commonly mean" by "ultimate" in this discourse. See above, JE's introduction, at the end of par. "Fifthly." or stricter sense. In a larger sense it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own fullness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love: 'tis the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper sense; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being. But yet this can't have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futurition of the existence of it.I. e., the very source of the assurance of the future of the existence of it. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself, as will more clearly appear afterwards. But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects: love in the most strict and proper sense presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence strictly taken presupposes an existing object, as much as pity, a miserable suffering object. This propensity in God to diffuse himself may be considered as a propensity to himself diffused, or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fullness, warmth and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himself to belong to the fullness and completeness of himself, as though he were not in his most complete and glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ (toward whom and in whomRomans 11:36 and Hebrews 2:10 resonate in the words "toward whom and in whom," as also in True Virtue, p. 551 below. Notable also of this parenthesis is its massing together of those verses with "emanations" of God's glory and "communications" of his fullness. are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fullness) is called the fullness of Christ: as though he were not in his complete state without her; as Adam was in a defective state without Eve. And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Corinthians 11:7. Isaiah 46:13, "I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel my glory."Very remarkable is that place, John 12:23–24, "And Jesus answered them saying: the hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified. Verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had respect herein to the blessed fruits of Christ's death, in the conversion, salvation, and eternal happiness and holiness of those that should be redeemed by him. This consequence of his death, he calls his "glory"; and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being "glorified": as the flourishing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat sown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created: but from him by his death proceeds a glorious offspring: in which he is communicated, that is, his fullness and glory: as from Adam in his deep sleep proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptiness and relieve his solitariness. By Christ's death, his fullness is abundantly diffused in many streams; and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his spiritual offspring.— JE's Footnote. in God; as shall be more particularly observed presently. But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fullness in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fullness of good there is in himself, and the supreme respect and regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations of himself his end, he does ultimately make himself his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly the nature and circumstances of these communications of God's fullness which are made,The following "more particular" consideration of the divine communications, with which this section concludes, adds the important notion of "participation" to everything said so far. and which we have reason either from the nature of things, or the Word of God to suppose shall be made. One part of that divine fullness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creatures' knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge: and even the faculty of understanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God in making this his end makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature is but a conformity to God. 'Tis the image of God's own knowledge of himself. 'Tis a participation of the same: 'tis as much the same as 'tis possible for that to be, which is infinitely less in degree:JE means the statements in this paragraph quite literally. The "divine knowledge," God's own knowledge of himself, is communicated. Ours is "a participation of the same." See Intro., pp. 19–23. Commenting on "He that seeth me seeth him that sent me," John 12:45, and on "If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also: and from henceforth ye know him and have seen him," John 14:7, JE wrote: "Seeing the perfect idea of a thing, is to all intents and purposes the same as seeing the thing: it is not only equivalent to seeing of it, but it is seeing of it; for there is no other seeing, but having an idea. Now by seeing a perfect idea, so far as we see it we have it; but it can't be said of anything else, that in seeing of it we see another, speaking strictly, except it be the very idea of the other." Miscell. no. 260. TRINITY (c. 1726–27). as particular beams of the sun communicated, are the light and glory of the sun in part. Besides God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge; he must delight in everything of that nature: as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light: and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified. Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fullness, that is and will be made in consequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God's holiness; so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency, which is properly the beauty of the divine nature.See Intro., pp. 12–14, 20–21. Statements in the genitive case were not at all ambiguous for JE. Such statements meant both "God's delight and joy," "God's virtue and holiness," and "our delight, joy, happiness in God" (in human affections) and "our virtuous, holy love to God" (in human wills). God communicates. The creature "partakes." There is egress. There is reception. These are one. God wills (loves) and enjoys nothing in the creature that is not himself— himself reflected— as there is no body whose lightsomeness is not that of the sun. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness; which is a conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel, held in the sun's beams, is a participation, or derivation of the sun's brightness, though immensely less in degree. And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists; viz. in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue;Cf. Charity, Sermon One. and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in an high esteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the heart's exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which as I showed before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself and values the glory of his own nature. Another part of God's fullness which he communicates is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself, and so does also the creature's happiness.The first mention of the creature's happiness in Two Dissertations; this, too, is a participation in the happiness that is God's. 'Tis, as has been observed of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted: joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praise. So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fullness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God: and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and united to him; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praise of God consists. And 'tis farther to be considered that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show how in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And 'tis to be considered that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: for so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close: and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity, and oneness. For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son: so that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfillment of Christ's request, in John 17:21, John 17:23: "That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us,Ver. John 17:22 omitted at this point. I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one."See position 12, Ch. II below, Sec. II, p. 474, n. 1; and also my comment (Intro., pp. 20–21) on JE's Miscellany on Christ's prayer that the Father's love ("the love of the Father's") to him be also "in them and I in them," John 17:26. The oneness toward which the whole creation moves— of the Father and the Son, and of Christ with his people— is reminiscent of the saints' being one another's by propriety, God and Christ theirs, in "Heaven Is a World of Love." In this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of the creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, centering most perfectly in him, and as it were swallowed up in him: so that his respect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to himself. The interest of the creature is, as it were, God's own interest, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a man's family is looked upon as the same with his own interest, because of the relation they stand in to him, his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration, so they are infinitely dearer to God than a man's family is to him. What has been said shows that as all things are from God as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity: which argues that he who is their first cause is their last end.With this section, what reason teaches comes to a conclusion; objections and answers come next. The stress above on the progressive approach of the creature, brought home to strictness of union with God and comprehended in God, can only be compared with the peroration with which the first dissertation as a whole concludes (Ch. II below, Sec. VII), where some of the foregoing images are again used and extended. See also App. III.
SECTION IV. SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST THE REASONABLENESS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID OF GOD'S MAKING HIMSELF HIS LAST END
OBJ. 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability: particularly the representation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication of his fullness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this don't well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed anything; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world: and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end, or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore can't now possibly need, nor with any color of reason be supposed to seek? Ans. 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from his absolute self-sufficience, independence, and immutability. ThoughFrom this point in the text JE's answer is verbally very close to his answer to an objection, second in number, in Miscell. no. 1208 (c. 1752–53, five or six years before his death). This entry is a nearly complete draft of Ch. I of this first dissertation. See Intro., pp. 7–10, 11–12 above. Attention has already been drawn to the "impartial observer" argument in this draft (Intro., pp. 45–47, and Sec. I above, p. 426, n. 4). it be true that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and can't be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet it don't hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in anything he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature: yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself,The answer drafted in Miscell. no. 1208 omits this phrase. It speaks only of "delight in the exercise of his own goodness, and so gratifying the inclination of his own heart." and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his creature's happiness can't properly be said to be what God receives from the creature. For 'tis only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature; in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fullness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness. With respect also to the creature's holiness, God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination to communicate of his own excellent fullness.God's proper delight in communicating divine "fullness" is not mentioned in Miscell. no. 1208. God may delight with true and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from himself, that 'tis an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he don't delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but is truly an instance of it.The correctness of this answer as a whole may more clearly appear by comparing it at this particular place, and some other places as well, with the text of the preceding section, p. 426. And with respect to God's being glorified in this respect, that those perfections wherein his glory consists are exercised and expressed in their proper and corresponding effects; as his wisdom in wise designs and well-contrived works, his power in great effects, his justice in acts of righteousness, his goodness in communicating happiness; and so his showing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exercised, exhibited, communicated, known, and esteemed: his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in himself, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it. Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures: becauseFirst ed. begins new sentence. God would be less happy, if he was less good, or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fullness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and can't be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.There is no parallel to "God would be less happy if he was less good" in the answer drafted in Miscell. no. 1208, which JE marked for use. This could be insignificant, because by now JE is extending the length of his answer. Moreover, such an argument would be quite inappropriate in the mouth of an "impartial observer," who is some third person asked to determine the respect due to God. See Miscell. no. 679 (c. 1734) for a comparatively early entry in which JE argues both that God delights in his creatures and that "he is not dependent on the creature for anything nor does he receive any addition from the creature," while still impelled to add, as here: "But yet in one sense it can be truly said that God has more delight, for the loveliness and happiness of the creature, viz. as God would be less happy if he were less good, or if it were possible for him to be hindered in exercising his own goodness, or to be hindered from glorifying himself." This early association of goodness with glory shows that JE probed in one direction, then in another, tried one term, then another, in his lifelong struggle for clarity on this question, before folding "goodness," "fullness," "happiness," etc., into "to glorify."
From this view it appears that nothing that has been said is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in the Scripture that signify that man can't be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man. From what has been said it appears that the pleasure that God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, 'tis no argument of indigence in God that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fullness. 'Tis no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain that it is inclined to overflow. Another thing signified by these expressions of Scripture is that nothing that is from the creature adds to or alters God's happiness, as though it were changeable either by increase or diminution. Nor does anything that has been advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does, or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability of God's pleasure and happiness. For though these communications of God, these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty and fullness in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present, as with him there is no variableness or succession.Cf. God's eternal view of the "eternal duration" of the creature, which he has respect to "in the whole, of infinite height," moving "not with constantly diminishing (but perhaps an increasing) celerity" toward more and more perfect union with himself, p. 534 below, the conclusion of the whole dissertation. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, absolutely perfect, unchangeable and independent. It can't be added to or diminished by the power or will of any creature; nor is in the least dependent on anything mutable or contingent. Ans. 2.There is no parallel to ans. 2 and 3 in Miscell. no. 1208; indeed, the final paragraphs of ans. 1 are new also. JE omitted from his use of this entry the impartial arbiter's consideration of the satisfaction due for sin and Christ's satisfaction. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection: let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will), then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how can he have anything future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own complete object of enjoyment? Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection, let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above. It may therefore be proper here to observe that let what will be God's last end, thatEd. italics. he must have a real and proper pleasure in: whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either gratefulOn the meaning of "grateful," see Intro., p. 4, n. 13. to him in itself; or for something else for which he wills it: and so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he wills for its own sake; as grateful to him in itself: or which is the same thing, it is that which he truly delights in, or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to anything brought to pass in time; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose that God's works in creating and governing the world are properly the fruits of his will, as of his understanding. And if there be any such thing at all as what we mean by acts of will in God, then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfillment of his will: or which is the same thing, he has a pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happiness. That in which God's delight or pleasure in any measure consists, his happiness in some measure consists. To suppose that God has pleasure in things, that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically, is to suppose that he exercises will about these things and makes them his end only metaphorically.On acts of will in God, see Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1957), 1, 375–96. Ans. 3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself to be his last end is a doctrine the farthest from having a favorable aspect on God's absolute self-sufficience and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end in his desires, aims, actions and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, actions and pursuits, if he fails of his end. Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him,Romans 11:36, "For of him and through him and to him are all things"; Hebrews 2:10, "by whom are all things, and to whom are all things." and he the first and the last,Revelation 1:11, "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last"; Revelation 22:13, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." this shows him to be all in all: he is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature. Obj. 2. Some may object that to suppose that God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonorable to him; as it in effect supposes that God does everything from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and sordid in the creature! unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, that should in everything he did be governed by selfish principles; should make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the blessed and only potentate! Does it not become us to ascribe to him the most noble and generous dispositions, and those qualities that are the most remote from everything that is private, narrow and sordid? Ans. 1.This answer, drafted in Miscell. no. 1208, was directed to that entry's formulation of a first objection to the supposition that God is the supreme arbiter. It might be fit for a third party to determine that God should be the supreme object of respect and be his own last end. But if God is the determiner, "it might show a noble generosity" in him to "forego his own right and make the good of his creatures his last end"; to determine otherwise "in his own cause... would look like selfishness in him in his actions to prefer himself to all other beings." That was the objection framed, after which follow the words of ans. 1 above. Ans. 2 and 3 have no parallel in this Miscellany. Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. If by selfishness be meant a disposition in any being to regard himself, this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account than as it is a disposition that don't agree with the nature of things, and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in anyone to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself. But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable Being;First ed., lowercase. then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them: and so 'tis fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures. Ans. 2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good: at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That which this person looks upon as his interest may interfere with or oppose the general good. Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public. But this can't be with respect to the Supreme Being, the Author and Head of the whole system: on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart and vitals of the natural body should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God who is omniscient should apprehend the matter thus; viz. his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole. Ans. 3. God's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, or any possibility of being so, that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fullness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition that inclines him to delight in his glory causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communications of it. This is a natural conclusion. If there were any person of such taste and disposition of mind that the brightness and light of the sun seemed unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself: but they that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused and communicated through the world. Here by the way it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect, viz. that whereas they speak against the doctrine of God's making himself his own highest and last end, as though this were an ignoble selfishness in God: when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings; inasmuch as he is the highest Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others— yetFirst ed. begins new sentence. with regard to creatures, who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at least) suppose that they necessarily at all times seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtuous actions: and that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all virtue and everything that is morally good and excellent in them.JE's turning of this objection against the objector, in the foregoing "by the way" paragraph, can be found in at least two places in the "Miscellanies." In No. 1080. GOD'S GLORY THE END OF CREATION (c. 1745), an entry otherwise entirely devoted to listing scriptures concerning "glory," and marked for use (in Ch. II, Sec. III below), the counterargument from inconsistency, briefly stated in terms of the "ignoble selfishness" of love of "one's own" happiness, is surrounded by horizontal and vertical markings, i.e., by a bottomless rectangle at the end of the entry. JE's most complete statement of this argument— a line along the left margin indicating its use— was Miscell. no. 1182. END OF CREATION. GLORY OF GOD, c. 1751. Obj. 3. To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end in this way, viz. in seeking that his glory and excellent perfection should be known, esteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God.The previous objection was that a god who glories in himself communicated would be unworthy because selfish. Obj. 3. is not the same. Now the charge is that a god who glories in making his perfections known, esteemed, and loved would be unworthy because ignoble, or lacking in "greatness of soul." For greatness of soul as a fruit of charity, see Charity, pp. 199–201. It is considered as below a truly great man to be much influenced in his conduct by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise. How much more is it unworthy the great God to perform his magnificent works, e.g. the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust: that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher. This objection is specious. It hath a show of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a show, if we consider Ans. 1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself, and so to take pleasure in its existence. It seems not liable to any doubt that there could be nothing future, or no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If when the world was not there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and love of it must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise is in some actual knowledge and exercise of will. And certainly the most excellent actual knowledge and will that can be in the creature is the knowledge and the love of God.Join this passage with pp. 441, 442, 443 of Sec. III above, text at nn. 5, 6, and 1. For commentary on both passages, see Intro., pp. 21–22. Knowledge of God and love of God are God's. Just as an archangel is further removed from nonentity than a worm (True Virtue, Ch. I, p. 546 below, n. 6), so regenerate being, the "new creation," is further removed from nonentity than the old. If the new being in whose being dwells God's effectually communicated knowledge, love, joy, was the original ultimate end for which God created the world, then it seems God can never be and at no time was without creatures. The new creation is also continual creation; and for this the first was made. And the most true excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence; and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love and a delight in his glory. If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or anything that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine glory is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation. If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be considered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others' esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others' esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself. If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem and honor of himself. The matter may be also cleared by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e.g. our nation or country. It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; that is, on supposition it becomes God to love himself as well as it does men to love a friend or the public, which I think has been before proved. Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. (1) That in God the love of himself, and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man, because God's beingFirst ed., word capitalized. as it were comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himself must be so likewise. (2) In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, can't be a distinct thing from the love of himself— becauseFirst ed. begins a new sentence. the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holiness does primarily and chiefly consist,Cf. Charity, Sermon One, and True Virtue, Ch. II. and God's own holiness must primarily consist in the love of himself, as was before observed. And if God's holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of and pleasedness with the esteem and love of him in others. For a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. that loves himself, necessarily loves LoveHere (and below) I retain the capitalization of the first ed., despite my judgment that this tends to reify what was for JE more interrelational, consensual, dynamic. to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature. Virtue by such of the late philosophersThis is the first of several similar plural references in the Two Dissertations. In this instance JE approves and uses what those "late philosophers" say. In the second dissertation, he designates collectively writers whose views he opposes. In either case, it would have been uncharacteristic of JE not to name a particular author if he had him alone or mainly in mind. See below, True Virtue, p. 541, at n. 3. as seem to be in chief repute is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise than as it is implied in or arises fromThe expressions "implied in" and "arises from" as a tendency occur twice more in the next paragraph. See above, pp. 436, 438, nn. 2, 3. I venture to suggest— in searching out JE's meaning— that the reader ponder the comparison with Augustine's description of the virtues as forms of love arising from whatever sort of love is in the heart. The expression "forms of" occurs in On the Morals of the Catholic Church, ch. XV; "arising from," in ch. XXV. See p. 55, n. 8. this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves Love to the public. Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect Universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the Divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself; and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he makes virtue his end he makes himself his end. In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself: and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works. I would here observe by the way that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; and that it supposeth too much selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight in himself: this will contradict a former objectionObj. 1. against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself.I. e., in separation from delight in the creatures' happiness and holiness. The sentence states the "former objection," obj. 1. For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections they must be inconsistent with themselves. Ans. 2. In answer to the objection we are upon, as to God's creatures whose esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity, IFirst ed. begins new sentence. would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honor and glory. They who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world, but that all that he had any ultimate regard to was the happiness of his creatures; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself his last end; do it under a color of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures. But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved: so, that God should take pleasure in the creature's just love and esteem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself; and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem: because he loves not because he needs them. Ans. 3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace: I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humor, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded. But 'tis not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind,On "greatness of mind," see the text of obj. 3 above and Intro., p. 73. And recall JE's denial in Charity, Sermon Six, despite Philippians 2:5–8 in Scripture, that humility was a virtue of Christ in his divine nature; and his use instead of "condescension" or "not grudging" of God and Christ, and to characterize the disposition of the higher saints above toward those lower, in Sermon Fifteen. Obj. 4. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the freenessEd. italics. of his goodness, in his beneficence to his creatures; and from their obligations to gratitudeEd. italics. On the moral determination of an act of will in God, JE responded to Isaac Watts— on both these counts— in Freedom of the Will, in Works, 1, 393–96. for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his fullness, makes himself, and not the creatures, his end; then what good he does, he does for himself, and not for them; for his own sake, and not theirs. Ans. God and the creature, in this affair of the emanation of the divine fullness, are not properly set in opposition; or made the opposite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creature's good to be spoken of as if they were properly and entirely distinct, as they are in the objection. This supposeth that God's having respect to his glory and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: that God's communicating his fullness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a proper disjunction and opposition. Whereas if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above us, 'tis probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwise: and that these things, instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied one in the other.On the implication of one thing in another (here and in the next sentence), see above, p. 436, n. 2, and p. 438, n. 3. That God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures: becauseFirst ed. begins new sentence. the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creature. And that in communicating his fullness for them, he does it for himself: becauseFirst ed. begins new sentence. their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God's glory: God in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, i.e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fullness), he seeks their glory and happiness. This will the better appear if we consider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in his creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness during the whole of the designed eternal duration of the world he was about to create: which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with himself, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz. with respect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally progressive union and communion with him; so the creature must be viewed as in infinite strict union with himself. In this view it appears that God's respect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both regards are like two lines which seem at the beginning to be separate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the same center. And as to the good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, it must be viewed as infinite; and so not only being some communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infinite fullness. The nearer anything comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it can't be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory. The Apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, Ephesians 5:25 to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church as coinciding with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him. Thus "husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it... that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself... even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones."Ephesians 5:25–33 and "fullness" (Colossians 1:19 and Colossians 2:9, with Ephesians 4:13) were subordinate only to John 12 and John 17 as anchorage in Scripture for JE's constant view that the redemption of his people was God's original end in creation. "It perhaps was thus: God created the world for his Son, that he might prepare a spouse or bride for him to bestow his love upon; so that the mutual joys between this bride and bridegroom are the end of creation." Miscell. no. 271. END OF CREATION (c. 1726–27). This early entry is one of many in which JE probes goodness as a propensity of the divine nature that delights in communicating happiness to his creatures. Still, the entry ends with the words: "Colossians 1:16, ‘All things were made by him and for him, that is, for the Son.’" See also Miscell. no. 702 (c. 1735) for an extraordinary elaboration of the creation of Eve as a type of Christ's church. Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's seeking the good of the creatures, or in his disposition to communicate of his own fullness to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation. God's disposition to communicate good, or to cause his own infinite fullness to flow forth, is not the less properly called God's goodness, because the good that he communicates, is something of himself; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no less benefit by it; neither has such a disposition less of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit; or the less of a tendency to love to the creature, when the creature comes to exist. Nor is this disposition in God to communicate of and diffuse his own good the less excellent because it is implied in his love and regard to himself. For his love to himself don't imply it any otherwise but as it impliesThis is the fourth variant of "implied in" in this paragraph alone. The notion of one thing being implied in the nature of another has been employed a total of thirteen times since it was introduced at the beginning of Sec. III. Nine of these instances are in the present section, where also the fullest use is made of "participation." a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's glory is in itself worthy and excellent, and so God delights in it: and his delight in this excellent thing is implied in his love to himself, or his own fullness; because that is the fountain, and so the sum and comprehension of everything that is excellent. And the matter standing thus, 'tis evident that these things cannot derogate from the excellency of this disposition in God, to an emanation of his own fullness, or communication of good to the creature. Nor does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, i.e. from regard to himself, or delight in his own glory, at all diminish the freeness of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear if we consider particularly in what ways doing good to others from self-love may be inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence. And I conceive there are only these two ways, 1. When any does good to another from confined self-love, that is opposite to a general benevolence. This kind of self-love is properly called selfishness. In some sense, the most benevolent generous person in the world seeks his own happiness in doing good to others, because he places his happiness in their good.The notion of "placing" one's happiness in the good of another was used by JE in Charity, Sermons Seven and Fifteen. Here the context is that of "partaking with them" in their good and happiness; participation was a concept also used in "Heaven Is a World of Love." Just as JE brought into play the Pauline notion of "fullness" in Ch. I, not yet elaborated in its biblical association with "glory," so "participation" or "partaking" has yet to be given biblical background and meaning. This must surely be 2 Peter 1:4, that by the "exceeding and precious promises" given us, "ye might be made partakers of the divine nature" (Ed. italics). See Charity, Sermon One, p. 133, and n. 1; the discussion of participation in App. III, for JE's defense of his use of this notion of "participation in the divine nature" in Religious Affections; and Related Correspondence. But now, with respect to the Divine Being,First ed., lowercase. there is no such thing as such confined selfishness in him, or a love to himself, opposite to general benevolence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own essence. The first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, Being in general; and comprehends universal existence, as was observed before. God in his benevolence to his creatures, can't have his heart enlarged in such a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of himself, distinct and independent. This can't be in an infinite being, who exists alone from eternity. But he, from his goodness, as it were enlarges himself in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffusing himself; and so instead of finding, making objects of his benevolence: not by taking into himself what he finds distinct from himself, and so partaking of their good, and being happy in them; but by flowing forth, and expressing himself in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himself expressed in them, and communicated to them. 2. Another thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or desire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not self-moved, but as it were, constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shown already that God's making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no dependence; but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficience. And I would here observe that there is something in that disposition in God to communicate goodness which shows him to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and self-moved in their goodness but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited by some object that they find: something appearing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God being all and alone is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutely from within himself, not finding anything, or any object to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the overflowing of his fullness. These things show that the supposition of God's making himself his last end, in the manner spoken of, don't at all diminish the creature's obligation to gratitude for communications of good it receives. For if it lessen its obligation, it must be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not so much benefit by it; or, that the disposition it flows from is not proper goodness, not having so direct a tendency to the creature's benefit; or that the disposition is not so virtuous and excellent in its kind; or that the beneficence is not so free. But it has been observed that none of these things take place with regard to that disposition which has been supposed to have excited God to create the world. I confess there is a degree of indistinctness and obscurityThese words and paragraph should be taken quite seriously. A comparison of the single ans. to obj. 4. with the final section of Ch. II below (actually a conclusion to the entire dissertation) will show that JE already has his position in place from what reason teaches. It is true that this has been because of ample use of biblical notions like "fullness" and "participation"— somewhat stripped down to philosophical concepts. Still, it is the case that what Scripture teaches will add— beyond its language of "glory," "name," and "praise"— only the distinctness and clarity, and the surety of guidance, that JE claims at this point. in the close consideration of such subjects, and a great imperfection in the expressions we use concerning them; arising unavoidably from the infinite sublimity of the subject, and the incomprehensibleness of those things that are divine. Hence revelation is the surest guideSee n. 7 above. in these matters, and what that teaches shall in the next place be considered. Nevertheless, the endeavors used to discover what the voice of reason is, so far as it can go, may serve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils insisted on by many; and to satisfy us that what the Word of God says of the matter, is not unreasonable; and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquiescence in the instructions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine sense of words and expressions we find often used there concerning this subject.
Jonathan Edwards [1749], Ethical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 8) , Ed. Paul Ramsey [word count] [jec-wjeo08]. |
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