The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University
Jonathan Edwards [1749], Ethical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 8) , Ed. Paul Ramsey [word count] [jec-wjeo08].
DISSERTATION II: The Nature of True Virtue
CHAPTER I. SHOWING WHEREIN THE ESSENCE OF TRUE VIRTUE CONSISTS
WHATEVER controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (excepting some skeptics who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty or excellency. 'Tis not all beauty that is called virtue; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow: but some beauty belonging to beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. See above, Dissertation I, Intro., p. 413, n. 6. that have perception and will. 'Tis not all beauty of mankind that is called virtue; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original seat in the mind. But yet perhaps not everything that may be called a beauty of mind is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation. There is something in the ideas and conceptions of great philosophers and statesmen that may be called beautiful, which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature, i.e. such as are attended with desert or worthiness of praise or blame. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not anything belonging merely to speculation; but to the disposition and will, or (to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) to the "heart." Therefore I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion when I say that virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from them. So that when it is inquired, what is the nature of true virtue? this is the same as to inquire, what that is which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly beautiful? IFirst ed., no par. use the phrase "true" virtue, and speak of things "truly" beautiful, because I suppose it will generally be allowed that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, through a partial and imperfect view of things; that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circumstances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehensive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connections in the universality of things. ThereFirst ed., no par. is a general and a particular beauty. By a "particular" beauty I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connection with, and tendency to some particular things within a limited and, as it were, a private sphere. And a "general" beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with everything it stands related to. The former may be without and against the latter. As a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious; which, when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sounds they are connected with, may be very discordant and disagreeable. (Of which more afterwards.)See the discussion of private and universal systems and affections, Ch. II below, pp. 554–60. That only, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is that, belonging to the heart of an intelligent being,First ed., word capitalized. that is beautiful by a general beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view as it is in itself, and as related to everything that it stands in connection with. And therefore when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz. wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does most essentially consist, this is my answer to the inquiry— True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will.I take "consent, propensity and union of heart" to be JE's definition of "benevolence." See below, p. 543, nn. 7, 3; p. 544, n. 1. The things which were before observed of the nature of true virtue naturally lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general goodness and beauty of the disposition and exercise of that, in the most comprehensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related to everything that it stands in connection with; what can it consist in, but a consent and good will to Being in general? Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent beingFirst ed., word capitalized. is some way related to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole? If any such thing can be supposed as an union of heart to some particular being,First ed., word capitalized. or number of beings,First ed., word capitalized. disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of beings,First ed., word capitalized. which are but a small part of the whole; not implying a tendency to an union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards Being in general; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true virtue: although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things. But of this more afterwards.On private, confined affections see below, Ch. II, pp. 554–60. It is abundantly plain by the Holy Scriptures, and generally allowed not only by Christian divines but by the more considerable Deists, that virtue most essentially consists in love. And I suppose, it is owned by the most considerable writers to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection:For a similar neutral or favorable reference in the plural to "late philosophers" on benevolence, see above, Dissertation I, p. 456, at n. 9. Collective references to come in this second dissertation are in contexts that oppose the views of those writers. though, it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained; which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses on this subject. When I say, true virtue consists in love to Being in general, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue but what has Being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object: so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular being,First ed., word capitalized. that is but a small part of this whole, has anything of the nature of true virtue. But, that the nature of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards Being in general: though,First ed. begins new sentence. from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder that he who is of a generally benevolent disposition should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons,First ed., word capitalized. whom he is acquainted and conversant with, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper. But my meaning is that no affections towards particular persons, or beings,First ed., word capitalized. are of the nature of true virtue but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists a disposition to love Being in general. And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers that when I speak of an intelligent being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. having a heart united and benevolently disposed to Being in general, I thereby mean intelligent Being in general. Not inanimate things, or beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. that have no perception or will, which are not properly capable objects of benevolence. Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence. Love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being,First ed., word capitalized. which causes it to incline to its well-being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, 'tis agreeable to the common opinion that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity: but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is generally supposed not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation of God's benevolence; as 'tis supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both beingFirst ed., word capitalized. and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to being,First ed., word capitalized. which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a propensity not only to beingFirst ed., word capitalized. actually existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible being,First ed., word capitalized. so as to incline him to give being,First ed., word capitalized. beauty and happiness. But not now to insist particularly on this— what I would have observed at present is that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.In the first dissertation, neither "goodness" nor "benevolence" was the term finally favored in referring to God's disposition to create being. There, JE's discussion of benevolence was mainly in connection with his first treatment of any length of "fullness." See above, Dissertation I, p. 438, text at n. 4. In its connection with fullness, God's love of benevolence was said to have both a "larger" and a "stricter" sense. In its larger sense, God's benevolence signifies nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate his own fullness in general, and "to give creatures existence in order to it." God's love or benevolence taken more strictly signifies that general disposition directed to "particular objects." The latter presupposes an existing object; the former does not. To trace the fullness of God's love back to him, the second dissertation must again modify the meaning of the familiar loves of benevolence and complacence. What is commonly called love of complacence presupposes beauty, forFirst ed. begins new sentence. it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the person or beingFirst ed., word capitalized. beloved for his beauty. If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent being,First ed., word capitalized. and virtue consists in love, then it is a plain inconsistence to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation.This statement seems quite enigmatic. Does not clarity call for: "the beauty of an object has benevolence for its foundation" (which then complacence esteems)? I suggest that JE's meaning is that benevolence has its foundation in its object's beauty in an obtained state, or when actualized. The beauty of an object may be to be bestowed (which is the objective and foundation of benevolence) while that of complacence is beauty in the object. Complacence delights in present moral beauty; benevolence has the future moral beauty of an object as its foundation. (Only intelligent being is a capable subject or a capable object of either sort of love.) virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cause of the very beginning or first beingFirst ed., word capitalized. of virtue: whichFirst ed. begins a new sentence. makes the first virtue both the ground and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself. Doubtless virtue primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be inquired what that virtue is, which virtue consists in the love of the love of, it must be answered, 'tis the love of virtue. So that there must be the love of the love of the love of virtue, and so on in infinitum. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation. For 'tis without beginning and hangs on nothing. Therefore, if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in love, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because 'tis absurd to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.So both familiar loves are "run out of the world." For another instance of JE's standard argument in the matter of virtue, see Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, in Works, 1 (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1957), 33–34. See also Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook, in Works, 3 (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1970), 224–25, written in the same period as Two Dissertations: here, the main use JE made of Francis Hutcheson on men's affections to moral good was to mold quotations from him into a similar reductio ad absurdum argument against George Turnbull. See App. II. Nor can virtue primarily consist in gratitude; or one being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistence. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude that is the cause of gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, can't be gratitude. Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion than that the primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered; or that true virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular beings,First ed., word capitalized. because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to Being simply considered; exciting "absolute Benevolence" (if I may so call it) to Being in general.First ed.: absolute Benevolence. I use quotation marks to indicate that this is an expression referred to as an expression. It is also a "term of art" to be given the meaning JE gives it in context. is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence.There is, for example, true virtue in consent to benevolent Being. This is the second object of virtuous benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth on this subject in the following particulars. The first object of a virtuous benevolence is Being, simply considered: and if Being, simply considered, be its object, then Being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of Being in general. And it will seek the good of every individual beingFirst ed., word capitalized. unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of Being in general. In which case the good of a particular being,First ed., word capitalized. or some beings,First ed., word capitalized. may be given up for the sake of the highest good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. that is looked upon as statedly and irreclaimably opposite and an enemy to Being in general, then consent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forsake that being,First ed., word capitalized. and to oppose it.In JE's "Book on Controversies" there is a lengthy section entitled "The Nature of True Virtue" (c. 1754), MS pp. 180–88. This was JE's penultimate draft of his second dissertation. See Intro., pp. 7–12 above. And further, if Being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being who has most of being,First ed., word capitalized. or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. is exhibited to our faculties or set in our view, will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart. I say "other things being equal" especially because there is a secondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take notice of presently, whichFirst ed. begins new sentence. is one thing that must be considered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its firstEd. italics. Miscell. no. 1070 (c. 1745) defines "pure benevolence" as furthest from benefit to self and not moved by attractiveness or worth in the object. exercise is nothing else but being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. I take the next word, "uniting," to be a gerund, not a participle modifying "consent." uniting, consent, or propensity to Being; appearing true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general highest good, and to each being,First ed., word capitalized. whose welfare is consistent with the highest general good, in proportion to the degree of existenceI say "in proportion to the degree of existence"because one being may have more existence than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is great has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little. One being may have everything positive belonging to it, or everything which goes to its positive existence (in opposition to defect) in an higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in an higher degree. An Archangel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from nonentity, than a worm or a flea.— JE's Footnote. The second object of a virtuous propensity of heart is benevolent being.First ed., word capitalized. A secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object. When anyone under the influence of general benevolenceEarlier usages of "general benevolence" or moral beauty were not fully defined. See above p. 544, n. 1. This requires the addition of the second object of a virtuous heart, and the rest of Ch. I. See Intro., pp. 27–31. sees another beingFirst ed., word capitalized. possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence: because so far as the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. beloved has love to Being in general, so far his own beingFirst ed., word capitalized. is, as it were, enlarged; extends to, and in some sort comprehends, Being in general: and therefore he that is governed by love to Being in general, must of necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence,The loves of complacence and of benevolence in their ordinary meanings, and gratitude, fall into place within the second object of virtuous "benevolence," i.e., love to benevolent Being. As with gratitude, both those loves are excluded from the primary essential meaning of true virtue. Concerning benevolence to benevolent beings, see also Charity, Sermon Seven, p. 257, n. 1. that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. 'Tis because his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to Being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. in whom it is; an excellency that renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good will.The foregoing explication of the second object of true benevolence was substantially drafted in "Controversies," MS p. 183. Also, par. 1–6 just below in our present text are differently organized under five numbers in the draft, MS pp. 183–85. Although introduced by identical words, these paragraphs are so similar that to note differences would be both superfluous and too wearisome. After the final of these elaborations, JE began a series of five corollaries— the first on conscience or moral sense. See Ch. V below. After that first corollary, he added a sixth particular, marked to be continuous with the 1–5 numbered "Controversies"— draft of par. 1–6 below in our text. The topic of this par. 6 was "some kind of love to some virtues," viz. justice and gratitude, which men may have from other principles than pure benevolence (MS p. 185). When this sixth particular (not here paralleled) is joined with a one-line note to himself, "method show how all virtues are derived from pure benevolence" (MS p. 188), we have in the "Controversies"— draft JE's "two sources of morality"— two sources of the same correctly named virtues— elaborated below in Ch. VII on why ordinary morality is so often mistaken for true virtue. Resuming the series of corollaries, nos. 2–4 are different versions of the impartial arbiter's reasoning, i.e., one main theme of End of Creation: God, "being infinitely the greatest and best of beings comprehending within himself infinitely the most being and the most virtue, it would appear that he had not that principle of absolute benevolence to being in general and love to true virtue if he did not love himself more than all other beings" (corol. 3, p. 186). corol. 5 says the same for true virtue on the creature's part. The remainder of this draft treats anger, gratitude, pity (familial kind affections are omitted), moral good and happiness, self-love, benevolence, moral sense, sense of justice, conscience. But several things may be noted more particularly concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love. 1. That loving a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. on this ground necessarily arises from pure benevolence to Being in general, and comes to the same thing. For he that has a simple and pure good will to general entity or existence must love that temper in others that agrees and conspires with itself. A spirit of consent to Being must agree with consent to Being.Perhaps JE meant here to say something metaphysical or general about "being consenting to being." I retain the capitalization of the first ed., however, because "consent to Being must agree with consent to Being" supports the argument that benevolence as the secondary object of a truly virtuous mind "arises from" and "comes to the same thing" as pure or absolute benevolence to Being in general. In the passage above, "general Entity or Existence," "same Thing" and "it Self are exceptions to the first ed. 's use of lowercase for common nouns, ordinarily varying from this only, if erratically, in the case of "being." That which truly and sincerely seeks the good of others must approve of, and love, that which joins with him in seeking the good of others. 2. This which has been now mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous love is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual beauty primarily consists. Yea, spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and the various qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all true virtue, viz. in this love of Being, and the qualities and acts which arise from it. 3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous principles and acts, so 'tis primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply consent and union with Being in general. This is the primary and most essential beauty of everything that can justly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I say "the primary and most essential beauty" because there is a secondary and inferior sort of beauty; which I shall take notice of afterwards. 4. This spiritual beauty, that is but a secondary ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground not only of benevolence but complacence, and is the primary ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous.In this dense sentence, complacence takes on enhanced meaning, in that it has its primary ground in union of heart with benevolent Being "when the complacence is truly virtuous." Need we affirm for JE an implicit definition of a "pure" or "absolute" complacence? The next sentence removes "love to us in particular, or delight in kindness received, from JE's primary understanding (if I read particulars 2–4 correctly) of spiritual beauty or true virtue. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground: but this is the primary objective foundation of it. 5. It must be noted, that the degree of the amiableness or valuableness of true virtue, primarily consisting in consent and a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by such a spirit, is not in the simple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatness of the benevolent being,First ed., word capitalized. or the degree of beingFirst ed., word capitalized. and the degree of benevolence. One that loves Being in general will necessarily value good will to Being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he sees the same benevolence in two beings,First ed., word capitalized. he will value it more in two than in one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to have two beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. to favor it than only one of them. For there is more beingFirst ed., word capitalized. that favors being:First ed., word capitalized. both together having more beingFirst ed., word capitalized. than one alone. So, if one beingFirst ed., word capitalized. be as great as two, has as much existence as both together, and has the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favorable to BeingIn this instance, "being in general" is lowercase in the first ed. in general than if there were general benevolence in a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. that had but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same degree of preciousness, i.e. with the same excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal. 6. It is impossible that anyone should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, who has not that temper himself. I have observed that if any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. JE "observed" this in par. 1 above. is possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with the same temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonstrated that 'tis such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish such a spirit. For if a being,First ed., word capitalized. destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to Being in general, it would prize and seek that which it had no value for. Because to love an inclination to the good of Being in general would imply a loving and prizing the good of Being in general. For how should one love and value a disposition to a thing, or a tendency to promote a thing, and for that very reason, because it tends to promote it— when the thing itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, nor desires to have promoted?The movement of this chapter's argument, in its essential details, is analyzed above, Intro., pp. 27–33.
CHAPTER II. SHOWING HOW THAT LOVE WHEREIN TRUE VIRTUE CONSISTS RESPECTS THE DIVINE BEING AND CREATED BEINGS
FROM what has been said, 'tis evident that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God; the Being of beings,First ed., word capitalized. infinitely the greatest and best of beings.First ed., word capitalized. The internal argument of this chapter requires us to treat "Being itself, simply considered" and "Being in general" (and variants) as direct, respectful, or devout references to God, not as a metaphysical property or generality. See p. 421 above, n. 5; Intro, above, pp. 116–19, Ch. VIII, p. 621 below, n. 8. This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love. It was observed that the first objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue consists, is Being, simply considered: and as a necessary consequence of this, that beingFirst ed., word capitalized. who has the most of being,First ed., word capitalized. or the greatest share of universal existence, has proportionably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such a beingFirst ed., word capitalized. is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest being.First ed., word capitalized. This reference treats God comparatively as a being among beings, even though "highest." So that all other being,First ed., word capitalized. even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being. And if we consider the secondary ground of love, viz. beauty or moral excellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greatest being,First ed., word capitalized. so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of the diffused beams of that BeingHere in the text JE begins to mass his images around the word being, and to replace the usage of that word in Ch. I with the word God. who hath an infinite fullness of brightness and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. upon both those accounts mentioned, viz. the degree of his virtue and the greatness of the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. possessed of this virtue. And God has sufficiently exhibited himself, in his being,First ed., word capitalized. his infinite greatness and excellency: and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering immense superiority to all other beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. in these respects. Therefore he that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous being,First ed., word capitalized. Note that both benevolence and complacence have moral beauty/virtuous being as object; and that in supreme love to God these loves coincide. Cf. "Controversies"— draft, MS p. 189:
If it should be objected that virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper objects of our benevolence; inasmuch as our goodness extendeth not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him. To this I answer, 1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised, not only in seeking to promote the happiness of the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. towards whom it is exercised, but also in rejoicing in his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavors to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor; but also, if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his prosperity. 2. Though we are not able to give anything to God, which we have of our own, independently; yet we may be the instruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true and proper delight. (As was shown at large in the former treatise on God's End in Creating the World, Ch. I, Sec. IV. Whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.)Brackets in the first ed. I judge from this and subsequent internal references to the "former treatise" that JE intended End of Creation to be read first, and presupposed its argument and conclusion in all that he says in True Virtue. Another bracketed reference to the first dissertation is in the present chapter, p. 557 below, at n. 2. I use parentheses to avoid confusion with my editorial insertions. These internal references to End of Creation do not function as footnotes. Instead, they emphatically cut short an argument, directing the reader to a more complete exposition that would need to be repeated here if the reader did not have it fully in mind. JE did not include these references among his own footnotes, which are connected with the text by asterisks. See Intro., p. 7 above. Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet is there any that owns the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no benevolence is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then for the same reason, neither is gratitude to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us; because we cannot requite him. But where is the man who believes a God and a providence that will say this? There seems to be an inconsistence in some writersSee Ch. I, p. 541 above, n. 3. on morality, in this respect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the created
system the head of the system, and the chief part of it; if it be proper to call him a part who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.JE's argument concerning this "inconsistence in some writers on morality" is essentially that of the impartial arbiter. See Dissertation I, pp. 421–26 above, Intro., pp. 41–47 above, and the measuring of humility by God's greatness and goodness in Charity, Sermon Six. But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something further to make it plain that love to God is most essential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatsoever to other beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. can be of the nature of true virtue, without it. And therefore let it be supposed that some beings,First ed., word capitalized. by natural instinct or by some other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a particular person or private system,It may be here noted that when hereafter I use a phrase as "private system of beings," or others similar, I thereby intend any system or society of beings that contains but a small part of the great system comprehending the universality of existence. I think that may well be called a "private system" which is but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection "private affection" which is limited to so narrow a circle; and that "general affection" or "benevolence" which has Being in general for its object.— JE's Footnote. This is allowed by all with regard to self-love, in which good will is confined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons why any other private affection or good will, though extending to a society of persons, independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person. However, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why private affections, or good will limited to a particular circle of beings,First ed., word capitalized. falling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. 1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on it, as the case may be, will be against general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will set a person against general existence, and make him an enemy to it. As it is with selfishness,I. e., "self-love" as just defined, very narrowly: "good will confined to one single person only." or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the public good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view that suit his personal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public. On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and sordid. But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still, to a larger circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general; his private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz. to pursue the interest of its particular object in opposition to general existence: which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue is its favoring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible that it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination directly contrary to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists. 2. Private affection,First ed., plural "affections." if not subordinate in general affection, is not only liable, as the case may be, to issue in enmity to Being in general, but has a tendency to it, as the case certainly is and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to regard to Being in general, sets up its particular or limited object above Being in general; and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another prince as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently published that the supreme, infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure (as we must suppose it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world), then a consciousness of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably excite enmity and fix us in a stated opposition to the Supreme Being. This demonstrates that affection to a private society or system, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this would be absurd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue and yet at the same time has a tendency opposite to true virtue. 3. Not only would affection to a private system, unsubordinate to regard to Being in general, have a tendency to opposition to the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become itself an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in its nature, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and sets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely superior in itself and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private, infinitely inferior object: which is to treat it with great contempt and truly to act in opposition to it, and to act in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest; making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an interest infinitely inferior. This is to act against it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a subject, and exalts him above his prince, sets him as supreme instead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince. From these things, I think, it is manifest that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending system. And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God, the Supreme and Infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue. From hence also it is evident that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in love to himself, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another.This reference to the love in the innertrinitarian life of God is not a casual remark. Not only must God be the chief part of morality if he is any part of it, since he has both supreme greatness and goodness; it is also the case that for JE the love in the Trinity is the paradigm of all virtuous love. Between the Father and the Son, what JE calls "absolute benevolence" and what we may call "absolute complacence" are perfect and the same. "It appears that there must be more than a unity in infinite and eternal essence, otherwise the goodness of God can have no perfect exercise... Wherefore if this goodness be perfect, this delight must be perfect; because goodness and this delight are the same. But this delight is not perfect, except it be equal to the highest delight of that being; that is, except his inclination to communicate happiness be equal to his inclination to be happy himself... [W]herefore, God must have a perfect exercise of his goodness, and therefore must have the fellowship of a person equal with himself." Miscell. no. 96. TRINITY (c. 1723–24). There is no need of multiplying words to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue in its most essential nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards Being in general; and so flowing out to particular beings,First ed., word capitalized. in a greater or lesser degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty which they are possessed of. It will also follow from the foregoing things that God's goodness and love to created beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. is derived from and subordinate to his love to himself. (In what manner it is so, I have endeavored in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of God's End in Creating the World.)See p. 552 above, n. 3. JE is probably referring to Ch. II, Sec. V— VII of Dissertation I. If, however, the reference is in support of the entire preceding paragraph rather than only the immediately preceding sentence, the citation would be the entirety of Dissertation I, which he supposed in either event would come to the reader bound in one volume with Dissertation II. With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in created beings,First ed., word capitalized. one to another, is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by a proper consideration of what has been said; that it is sufficient to render love to any created beingFirst ed., word capitalized. virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely. Because it appears from what has been already observed, all that love to particular beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. which is the fruit of a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing. Therefore, if love to a created beingFirst ed., word capitalized. comes from that temper or propensity of the heart, it is virtuous. However,First ed., no paragraph. every particular exercise of love to a creature may not sensibly arise from any exercise of love to God, or an explicit consideration of any similitude, conformity, union or relation to God in the creature beloved.The stress is on "sensibly." Still, this is a somewhat puzzling claim, in view of JE's belief that there is only one work of divine love in the heart going out to God and to our fellow creatures, and in view of his statement that, while a perception of secondary beauty requires no knowledge of acoustics, harmony, etc., what makes primary, spiritual beauty "grateful is perceiving the union itself," or an "immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies that is pleasing to the virtuous mind" (Ch. III below, p. 566). The most proper evidence of love to a created being,First ed., word capitalized. its arising from that temper of mind wherein consists a supreme propensity of heart to God, seems to be the agreeableness of the kind and degree of our love to God's end in our creation and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exercises of our love, in their manner, order, and measure, with the manner in which God himself exercises love to the creature in the creation and government of the world, and the way in which God as the first cause and supreme disposer of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supreme end.The sentence above takes the measure of truly virtuous love of fellow creatures to be its "coincidence"— its perfect alignment in manner, order, or degree— with "the manner in which God himself exercises love to the creature... in subordination to himself as his own supreme end." In the remainder of this paragraph and the next, men's highest excellency or true goodness is "involved in" and essentially the same as their supreme love to God, and their love of another creature in subordination to that. Thus the contours of human virtue are to the shape of the divine event of creation, providence, redemption. The "coincidence" is that of convex human action to the concave of God's exercise of love. Otherwise expressed, human virtue or holiness is the mirror image of God's holiness. We may understand the "subordination" spoken of above as a reflection of an internal subordination within God's end in creation. Thus there was an internal coincidence of God's respect to himself ("for his glory") and his disposition to the creature's good ("for his mercy's sake") in the final Sec. VII of Ch. II of End of Creation (see esp. p. 526, n. 2). Still God's end is "but one." Similarly, there is a kind of manifoldness, and a kind of subordination within the twofoldness, of that love to God which disposes persons who are truly virtuous. If this is a correct reading, the present dissertation is quite consistent with the charity sermons' "but one" principle of divine love in heart and life going out to God and neighbor. "Subordination" cannot mean that one should love God first, and then a fellow creature; and the subordination in the first dissertation, of which this is the mirror image, cannot mean that God loves himself more than he communicates himself to creatures. For the true virtue of created beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. is doubtless their highest excellency, and their true goodness, and that by which they are especially agreeable to the mind of their Creator. But the true goodness of a thing (as was observed before) must be its agreeableness to its end, or its fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Or, at least, this must be its goodness in the eyes of the workman. Therefore they are good moral agents whose temper of mind or propensity of heart is agreeable to the end for which God made moral agents. But, as has been shown, the last end for which God has made moral agents must be the last end for which God has made all things: it being evident that the moral world is the end of the rest of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.Without expressly citing End of Creation, as in the two bracketed references above in the first ed., JE here is evidently applying the lengthy argument and conclusions of the first dissertation to his analysis of the nature of true virtue. He cannot have intended the passage just above and the following paragraph to be read first, and only afterward its fuller elaboration and demonstration from reason and Scripture. See Intro., p. 7 above. By these things it appears that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the sovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things seek the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end: consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communications of the infinite fullness of God to the creature; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expressions of these.See End of Creation, p. 531, text, and n. 7. And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created beings,First ed., word capitalized. it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him. And that temper or disposition of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to Being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue, truly so called; or in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue. Corol. Hence it appears that these schemes of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the foundation and all other virtues handled in a connection with this, and in a subordination to this, are no true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of that are not attended with a love to God, which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them. And it may be asserted in general that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last;Near the beginning of this chapter, allusion to Romans 11:36 and Hebrews 2:10 was emphasized by italics in the first ed. See above, p. 551, n. 8. Now, at the end of the chapter, the words in italics reflect other verses of Scripture that framed the first dissertation: "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last," Revelation 1:11; "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last," Revelation 22:13. or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.
CHAPTER III. CONCERNING THE SECONDARY AND INFERIOR KIND OF BEAUTY
THOUGH this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual beings:First ed., word capitalized. this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear and comprehensive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. that have understanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles of action, that often obtain the epithet of "virtuous" and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue: which, are entirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue— as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be observed in this and the following chapters.I. e., Chs. III– VI, where four "principles" of common morality are examined. That consent, agreement, or union of beingFirst ed., word capitalized. to being,First ed., word capitalized. which has been spoken of, viz. the union or propensity of minds to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty that is to be found among things that exist: being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual and moral beings,First ed., word capitalized. See below, p. 564, n. 9. which are the highest and first part of the universal system for whose sake all the rest has existence.By the reasoning of position 4, Dissertation I, Ch. II, Sec. II. Yet there is another, inferior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual beings,First ed., word capitalized. but is found even in inanimate things: which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipse. Such is the agreement of the colors, figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chintz, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr. Hutcheson, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety: whichFirst ed. begins new sentence. is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, etc."The Figures which excite in us the Ideas of Beauty, seem to be those in which there is Uniformity amidst Variety... But what we call Beautiful in Objects... seems to be in a compound Ratio of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as the Uniformity." Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. In Two Treatises. I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony and Design. II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil. (2d ed. London, 1726), Treatise I, sec. II, art. iii, p. 17. Hereafter, short title for the first treatise, Beauty; for the second, Moral Good. mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is because 'tis more considerable to have many things consent one with another than a few only. The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use, and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it's to be observed that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and proportion of various things is their relation one to another, which connects them and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby one suggests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty as that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answerableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion, fitness, and agreeing of a cause or means to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect suggested to the mind by the idea of the means.Note that for JE the fit of means to end in the use of instruments was a thing of beauty! This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to its tenon.A mortise is a cavity, hole, or the like into or through which some other part of a building fits or passes. A tenon is a part shaped to fit, as in a joint, but is especially a "tenon" if the fitted part passes through the mortise. Only when the beauty consists in unity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, through this, viz. the designed end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union, whereby they being united in this third, they thereby are all united one to another. The reason, or at least one reason, why God has made this kind of mutual consent and agreement of things beautiful and gratefulFor the meaning of "grateful," see Intro., p. 13, n. 4. to those intelligent beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. that perceive it probably is that there is in it some image of the true, spiritual original beauty, which has been spoken of: consisting in being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. consent to being,First ed., word capitalized. or the union of minds or spiritual beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. JE's very language "being's consent to being" is analogous (because "it pleases God to observe analogy in all his works") to the consent of "minds or spiritual beings in a mutual... affection of heart." Since "perceiving being only is properly being" ("The Mind," no. [45]), the "highest excellency, therefore, must be the consent of spirits one to another" (no. [1]). There is secondary beauty in many agreements of minds and of wise thoughts and just actions (see par. 4, below): these, too, are but shadows of true spiritual beauty. From the first paragraph of the present dissertation it has been clear that "not everything that may be called beauty of mind is properly called virtue." in a mutual propensity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by that uniformity diverse things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is manifest in fact in innumerable instances; and especially to establish inferior things in an analogy to superior. Thus, in how many instances has he formed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind; and plants, in analogy to animals, with respect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, etc.? And so he has constituted the external world in an analogy to things in the spiritual world, in numberless instances; as might be shown, if it were necessary, and here were proper place and room for it. Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, 'tis not needful now to inquire.A brief answer to this question is in the next paragraph: to assist those whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper to enliven the spiritual beauty in them. See also Ch. VII below. It is sufficient that he makes an agreement or consent of different things, in their form, manner, measure, etc. to appear beautiful, because here is some image of an higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual beings.First ed., word capitalized. It has pleased him to establish a law of nature,God's "laws of nature" figure prominently in the present chapter; perhaps even more in JE's account of how divine governance insures that self-love produces extensive love to others, in Ch. IV below; and in his account of how instinctual kind affections serve not only to preserve the world but also to give men pleasure and comfort in it, Ch. VI below. On God's laws of nature, see p. 567 below, n. 2. by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the various parts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, and the consent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, should appear beautiful; because therein is some image of the consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent beings,First ed., word capitalized. sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart. AndFirst ed., no par. here, by the way, I would further observe, probably 'tis with regard to this image or resemblance which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty that God has so constituted nature that the presenting of this inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty.See Ch. VII below. From what has been said we may see that there are two sorts of agreement or consent of one thing to another. (1) There is a cordial agreement that consists in concord and union of mind and heart: which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord than concord,A "principle" of true virtue in the heart does not mean that virtue is perfect, only that virtuous love is in via. See Ch. II above, p. 553, n. 6. is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty which is the only true moral beauty. (2) There is a natural union or agreement: which, though some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature, form, quantity, etc. (as before described), wherein lies an inferior secondary sort of beauty which may, in distinction from the other, be called natural beauty. This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the phrases of "cordial" and "natural" agreement; and "moral," "spiritual," "divine," and "primary" original beauty and "secondary" or "natural" beauty. Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be observed. 1. The cause why secondary beauty is grateful to menFirst ed., word capitalized. I use italics to mark the first ed. 's contrast with "God." On "grateful," see Intro., p. 13, n. 4. is only a law of nature, which God has fixed, or an instinct he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the same thing which God is pleased to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature. This appears in two things. (1) That which God has respect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a secondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in measure, form, etc. But in many instances persons that are gratified, and have their minds affected, in presenting this beauty, don't reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which according to the law of nature is the ground and rule of beauty in the case; yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleased with the harmony of the notes in a tune and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjustment of the notes, which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody.Cf. Hutcheson, Beauty, sec. II, art. xiv, p. 29: "But in all these instances of Beauty let it be observed, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation... Uniformity amidst Variety. We may have the sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's Taste may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho' he be ignorant of the Forms of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him." He knows not that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, etc. Yea, he may not know that there are vibrations of the air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirits. So, a man may be affected and pleased with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what measures, quantities, and distances it consists in.From the fact that God has, by a "law of nature," planted the pleasingness or gratefulness of secondary beauty in men's "instinct," or the frame of their minds, a skeptic might conclude that beauty is only in the sensibility of the beholder. But JE's idealism was not Berkeley's "to be is to be perceived." The immediately following paragraph stops such a skeptic's mind in regard to primary or cordial beauty by denying any distinction between "spiritual union and agreement" and "perceiving the union itself" in the case of mutual consent of minds. Here we begin to understand why JE chose to return to the question whether virtue or moral good is founded in "sentiment" or in "the reason and nature of things" in his concluding chapter. In this a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritual beauty consisting in a spiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful is perceiving the union itself. 'Tis the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies that is pleasing to the virtuous mind. (2) As was observed before, God in establishing such a law that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, etc. should appear beautiful or grateful to men, seems to have had regard to the image and resemblance there is, in such a natural agreement, of that spiritual cordial agreement wherein original beauty consists, as one reason why he established such a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or perception of, such a resemblance of this to spiritual beauty that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appears beautiful to men: but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary beauty, is immediately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he has given.A law of nature refers to God's governance of the creation, its moral part no less than what we today call "nature." Laws governing physical nature or intelligent moral beings are immediate arbitrary constitutions. "When I call [anything]," JE wrote, "an arbitrary constitution, I mean that it depends on nothing but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom" (Original Sin in Works, 3, 403). In the moral order or in the physical order, a "new effect is consequent on the former, only by the established laws, and settled course of nature: which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a constitution that he has been pleased to establish." So "God's preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating those things out of nothing at each moment of their existence" (ibid., p. 401). JE's understanding of creation, preservation and God's governance, moral law and constitution is crucial for his account of the moral life, whether from natural or divine principles. See Intro., pp. 34–35. 2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty is that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of considerable importance than in little trivial matters. Thus, the symmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the solar system, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some little slight compositions made to please children.The "Controversies"— draft on the nature of true virtue, obs. 6, on the secondary object of benevolence, reads in part: "there is a harmonious proportion in many virtues, whereby they have the same sort of beauty as that wherein the beauty of external things consists; and this, to one that relishes this sort of beauty which all mankind do, may appear more important in intelligent beings because they are of greater importance, for the same reason as proportion in the parts of the body and features of the face of an human being affects the heart more and is valued more than the beauty of a flower or the beauty of a picture or statue" (MS p. 185). 3. It may be observed (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, etc. of different things is requisite in order to this inferior beauty, but some relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another. As, the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thither, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal degree, as uniformity in pillars connected in the same building in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and very disproportioned, in distant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such idea of deformity as disagreement and inequality or disproportion in things related and connected: and the nearer the relation and the stricter the connection, so much the greater and more disgustful is the deformity consisting in their disagreement. 4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter as well as the former: and when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to them that behold it, in these, as well as the other, by virtue of the same sense or the same determination of mind to be gratified with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to, this sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same sense in immaterial things as well as material, if there be equal capacity of discerning it in both? and indeed more in spiritual things (ceteris paribus) as these are more important than things merely external and material?Cf. par. 2 above. This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but is evident in fact, in numberless instances. There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and everyone keeps his place and continues in his proper business. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skillful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place, the pilastersA pilaster is an imitation pillar. It is a vertical relief, flat surfaced, projecting from the connecting panel or wall, with a capital and base. A cornice (mentioned just below) is a horizontal structure crowning the arrangement of a building (as a facade), typically moulded and (like a pilaster) projecting. These were familiar features of, for example, New England meetinghouses. in a place fit for them, the square pieces of marble in the pavement in a place suitable for them, the panels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the cornices in places proper for them, etc. As the agreement of a variety in one common design of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity which belongs to the secondary kind of beauty, so there is the same kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called wisdom, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose: which is a distinct thing from the goodness of that general purpose, as being useful and benevolent.
So there is a beauty in the virtue called justice, which consists in the agreement of different things that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and measure: and therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion which is observable in those external and material things that are esteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things that have relation one to another, and an harmonious corresponding of one thing to another: that he which from his will does evil to others should receive evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whose business it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: and that he should suffer evil in proportion to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal sense, when he whose heart opposes the general system should have the hearts of that system, or the heart of the Head and Ruler of the system, against him: and that in consequence, he should receive evil in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart. So, there is a like agreement in nature and measure, when he that loves has the proper returns of love: when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude."Gratitude" means "thankfulness," although the word "grateful" ordinarily does not mean "thankful" but objectively "pleasing." See Intro., p. 13, n. 4. Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another; some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties;I. e., duties of special moral relations. duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighborhood: and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor; and all duties whatsoever, considered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and also considered as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as testimonies of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therefrom. It is this secondary kind of beauty which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. Wollaston seems to have had in his eye when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He evidently has respect to the justice there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one beingFirst ed., word capitalized. towards another; which consists in one being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. expressing such affections and using such a conduct towards another, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from them: which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it.A quite perceptive paragraph in regard to William Wollaston's The Religion of Nature Delineated (London, 1726). Having written concerning the connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms the existence of things (Freedom of the Will, in Works, 1, 152–56, 258, 265), JE knew not to suppose that "the thing spoken of" in one of Wollaston's "true" propositions was itself merely mental, or that by "contradiction" and "inconsistency" he meant that moral evil was simply a mistake occurring in the understanding.
But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things; viz. the union of heart to Being in general, or to God the Being of beings,First ed., word capitalized. which appears in those virtues; and which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects of. Benevolence to Being in general, or to Being simply considered, is entirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the midst of variety,Hutcheson on beauty. See above, p. 562, n. 1. and is a superior kind of beauty. 'Tis true that benevolence to Being in general, when a person hath it, will naturally incline him to justice, or proportion in the exercises of it. He that loves Being, simply considered, will naturally (as was observed before),See in general JE's discussion of the secondary object of virtuous benevolence, Ch. I above, especially par. 5; and Ch. II, at the beginning. other things being equal, love particular beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. in a proportion compounded of the degree of beingFirst ed., word capitalized. and the degree of virtue, or benevolence to being,First ed., word capitalized. which they have. And that is to love beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. consists in those two things. Respect to Being, in this proportion, is the first and most general kind of justice; which will produce all the subordinate kinds.These few words say in effect that divine love in the heart produces all virtues. This was the theme of the charity sermons, and it is stated again in Ch. VII below, p. 616, and n. 1. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exists, the proportion which is observed in objects may be the cause of the proportion of benevolence to those objects: but no proportion is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence which is proportionable to the degree of being,First ed., word capitalized. The following "etc." reminds the reader to complete JE's formulation: proportionable to the degree of being and the degree of goodness compounded. etc. is the consequence of the existence of benevolence; and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attraction in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the beingFirst ed., word capitalized. of such a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion. By this it appears that just affections and acts have a beauty in them distinct from, and superior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them: for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And that is the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to Being in general. And besides this, there is the agreement of justice to the will and command of God: and also something in the tendency and consequences of justice that is agreeable to general benevolence, viz. as in many respects it tends to the glory of God, and the general good— whichFirst ed. begins new sentence. tendency also makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind.The first part of this remarkable sentence affirms the tendency of virtuous love to produce "fruits" in heart and life (cf. Charity). The second part affirms that the justice that is founded in secondary beauty tends to produce effects agreeable to true virtue— never virtuous benevolence itself. For the "mixing" of morality from a "principle" of love in the heart with morality from other "principles" elucidated in Chs. III— VI, see the almost equally terse passage in Ch. VII below, pp. 616–18. In that chapter, it is resemblance in both nature and effect that causes common morality to be mistaken for true virtue. See also "The Two Sources of Morality," Intro., pp. 53–59. And it is on these accounts chiefly that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a truly benevolent heart. But,First ed., no par. though it be true, there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is in justice which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet that is no argument that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good; but that is no argument that there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its suiting benevolence by tending to the general good.This paragraph and similar passages like it in Chs. III— VI should be pondered in order to correct the prevailing opinion that JE held common morality in very low esteem. This does not follow from par. 5 below, or from similar passages throughout, which affirm that nevertheless there is nothing of nature of true virtue in natural justice or in the secondary beauty of minds and actions, or from other springs of the morality which all men (given God's creation of our "frames" and his laws of nature) have in common. 5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears that that disposition or sense of the mind which consists in determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow that a taste of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind? 'Tis a relish of uniformity and proportion that determines the mind to approve these things. And if this be all, there is no need of anything higher, or of anything in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things which are equally discerned. 'Tis virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue for the heart to be pleased with that which is entirely distinct from it. Though it be true, there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty; as much as material things can have analogy to things spiritual (of which they can have no more than a shadow); yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy perceived.See above, pp. 564–65; and cf. pp. 565–66. Men approve of secondary beauty for the beauty's sake, not for any perceived connection with spiritual beauty. Moreover, with no experience of the shadowing forth of spiritual beauty, they cannot reason by analogy from the lower to the higher. The reverse is the case. God makes the analogy to himself; or better said, God manifests or communicates another image of himself in secondary beauty. And not only reason but experience plainly shows that men's approbation of this sort of beauty does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connection with virtue. For, otherwise, men's delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd. 'Tis evident in fact that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. whatsoever, any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralistsSee above, Ch. II, p. 553, n. 6. for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.
CHAPTER IV. OF SELF-LOVE AND ITS VARIOUS INFLUENCE TO CAUSE LOVE TO OTHERS, OR THE CONTRARY
MANY assert that all love arises from self-love. In order to determine this point, it should be clearly determined what is meant by self-love. Self-love, I think, is generally defined:First ed. has a long dash at this point. a man's love of his own happiness. Which is short, and may be thought very plain: but indeed is an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun "his own" is equivocal,JE's first move in this chapter is to unpack the two different meanings of "self-love" contained in the "ambiguous... pronoun" his own. See "Self-Love, Love of Happiness, Love to God and to Neighbor," Intro., pp. 12–27. and liable to be taken in two very different senses. For a man's "own happiness" may either be taken universally, for all the happiness or pleasure which the mind is in any regard the subject of, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and separate good. And so "self-love" may be taken two ways. 1. Self-love may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is grateful or pleasing to him. Which comes only to this, that self-love is a man's liking, and being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him; or that 'tis a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happiness, or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is undoubtedly true that whatever a man loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he loves— if that be proper speaking. If by self-love is meant nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling that "self-love" which is only a general capacity of loving, or hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased: which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chooses, is grateful to him; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness.Sermon Seven of Charity expressed this first meaning of self-love (i.e., a general capacity of loving whatever is "grateful") as the love of one's own happiness "absolutely and not comparatively," not "a thing liable of diminution or increase," "alike in all" because it belongs to the "nature of all intelligent being," as necessary to their natures "as a faculty of will is." For the same analysis in JE's other writings, see Intro., pp. 13–18, especially nn. 5, 6, 3. But if this be what is meant by "self-love," there is an impropriety and absurdity even in the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, don't arise from self-love?It is also an impropriety to ask whether love to God can be superior to "self-love" in this sense. See Miscell. no. 530. LOVE TO GOD. SELF-LOVE (c. 1731–32), and Intro., p. 17, n. 3. For that would be the same as to inquire, Whether the reason why our love is fixed on such and such particular objects is not that we have a capacity of loving some things? This may be a general reason why men love or hate anything at all; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing and hate nothing. ButFirst ed., no par. it can never be a reason why men's love is placed on such and such objects.This expression— together with, below, "the reason why such and such things become his happiness," and, said of other persons, "look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own" (Ed. italics)— calls to mind JE's exclamation, "What can more properly be called love to any being, or any thing, than to place one's happiness in that thing?" (Charity, Sermon Seven, p. 258 above), and his use of "placing" one's happiness of both Christ and the saints in heaven in the final charity sermon). I take these expressions to be the meaning of "compounded self-love" in Miscell. no. 530. That a man, in general, loves and is pleased with happiness, or (which is the same thing) has a capacity of enjoying happiness, cannot be the reason why such and such things become his happiness: as for instance, why the good of his neighbor, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness. Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not that our loving such and such particular persons and things, arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to love our own happiness, which consists in these objects; so, the reason why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbors, is because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in— still the notion is absurd.This notion derives other-love from "a love to love our own [specific] happiness," i.e., from the self's love of self. See commentary on Miscell. no. 530 (written when JE was in his late twenties), Intro., p. 14, n. 6, p. 16, n. 9, and p. 17, n. 3. The corollary of this entry (that it is "impossible for any person to be willing to be perfectly and finally miserable for God's sake") requires that we understand JE to mean that grace-given love to God supremely is "further informative" of a person's own particular happiness. So in the text above, our hearts musty first be united to others in affection. Then their happiness becomes ours. For here the effect is made the cause of that of which it is the effect: our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas, the truth plainly is that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that as it were, we look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own? Men who have benevolence to others have pleasure when they see others' happiness, because seeing their happiness gratifies some inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happiness; which was by benevolence or good will; and therefore when they see their happiness, their inclination is suited, and they are pleased. But the being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites. 2. "Self-love," as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined private self, or love to himself with respect to his private interest. By "private" interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures, or pains, that are personal. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that some have in others' pleasures, or pains; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by such a participation with others, whichFirst ed. begins new sentence. consist in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions. Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with external beauty, and with all inferior secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity, proportion, etc., whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the contrary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and displeased with others' hatred and contempt. ForFirst ed., no par. pleasures and uneasinesses of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of our nature as any of the pleasures or pains of external sense. And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind; being not by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence. 'Tis evidently mere self-love that appears in this disposition. It is easy to see that a man's love to himself will make him love love to himself, and hate hatred to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-love is exercised in no one disposition more than in this. Men, probably, are capable of much more pleasure and pain through this determination of the mind than by any other personal inclination or aversion whatsoever. Though perhaps we don't so very often see instances of extreme suffering by this means, as by some others; yet we often see evidences of men's dreading the contempt of others more than death: and by such instances may conceive something what men would suffer, if universally hated and despised; and may reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. are as nothing and vanity— together with a sense of his immediate continual presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him— and living constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifestations of his hatred and contempt and wrath.In this sentence, which piles up on itself, JE imagines what would be the immense sufferings of a man who has an overblown love of honor, if such a man— his bloated sense of his own dignity unmortified— had also a sense of his abhorrence in God's eyes. But to return, these things may be sufficient to explain what I mean by private interest; in regard to which self-love, most properly so called, is immediately exercised. And here I would observe that if we take self-love in this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect of self-love; i.e. according to the common method and order which is maintained in the laws of nature.On "laws of nature," see above, Ch. III, p. 567, n. 2. For no created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwise than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man should love those that are of his party, when there are different parties contending one with another; and that are warmly engaged on his side, and promote his interest: this is the natural consequence of a private self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things, that because a man loves himself, and regards his own interest, he therefore should love those that love him, and promote his interest; i.e. to suppose it to be otherwise implies no contradiction.On this meaning of metaphysical "necessity," see further Intro., p. 38, n. 6. It will not follow from any absolute metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravitation towards the center of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam of a balance should have greater power to counterbalance a weight on the other side, when at a distance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction that it should be otherwise: but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the Author of nature observes in the laws of nature he has established. Neither is there any absolute necessity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that because there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one solid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it should also be attracted by it, and those that are nearest be attracted most. But according to the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature one of these effects is connected with the other, so that it is justly looked upon as the same power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its center, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves one to another; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to those that love him is no more than a certain expression or effect of self-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect, if nothing intervenes to countervail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore there is no more virtue in a man's thus loving his friends merely from self-love than there is in self-love itself, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being disposed to hate those that hate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love in like manner as the loving those that love us, and being thankful for kindness shown us. But it is said by some that 'tis apparent, there is some other principle concerned in exciting the passions of gratitude and anger besides self-love, viz. a moral sense,JE never launches a full-scale discussion of "moral sense," although in the next chapter he adopts the term to refer to his notion of conscience. The focus of the argument begun at this point in the text is upon the proper explanation of gratitude and anger. Ch. III partially accounted for these passions as instances of our apprehension of the secondary beauty of things pleasing (grateful) or discordant in moral relations. See App. II for a full discussion of "moral sense." or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with displicence;Two instances of the usage of this term in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be cited from the Oxford English Dictionary: "Complacence is the first act of the will upon Good as Good... Displicence is its contrary, and its object is Evil as Evil" (1680), and "Devotion towards heaven, and a general displicence and peevishness towards every thing besides" (1716). and that their seeing or supposing this moral beauty or deformity in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise, why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things that do us good, or hurt? Why don't we experience gratitude to a garden or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We are very differently affected towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us which are destitute of reason and will. Now concerning this, I would make several remarks. 1. Those who thus argue that gratitude and anger can't proceed from self-love might argue, in the same way and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from love to others: which is contrary to their own scheme. They say that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense: which they say is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind. But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For, how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive? I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public by destroying the fruits of the earth?This, indeed, was an argument advanced by Francis Hutcheson, though he did not limit it to gratitude and anger: "Had we no Sense of Good distinct from the Advantage or Interest arising from the external Senses, and the Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony; our Admiration and Love toward a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation, would be much the same with what we have toward a generous Friend, or any noble Character; for both are, or may be advantageous to us: And we should no more admire any Action, or love any Person in a distant Country, or Age, whose Influences could not extend to us, than we love the Mountains of Peru, while we are unconcern'd in the Spanish Trade. We should have the same Sentiments and Affections toward inanimate Beings, which we have toward rational Agents; which yet every one knows to be false... [The latter] study our Interest, and delight in our Happiness, and are Benevolent toward us" (Moral Good, sec. I, art. i, pp. 117–18). Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love and public love, or moral sense arising from public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence, or malice? 2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, and are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; 'tis not at all strange that the Author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things which gratify self-love without sense or will, and in another manner towards beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favor and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves to them who are the same kind of beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love by expressing the same sort of love towards us.Near the beginning of the "Controversies"— draft, in numbered paragraphs under the head, "That MORAL TASTE that is naturally in men is not of the nature of true virtue and essentially differs from [it]," JE extends the argument by observations concerning the birds and the beasts. That a taste for external beauty may be without virtue is shown from the fact that God has implanted some degree of the same sensibility in "the very beasts," viz. "the birds have a taste of music and some serpents will be charmed by music" (par. 3, MS p. 181). Then in par. 4, in response to those who would found anger and gratitude in an inner sense all men possess, JE grants the tastes and even that they can't arise from self-love. But these passions do not arise from true virtue, since they are shared by the brutes, who also can tell the difference between their kind and inanimate objects! "But allowing this, such a moral sense, if it be proper to call it by that name, is in some degree in many of the beasts, as they have such a thing as anger. They are much otherwise moved when they suffer from an agent that has will, than when they suffer by the wind or water or hail. And nothing appears but that the same instinct, joined with that reason and that vastly more extensive knowledge that is in man may cause all the anger that appears in natural men, and without anything more akin to virtue. So there are appearances of gratitude in some of the brute creatures" (ibid. Ed. italics). See further App. II. 3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as 'tis granted, there is something that may be so called), all the moral sense that is essential to those affections is a sense of desert;This word fully capitalized in first ed. which is to be referred to that sense of justice, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty that lies in uniformity and proportion: which solves all the difficulty in the objection. This, or some appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others' love and kindness to us, or their ill will and injuriousness, appears to us to deserve our love, or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than just that as they love us, and do us good, we also should love them, and do them good. And so it seems just that when others' hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire they themselves may suffer in like manner as we have suffered: i.e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjustment between these things. Which is indeed a kind of moral sense, or sense of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a secondary kind, and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore doubtless 'tis a great mistakeFirst ed., word italicized. I retain JE's emphasis by beginning a new paragraph, to introduce par. 4 and 5 below, which argue the inconsistency of a moral sense from credible examples of gratitude and anger discordant with benevolence and with public good. in any to suppose all that moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of desert is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination of mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence. Which may be further confirmed, if it be considered that even with respect to a sense of justice or desert consisting in uniformity (and agreement between others' actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing or of ill-doing), 'tis not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of gratitude and anger that there should be any notion of justice in them, in any public or general view of things— as will appear by what shall be next observed. 4. Those authors who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all mankind consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all— they hold that true virtue consists in public benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the mind to public evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favor, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public benefit in the favor that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to anything that ever happens among mankind. A ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master to murder him, and run away with the ship, and turn pirates: but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole design; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him. And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infested the neighboring country have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time to divide their booty or prey, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavors to discover their secret haunt and place of resort, at length by some means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprise them, and seize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers, as to give them notice of their danger so as just to give them opportunity to escape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindness. Now in such instances, I think, it is plain that there is no supposition of a public injury in that which is the occasion of their anger; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public good in that which excites their gratitude; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person. 5. The passion of anger, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting in benevolence, natural to all mankind. For, if that moral sense which is exercised in anger were that which arose from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense or relish of the beauty of benevolence, one would think a disposition to anger should increase, at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign, and benevolent temper: which seems something disagreeable to reason as well as contrary to experience, which shows that the less men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep resentment of injuries. And though gratitude be that which many speak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be true, there is a gratitude that is truly virtuous, and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occasion to show afterwards),On truly virtuous gratitude, and other gracious virtues, see Ch. VII below, pp. 617–18. yet I think, what has been observed may serve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating those which hate us, but also that not all gratitude, or loving those which love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.Here ends JE's excursus on moral sense as an account of gratitude or anger. He now proceeds to account for (a) other-loves, (b) our admiration for the "qualities and characters" of fictional or actual historical figures, and (c) approbations and disapprovals that in moral experience seem quite unrelated to self-love or self-interest. Another sort of affections which may be properly referred to self-love, as its source, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws,On God's analogizing nature's laws of secondary beauty to true moral beauty, see Ch. III above, p. 564, n. 9, p. 567, n. 2, and p. 573, n. 8. is affections to such as are near to us by the ties of nature; that we look upon as those whose beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. we have been the occasions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whose circumstances, even from the very beginning of their existence, do many ways lead them, as it were, necessarily to an high esteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, submission and compliance; and whom the constitution of the world makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares, friendships, enmities, and pursuits. Which is the case of men's affection to their children. And in like manner self-love will also beget in man some degree of affections towards others with whom he has connection in any degree parallel. As to the opinion of those that ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and children to a particular instinct of nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards.Ch. VI below on "instinctual kind affections." In the constitution of the moral world, self-love works together with instinctual affections, as it does in other respects with secondary beauty, to insure bonds of affection with "such as are near to us" or "in any degree parallel."
And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may love to qualities and characters arise from the same source. Some represent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining to make it out that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not considered that what we approve of in the first place is the character; and from the character we approve the person. And is it a strange thing that men should from self-love like a temper or character, which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love; and which, we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphysical refining, in the general tends to men's pleasure and benefit?Francis Hutcheson believed admiration of distant historical or fictional characters to arise directly from moral sense. "But whence this secret Chain between each Person and Mankind?... Whence this Love, Compassion, Indignation and Hatred toward even feign'd Characters, in most distant Ages? If there is no moral Sense, which makes rational Actions appear Beautiful or Deformed; if all Approbation be from the Interest of the Approver [?] And yet as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others, and a Delight in their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author" (Moral Good, sec. I, art. ii, p. 121). His answer to those who trace such approbation or disapprobation to self-love "had we liv'd in their Days" was a direct denial: this could not be unless we had "some secret Sense which determines our Approbation without regard to Self-Interest; otherwise we would always favour the fortunate Side without regard to Virtue" (and admire the successful tyrant or traitor). Hutcheson drew an example from commercial rivalry with the Dutch: "We approve publick-spirited Burgomasters in another nation, threatening our Interests, above a useful but traitorous Refugee who trains our artisans to national advantage" (ibid., art. iii, pp. 122–23). But see the following note. And on the contrary, should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery? Is there need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction to make it out that a child, which has heard and seen much, strongly to fix an idea of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattlesnake, should have aversion to that species or form, from self-love; so as to have a degree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the same self-love it should be pleased and entertained with a lively figure and representation of some pleasant fruit, which it has often tasted the sweetness of? Or, with the image of some bird which, it has always been told, is innocent, and whose pleasant singing it has often been entertained with?— though the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none will think it difficult to allow that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and death, through self-love, together with the habitual connection of these agreeable or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which are impressed on the mind of the child by their images."Thus Swine, Serpents of all kinds, and some Insects really beautiful enough, are beheld with Aversion by many People, who have got some accidental Ideas associated with them. And for Distastes of this Kind, no other Account can be given" (Hutcheson, Beauty, sec. VI, art. iii, p. 75). These are accidentally associated ideas of disgust; so Hutcheson's account of liking or distaste for animal forms is consistent enough with n. 9 above. JE appeals to ideas experientially and regularly associated with self-love in both of his needed explanations. Hutcheson considered habitual association of ideas to be rather random or accidental; and, as did Locke, to have mainly a bad influence upon human judgment and conduct (John Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Bk. II, ch. 33). In JE, association of ideas was more central and a more thoroughly developed philosophy than in Hutcheson. Locke, too, moved from mere association to the power of the mind to compose simple ideas from different senses ("Mixed Modes"). And where is the difficulty of allowing that a child or man may hate the general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason as he hates the general nature of a serpent; knowing, from reason, instruction and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or poison in a serpent? And if a man may from self-love disapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that sort which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity, generosity, justice, and the social virtues in general; which, he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind? 'Tis undoubtedly true that some have a love to these virtues from a higher principle.See the concise listing of "sanctified" or graced moral virtues near the end of Ch. VII below. But yet I think it as certainly true that there is generally in mankind a sort of approbation of them which arises from self-love. Besides what has been already said, the same thing further appears from this: that men commonly are most affected towards, and do most highly approve, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their various conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially enamored with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great; not only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves; but they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in history, or even in romance. The poor will most highly approve and commend liberality. The weaker sex, who especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude and generosity in those of the other sex they read or hear of, or have presented to them on a stage.
As I think it plain from what has been observed that men may approve, and be disposed to commend a benevolent temper from self-love, so the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies; viz. as a man's loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper— the degree of it appearing from the obstacles it overcomes.On commendation of higher degrees of benevolent temper from self-love, see Charity, Sermon Four, pp. 209–10. I have suggested (Intro., pp. 23–27) that JE understands the love commandment's "as thyself" as unveiled in the "as I have loved you" of the new command of Christ. Still, throughout the sermon series he appeals to many homely examples of swapping places. Noting the heights to which reach his four partially concurring accounts of ordinary morality, one can at least raise the question whether he does not do by example in the sermons what True Virtue explains more theoretically in Chs. III— VI. And it may be here observed that the consideration of the tendency and influence of self-love may show how men in general may approve of justice from another ground, besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy see the necessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for human society; but they find the necessity of it for themselves in instances that continually occur: which tends to prejudice them in its favor, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from self-love. And again, that forementioned approbation of justice and desert, arising from a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, and disapprove malice; as men see that he who hates and injures others, deserves to be hated and punished, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them good, deserves himself also to be loved and rewarded by others, as they see the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptedness of these things. And having always seen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with the idea of being hated and punished, which is disagreeable to self-love; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love. And by virtue of this association of ideas benevolence itself becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing.Two different pairs of things are here joined together in a morally experienced self-love: (1) self-love and fixed attitudes toward "qualities and characters" of persons, and (2) self-love and "a kind of reflex and indirect influence" of "a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion." Either or both together cause men to approve justice or desert; and as well, to approve benevolence and disapprove malice. A tradition commending virtues that originally arose from morally experienced self-love, with its esteem of "qualities and characters" from association, will continue in moral education, long after memory of that connection is lost. In the history of modern moral philosophy only Jonathan Edwards and John Gay push to its limits the power of association of ideas— by "lapsing" of habitual linkages to explain why people persist in beliefs about virtue and vice, right and wrong, without reference to moral sense or justice or to any conscious intent of obtaining beneficial and avoiding evil consequences. See Intro., p. 40, n. 4. For Hutcheson further on misassociation of ideas acting to blind moral sense, see Ch. VIII below, p. 625, n. 6.
Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of self-love, through an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with it; contempt being what self-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottishness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. The idea of contempt becomes associated with the idea of such vices, both because we are used to observe that these things are commonly objects of contempt, and also find that they excite contempt in ourselves. Some of them appear marks of littleness, i.e. of small abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects among mankind. By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere, and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of. And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society. There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, and most of them in several of these ways, come to have some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet with some disapprobation. This kind of approbation and dislike, through the joint influence of self-love and association of ideas, is in very many vastly heightened by education; as this is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innumerable instances, of ideas which have no connection any other way than by education; and of greatly strengthening that association, or connection, which persons are led into by other means:This final, brief point in JE's argument adds yet another layer of association of ideas: the "strong, close, and irrefragable association, in innumerable instances, of ideas which have no connection any other way than by education." Children are morally educated in the virtues by a tradition of ordinary morality, who in no way have experienced their connection with self-love. as anyone would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance with American savages and their children.
CHAPTER V. OF NATURAL CONSCIENCE, AND THE MORAL SENSE
THERE is yet another disposition or principle of great importance, natural to mankind: which, if we consider the consistence and harmony of nature's laws, may also be looked upon as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union:Self-union is a replacement term for self-love, "in some sort" a serious qualification, as JE moves to yet another "principle" of natural morality. The background of his far from obvious discovery of a kind of self-love that is wholeness or a union with self is the oneness of saints with Christ as he is one with the Father (John 17:21), the close "mixtion" of the two natures in Jesus Christ, and the oneness of Father and Son in the innertrinitarian life. Good conscience is "some image" of those unities. See Intro., pp. 41–42, App. II, and App. III on "participation." and that is a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself and, as it were, against himself in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of doing that to others which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs; or, of forbearing to do that to them which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to him. I have observed from time to time that in pure love to others (i.e. love not arising from self-love) there's a union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's self: and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as though others were one with ourselves. So,I. e., in like manner. self-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves: which naturally renders a sensible inconsistence with ourselves, and self-opposition, in what we ourselves choose and do, to be uneasy to the mind: which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence of a malevolent and unjust behavior towards others and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a person for doing that to us which we should incline to and insist on doing to him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contradict ourselves. It would be for ourselves both to choose and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, as it were, the very same thing. No wonder this is contrary to nature. No wonder that such a self-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begets unquietness and raises disturbance in his mind. A thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with ourselves, or as one with ourselves, and a thus disapproving and being uneasy in the consciousness of disagreeing and being inconsistent with ourselves in what we do, is quite a different thing from approving or disapproving actions because in them we agree and are united with Being in general: which is loving or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and odiousness of sin. The former of these principles is private: the latter is public and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former (i.e. an inclination to agree with ourselves) is a natural principle: but the latter (i.e. an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to God, the Head of it, who is all and all in it) is a divine principle.In this paragraph, JE introduces his "two sources of morality," enlarged upon later in this chapter (text below at pp. 593–95), and brought to finest flower in Ch. VII, pp. 615–18. A chief question to be addressed to this dissertation is the interrelation of the moralities from natural and from divine principles, which have homonymous virtues. In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conscience: and when they are free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience with respect to these actions. And there is also an approbation of conscience of the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn, and punish them. And thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifestations he has made of his will to them, etc., strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those resentments which would be occasioned in themselves by an injurious treatment in any wise parallel. There is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men implied inThis expression here, and in the text near n. 2 above, may or may not have the same meaning as heretofore noted. "Implication" is more prominent in the charity sermons and in the first dissertation. Still, to say that JE's four principles of ordinary morality participate in and are "in some sort" implied in one another is a better reading than to reduce them all to any single principle. the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly give an account of. Unless men's consciences are greatly stupefied, it is naturally and necessarily suggested; and does habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and as it were insensibly arise in the mind. AndFirst ed., no par. JE offers an epistemological explanation of why conscience so habitually, instantaneously, etc., "speaks," according as we do or do not act as we would wish others to act if they were in our place and we in theirs. The only knowledge we have of the inner life of other selves is by ascribing to them "ideas" we have of ourselves. No wonder, then, that fundamental disunion with self arises if in morality we do not substitute ourselves in their place! Miscell. no. 782, composed not long after the charity sermons, is a remarkable discussion of men's use of "signs" for things of which they have no "actual idea." Other selves is one among many instances. "So a man may have a sensible apprehension of pleasure or sorrow that others are the subjects of indirectly by reflection, either by exciting from the memory something that he has felt heretofore which he supposes is like it, or by placing himself in others' circumstances, or by placing things about himself in his imagination, and from ideas so put together in his mind exciting something of a like pleasure or pain transiently in himself" (Ed. italics), i.e., by "deriving" those ideas to others. the more so for this reason, viz. that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of anything which other persons act or suffer, or of anything about intelligent moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious of in the acts, passions, sensations, volitions, etc. which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means in the place of another; or as it were substituting ourselves in their place. Thus, we have no conception, in any degree, what understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others, but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness, into their place; making such an alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. 'Tis thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental and not corporeal things; and everything that we conceive of, belonging to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation, and motion of their bodies. AndFirst ed., no par. this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imperfections, and ascribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of anything in the Deity.See Intro., pp. 21–27, with p. 19, n. 6; and Dissertation I above, text at p. 531 and n. 7. Actual knowledge of God is not by analogy; it is "the knowledge of God's" spread abroad in human hearts. But though it be so, that men in thinking of others do as it were put themselves in their place, they do it so naturally, or rather habitually, instantaneously and without set purpose, that they do it insensibly, and can scarce give any account of it, and many would think it strange if they were told of it. So it may be in men's substituting themselves in others' place in such exercises of conscience as have been spoken of: and the former substitution"Former substitution" refers to our conceiving of other selves by ascribing to them "agreement" with ourselves; the "latter" substitution, to golden rule agreement with self in moral actions, registered in the self-union of a clear conscience when we are "conscious to ourselves" of that consistency. leads to the latter, in one whose conscience is not greatly stupefied. For in all his thoughts of the other person, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily as it were puts himself in his stead, for the aforementioned reason; and therefore the more naturally, easily and quietly sees whether he being in his place should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is. Natural conscience consists in these two things. 1. In that which has now been spoken of: that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conscious that we should be displeased with the like treatment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our consciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conscious to ourselves that if we were in his case, and he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us; and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust if we were in his case. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned.First ed. has a dash, but no paragraph. The foregoing first element in conscience is purely formal. There is a practical contradiction— disunion with self— if a person claims such and such disposition or action to be moral and yet would not prescribe it to others toward himself in similar circumstances. To take a moral position means to prescribe reversibility (and derivatively, universalizability). (See Intro., p. 44, n. 1). Still, that is an empty prescription. The golden rule, and the "as thyself," are good advice if, but only if, what one would want done to himself, and how he loves himself, are materially good. The charity sermons did not reach this explicit need for material content because (a) swapping places had Christological meaning— the "as I have loved you" made manifest the meaning of the type, "as thyself"— so the matter of the two love commands was the same; and (b) the examples JE used throughout of familial loves, civic friendship, etc., to show the reasonableness of substituting self for others had familiar, agreed content in Puritan society. In True Virtue, JE's analysis of the first element of which natural conscience consists requires that a second, material element be added to it. See Intro., pp. 43–47. But this is not all that is in natural conscience. Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience disapproves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself that, were I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me, the question might be asked, ButFirst ed., word lowercase. what would be the ground of that supposed disapprobation, displeasure and anger which I am conscious would be in me in that case? That disapprobation must be on some other grounds. Therefore, 2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before: consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and resentment and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between showing kindness and being rewarded, etc.The second thing of which conscience consists— our sense of desert and justice— was argued in Ch. III from secondary beauty or excellence. The single paragraph above is enough to show that JE's several principles of ordinary morality cannot be reduced to one only, but that they do overlap, penetrate, or participate one in another. Both these kinds of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbor, in the first place he is conscious that if he were in his neighbor's stead, he should resent such treatment from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.Note that the thing considered "first"— the interchanges of love— is "founded on" the "second," the material content of what is exchanged, i.e., what is justly deserved. For a comparison with R. M. Hare, see Intro., p. 44, n. 1. Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained,I. e., in both senses explained in par. 1 and 2 above. will extend to all virtue and vice; to everything whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consideration, and is free from speculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others, either God or creatures, so men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others and being accepted and favored by others. And all vice, sin or moral evil summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, viz. hatred or malevolence, so men easily see the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them and suffering ill from them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of the whole system.First ed., word capitalized. And as this sense of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, so this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and disapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arising from an aversion to self-inconsistence and opposition. For in all cases of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and so of reflecting or being conscious to ourselves how we should like or dislike such treatment from others. Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding stupefying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.Here JE's two moralities seem to coincide completely in each and every approbation and disapprobation. JE postpones until the final three paragraphs of this chapter his undertaking to show the lack of full correlation in heart and life between the utterly different moralities of true virtue and virtue founded in conscience. And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience that has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i.e. it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that), yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our being,First ed., word capitalized. as we are for our beingFirst ed., word capitalized. itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness— the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.First ed. has dash, but no paragraph. Besides, that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense (as was observed before)Ch. III above, pp. 567–68, obs. 2 and 3, concerning natural, secondary, or inferior beauty. in things nearly related and of great importance: and therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the Creator and his creatures. And 'tis easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience should see the desert of punishment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great, we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably resent contempt.An inference from the impartial arbiter argument in End of Creation, pp. 422–26 above. The same inference was drawn in the discussion of self-love. See above, p. 578, n. 2. Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from being stupefied by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the Day of Judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For they must see that consent to Being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of beings,First ed., word capitalized. is most just; and that everything which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust and deserves the opposition of universal existence. Thus has God established and ordered that this principle of natural conscience, which though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so impliesWhile there is "implication" between the several principles of common morality, there is none between common morality and true virtue. See p. 590 above, n. 4. no truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste. That moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience that has been described.Since the account of morality founded in self-love in Ch. IV was so largely a matter of association of ideas, this sentence denies the reduction of the two elements of conscience to self-love. The parallel statement in the "Controversies"— draft (MS p. 183), "Natural men's moral taste, so far as it is disinterested and not founded in an association of ideas, is to be referred to this [lower kind of beauty]," is limited to the material element of conscience: justice and desert. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition to approve virtue and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the writings of many of late: a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made use of by these writers do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of virtue which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation of virtue, that was described, which arises from self-love. But other instances prove that there is a moral taste, or sense of moral good and evil, natural to all, which don't properly arise from self-love.Again, the way is blocked against the inroads of self-love (whether utterly nefarious or channeled to human good by God's laws or by "self-union" alone) as the sole ground of JE's interpretation and critique of natural morality. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natural conscience, and particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in the approbation of natural conscience, viz. a sense of desert and approbation of that natural agreement there is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what has been said that neither this, nor anything else wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil, which there is in natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of mind to relish and delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous benevolence of heart. "That moral sense" which is "the same with this natural conscience that has been described," we should observe, is in no way an intuition or an inner perception of right and wrong comparable to our physical senses of irreducible qualities in experience. The latter is often the meaning of conscience in ordinary language. If the "moral sense" school built upon that meaning of "sense," JE denies their meaning in adopting the term. See App. II. But it further appears from thisOnly now does JE move to showing the lack of correlation between conscientious morality and true virtue. JE's excursus, from p. 594 above, at n. 4, has already dwelt mainly on negative resemblances that cause ordinary morality to be mistaken for true virtue. Positive moral resemblances is the topic of Gh. VII.— If the approbation of conscience were the same with the approbation of the inclination of the heart, or the natural disposition and determination of the mind, to love and be pleased with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conscience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind; or rather, the degree would be just the same. In that person who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the testimony of conscience in favor of virtue would be equally full; but he that had but little would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and against vice. But, I think, the case is evidently otherwise. Some men, through the strength of vice in their hearts, will go on in sin against clearer light and stronger convictions of conscience, than others. If conscience's approving duty and disapproving sin were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse or conscience will be the same thing as repentance: and just in the same degree as the sinner feels remorse of conscience for sin, in the same degree is his heart turned from the love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they are the very same thing.corol. 1, MS p. 185 in the "Controversies"— draft on the nature of true virtue, sketched this argument. Christians have the greatest reason to believe from the Scriptures that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when sinners shall be called to answer before their Judge, and all their wickedness, in all its aggravations, brought forth, and clearly manifested in the perfect light of that day; and God will reprove them, and set their sins in order before them; their consciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be stopped, all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full exercise: and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the Judge against them and, seeing that they have deserved so great a punishment, will join with the Judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am opposing, would be the same thing as then being brought to the fullest repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love holiness; and virtue or holiness of heart in them will be brought to the most full and perfect exercise. But how much otherwise have we reason to suppose it will then be? viz. thatFirst ed., word capitalized. the sin and wickedness of their heart will come to its highest dominion and completest exercise; that they shall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on sinners, and his Spirit done striving with them, he will not restrain their wickedness as he does now. But sin shall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. 'Tis proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal to endeavor so to set his guilt before him as to convince his conscience of the justice of the sentence. This the Almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, so as most thoroughly to awaken and convince the conscience. But if natural conscience and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue were the same, then at the same time that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy; or, would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect benevolence of temper. But instead of this, their wickedness will then be brought to perfection,Cf. the vision of the damned given up to raging hatred of themselves and of one another, in Charity, Sermon Fifteen, pp. 390–92 above. and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away as cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.The preceding paragraph has a parallel in the "Controversies"— draft, in the six numbered items which show "‘That MORAL TASTE that is naturally in men is not of the nature of true virtue and essentially differs from [it]." (1) "['T]is unreasonable to call that by the name of virtue which is only a capacity of wickedness" (MS pp. 180–81). By "capacity of wickedness," I judge, JE meant capacity for disapprobation of wickedness. (2) "That which is consistent with the highest possible degrees of wickedness, and may be in a great height and in lively exercise at a time when wickedness will be in the height of its exercise, is not of the nature of true virtue." (MS p. 181). Par. 3 and 4 are, respectively, on the taste for music and on anger and gratitude in the "very beasts," as already noted. Par. 5, on the self-condemnation of the well-working consciences of the devils, and par. 6, on the clearing of the consciences of wicked men on the Day of judgment, are sections mainly containing the argument in the text above. To the latter JE adds a brief commentary on "I will reward him and he shall know it" (Ed. italics), a reference to Job 21:19: "But if conviction is the same thing as raising the love of virtue in his heart then he must bring him to repentance in order to punish him." Judgment is complete if, and only if, consciences are clear; consciences will be fully clarified if, and only if, God's judgment is revealed. "I will reprove thee, says God, and set thy sins in order before thee" (Psalms 50:21). But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they see the greatness of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion and opposition to; and have clearly set before them their obligations to him as their Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, etc. together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear sense of the desert of their sin, consisting in the natural agreement there is between such contempt and opposition of such a Being, and his despising and opposing them; between their being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffering the dreadful consequences of his being and acting as their great enemy: and their being conscious within themselves of the degree of anger which would naturally arise in their own hearts in such a case, if they were in the place and state of their Judge. In order to these things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relishing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposing and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary dependence one on the other.JE's account of the devils and the damned is but an extreme example used to clarify the nature of moral conscience in any intelligent moral creature. Miscell. no. 623. CONSCIENCE (c. 1733), the first entry using this example, is cross-referenced, through No. 472, with earlier numbers which elucidate the general competence of judgments of natural conscience (Nos. 468, 471, 472, 553). See App. II.
CHAPTER VI. OF PARTICULAR INSTINCTS OF NATURE WHICH IN SOME RESPECTS RESEMBLE VIRTUE
THERE are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not only for this, but also for their comfortably subsisting in the world. Which dispositions may be called "instincts."On instinct and the laws of nature, see Ch. III, pp. 565–66 above. Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally: such are many of our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are not wholly personal, but more social, and extend to others: such are the mutual inclinations between the sexes, etc. Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive: such are some of our natural inclinations that are personal; as those that relate to meat and drink. And of this sort also are some dispositions that are more social, and in some respects extend to others: as, the more sensitive inclinations of the sexes towards each other. Besides these instincts of the sensitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental: consisting in affections of the mind which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow creatures, or in some cases towards men in general.Neither of the affections treated in this chapter is exercised toward all men, though pity may be supposed to be directed toward the generality of men in calamity. Some of these instincts that are mental and social are what may be called "kind affections," as having something in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it. And others are of a different sort, having something in them that carries an angry appearance; such as the passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female. 'Tis only the former of these two last-mentioned sorts that it is to my purpose to consider in this place, viz. those natural instincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence, and so in some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider; and shall endeavor to show that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue. That kind affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called "natural affection," is by many referred to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love;JE has also implicitly derived the duties of familial affection from the secondary excellence of the proportion or agreement of "spiritual things," the beauty of order in society, and of "relative duties; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighborhood," and of civic friendship. See Ch. III above, p. 569. The law of nature governing in our sense of secondary beauty was, indeed, the determiner of an instinct (Ch. III, pp. 565–66). JE weaves the fabric of ordinary or common morality out of these four strands (Chs. III— VI) in various weights and combinations. These combinations themselves are not only connected by association of ideas, but they are also, secondarily, themselves beautiful or fitting in concord one with the other. and in that view, and in that supposition have shown, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as according to the order and harmony everywhere observed among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love: as was shown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose to insist on this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love as its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the Creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive proved before (Ch. II), that if any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. or beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence extending only to some particular persons or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system: such limited private benevolence, not arising from nor being subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.JE refers to Ch. II above, pp. 554–57. On "subordination," see Ch. II above, p. 558, n. 1. However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now that 'tis evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue— from these two things. First, that they don't arise from a principle of virtue. A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being simply considered; which implies a disposition to benevolence to Being in general.The sequence in this sentence is not unimportant: "union of heart with Being simply considered... implies" in some sense of "implies"— general benevolence. See Ch. I above, p. 544–46 and p. 549, n. 3. Now by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether we suppose they arise from self-love, or from particular instincts: because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And, Secondly, these private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed:JE's reference is to his excursus on "private systems" in Ch. II above, pp. 554–57, inclusive of par. 1–3 on why private affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue. Above in the text JE rehearses in the negative what he said of the unity of the virtues that arise from charity: they are always conjoined, one promotes or produces another, and one implies another as of the same essential nature. Cf. the moral progress in the virtues' essential co-implication in the charity series, especially Sermons Six and Twelve; and App. III. for being not dependent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as everyone sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person. Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which don't arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman Empire was of old; yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. If what is called natural affection arises from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably, does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with HutchesonI find one extended comment on this topic in the works of Francis Hutcheson which JE may have read, in Moral Good, sec. VI, art. iv, pp. 255–56: HumeJE's reference must be to a section in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) entitled "Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes." This brief section in Bk. II, "Of the Passions," is an example of Hume's account of the "compound passions." "'Tis plain, that this affection, in its most natural state," Hume writes, "is deriv'd from the conjunction of three different impressions or passions, viz. The pleasing sensation arising from beauty; the bodily appetite for generation; and a generous kindness and good-will." As beauty "gives us a keener appetite for our victuals," so with the appetite for generation. So there arises in the mind "a connection betwixt the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite, and benevolence... And we find from experience, that 'tis indifferent which of them advances first; since any of them is almost sure to be attended with the related affections. One, who is inflam'd with lust, feels at least a momentary kindness towards the object of it, and at the same time fancies her more beautiful than ordinary; as there are many, who begin with kindness and esteem for the wit and merit of the person, and advance from that to the other passions. But the most common species of love is that which first arises from beauty, and afterwards diffuses itself into kindness and into the bodily appetite. Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite easily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin'd passion of the soul; the other the most gross and vulgar. The love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures" (A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford, Clarendon, 1888, reprinted 1958]), pp. 394–95. limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections don't properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labors, anxieties, and pains requisite to the being,First ed., word capitalized. support and education of a family of children. Though not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage relation. But I suppose, few (if any) will deny that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affection between the sexes arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue. Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind when they see others in great distress. 'Tis acknowledged that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident that the pity which is general and natural is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking that all the pity or mercy which is anywhere to be found among them arises merely from natural instinct, or, that none is to be found which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive beings.Pity goes out to all "sensitive" beings, while the instinctual sexual affection God has fixed between men and women is a relation between "intelligent willing beings," "proper" beings. "Truly virtuous pity" is listed among the dispositions from divine principle in the heart that have the "same denomination" as a like disposition from natural principles (Ch. VII below, p. 683). Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think, I may be bold to say, this does not arise from general benevolence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name. If all that uneasiness on the sight of others' extreme distress which we call pity were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects of this passion must needs be in a degree of uneasiness, in being sensible of the total want of happiness of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now, this is not the case universally where men are disposed to exercise pity. There are many men, with whom that is the case in respect to some others in the world, that it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with any uneasiness, to know they were dead; yea, men who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, but view death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness;The clause "Yea... end of all happiness" is within parentheses in the first edition. who yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some very extreme anguish. Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brute creature under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure, at butchers' shambles in great cities. 'Tis the nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of the object of it; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case, a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's or being'sFirst ed., word capitalized. In this paragraph JE begins his proof of lack of correlation between natural pity and truly benevolent compassion. The substance of the paragraph is in the "Controversies"— draft, MS p. 187. Following the paragraph on pity is more than a full page (not used or marked for use in True Virtue) commenting on Henry Grove's Wisdom the First Spring of Action in the Deity (London, 1734; 2d ed. 1742). Two points are notable. The first is that JE puzzles over the identification of the highest good with "sensitive good," or "happiness," or "natural good," and understands exponents of "moral taste" to be saying that moral virtue (or "right" action, as in later utilitarians) is to be assessed in terms of increase of nonmoral good. The second point that can be sorted out is the incoherence in supposing "the very first act of true virtue" can be exerted without true virtue— which found its way, better stated, into Original Sin, in Works, 3, p. 227. enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure. Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, desiring no positive good for him, but evil: and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he sees the person whom he thus hates in misery far beyond his ill will, he may then pity him: because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct inclining to pity others in extreme calamity any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity.Cf. "covetousness" as a "comparative spirit" in Charity, Sermon Five, on envying not. Also "grudging not" as a fruit of charity, in perfection in Christ and among the ranks of saints in heaven in Sermon Fifteen. The first part of the paragraph above seems to be a reworking and modification of one on anger in the "Controversies"— draft (MS pp. 186–87), which JE set down after corol. 5, with a note to himself that this was to be added to MS p. 181, i.e., to the fourth of his six points in proof "That moral taste that is naturally in man is not of the nature of true virtue and essentially differs from [it]." Anger has as its object not only the "deformity" of injustice or the beauty of seeing an evildoer punished, but also self-vindication. The added paragraph continues, in part: "Thus it would [not] answer the desire of anger if we should know that the injurer suffered very greatly, but at the same time the suffering was not brought upon him by our power or for our sakes, and we supposed the sufferer did not know that we knew of his suffering, nor any others knew of his injury to us that might compare them one to another." And some men have such a grudge against one or another that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it.Hutcheson's explanation of this example was: "The ordinary Springs of Vice then among men, must be a mistaken Self-Love, made so violent as to overcome Benevolence... When Men, who had good opinions of each other, happen to have contrary Interests, they are apt to have the good Opinions abated, by imagining a design'd Opposition from Malice; without this they can scarcely hate one another. Thus two Candidates for the same office wish each other dead, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other" (Moral Good, sec. III, art. iv, p. 171). And when this is the case with them 'tis manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill will. These things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence: but is owing to a particular instinct which the Creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, viz. chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well-being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mankind, and an evidence that though the world be so sinful 'tis not God's design to make it a world of punishment: and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision for men's relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity, the natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connection with, especially in case of great calamity; because commonly in such cases men stand in need of the help of others besides their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to men's destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the Author of nature that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others' great prosperity and pleasure as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz. because they don't stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were the source of natural pity doubtless it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others' great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in great misery. The instincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation, and comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment, where the state of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of these merciful designs to answer, there, we have great reason to think, will be no such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case; as also there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between opposite sexes. To conclude what I have to say on the natural instinct disposing men to pity others in misery, I would observe that this is a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression; and so, of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, etc. Which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a principle of true virtue.Pity explains not only helpfulness in particular calamities. From this instinct, JE says in this final succinct paragraph, spring also approbations of virtues and disapprobations of vices, just as from particular experiences of self-love comes esteem for general "qualities and characters." JE's critique of the virtues of natural pity is limited to "so far as they arise from this cause only" (Ed. italics). Virtuous pity is introduced at the end of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII. THE REASON WHY THOSE THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED, WHICH HAVE NOT THE ESSENCE OF VIRTUE, HAVE YET BY MANY BEEN MISTAKEN FOR TRUE VIRTUE
THE first reason that may be given of this is that, although they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that belongs to the general nature of virtue. The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and beings,First ed., word capitalized. and consequently and secondarily in complacence in virtue, as has been shown.JE's reference is to the first exercise or object of pure benevolence (being's consent or propensity to Being) and to its second exercise or object, namely, love to benevolent Being. The familiar and common love of benevolence (of which several accounts have been given in preceding chapters) resembles the first of these exercises of pure love to persons or beings; the familiar and common complacent love of the love of others, or esteem for their "qualities and character," resembles the second. Cf. the definition of "absolute Benevolence" in Ch. I above, p. 544. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those respects. In many of these natural affections there is something of the appearance of love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, though it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object. The last mentioned passion, natural to mankind in their present state, viz. that of pity to others in distress, though not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cause persons to be uneasy when the objects of it are in distress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has the same effect.
Natural gratitude, though in every instance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, because persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards persons on certain occasions, whom they have no real and proper friendship for, as in the instance of Saul towards David, once and again, after David's sparing his life, when he had so fair opportunity to kill him: yet it has the same or like operation and effect with friendship, in part, for a season, and with regard to so much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindness received. And in other instances it may have a more general and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a sort of benevolence love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their country, etc. The natural disposition there is to mutual affection between the sexes often operates by what may properly be called love. There is oftentimes truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there also is between parents and children. Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue, which is love: and especially the thing last mentionedI. e., the affection of parents for children. See Intro., p. 51, on the various familial affections. First ed. reads "the thing last mentioned have" (Ed. italics). has something of a love of benevolence. What they are essentially defective in is that they are private in their nature, they don't arise from any temper of benevolence to Being in general, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private sphere: i.e. they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private system, and while we shut all other things they stand in any relation to out of our consideration. If that private system contained the sum of universal existence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words, would be beautiful all things considered: but now it is not so. These private systems are so far from containing the sum of universal Being, or comprehending all existence which we stand related to, that it contains but an infinitely small part of it. TheFirst ed., no par. reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true virtue is the narrowness of their views; and above all, that they are so ready to leave the Divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts as though he were not properly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy, imaginary being.First ed., word capitalized. And though most men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his beingFirst ed., word capitalized. is not apt to come into the account, and to have the influence and effect of a real existence, as 'tis with other beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. which they see, and are conversant with by their external senses. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward sensations of displicence and approbation which rise in their minds, 'tis not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity, as part of the system, and as the Head of the system, and he who is all in all, in comparison of whom all the rest is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed; and their minds to be accordingly impressed and affected. Yea, we are apt through the narrowness of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions, to limit our consideration to only a small part of the created system. When private affections extend themselves to a considerable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with respect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For though his private system contains but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet being a considerable number, through the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowness of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all.Ed. italics, consistent with the first ed. in the next paragraph and later in this chapter. Hence among the Romans love to their country was the highest virtue: though this affection of theirs, so much extolled among them, was employed as it were for the destruction of the rest of the world of mankind. The larger the number is that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, through the narrowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue; because then the private system appears to have more of the image of the universal system. Whereas, when the circle it extends to is very small, it is not so apt to be looked upon virtuous, or not so virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children. And this is the reason why self-love is by nobody mistaken for true virtue. For though there be something of the general nature of virtue in this, here is love and good will, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that it by no means engrosses the view; unless it be of the person himself, who through the greatness of his pride may imagine himself as it were all. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent: and though self-love is far from being useless in the world; yea, 'tis exceeding necessary to society, besides its directly and greatly seeking the good of one: yet everybody sees that if it be not subordinate to, and regulated by, another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the system he is related to. And though this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system that contains thousands of individuals, and those private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent of the viewFirst ed. reads "extent to the view" (Ed. italics). and comprehension of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were all, or at least as some resemblance of the universal system. Thus I have observed how many of these natural principles, which have been spoken of, resemble virtue in its primaryEd. italics. I. e., resemble pure love to "persons or beings," or "good-giving." Cf. n. 2, just above. operation, which is benevolence. Many of them also have a resemblance of it in its secondaryEd. italics. I. e., resemble esteem for the virtuous qualities of others, or "good-liking." Cf. previous n. 2, and Ch. I above, pp. 547–49. operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish of the essential beauty of virtue, consisting in a being's cordial union to Being in general, from a spirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conscience, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity; and from a sense of desert, consisting in a sense of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, showing kindness and receiving kindness.The first of these elements, the formal element in conscience ("swapping places"; consistency with self), was built upon and presupposed the material element (the secondary beauty of desert), in Ch. V above. The next sentence analyzes (disapprobation of conscience into the same two elements. So from the same principle there is a disapprobation of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion; and a sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, opposing and being opposed, etc. together with a painful sensation naturally arising in a sense of self-opposition and inconsistence. Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approbation, because by the wise constitution of the great Governor of the world (as was observed) when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, though not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that falls short of it; as was shown before. And indeed natural conscience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's stead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to distinguish right and wrong.On the entire concurrence of the "two sources of morality" in their approbations and disapprobations, see Ch. V above, pp. 593–97. It has also been observed,Ch. IV above, par. 5, pp. 583–88. how that virtue consisting in benevolence is approved, and vice consisting in ill will is disliked, from the influence of self-love, together with association of ideas, in the same manner as men dislike those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy, perniciousness; but like those things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasantness, comfortableness, etc. This sort of approbation or liking of virtue, and dislike of vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the nature of vice, but because here is much of resemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to Being in general, but from self-love. There is also, as has been shown,This paragraph expands upon the final, terse paragraph of Ch. VI above; see p. 608, n. 9. a liking of some virtues, and dislike of some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This men are apt to mistake for the exercise of true virtue, on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, such as humanity, mercy, tenderness of heart, etc. and the contrary very odious; but besides, the approbation is not merely from self-love but from compassion, an affection that respects others, and resembles benevolence, as has been shown. Another reason why the things which have been mentioned are mistaken for true virtue is that there is, indeed a true negative moral goodness in them.Common morality from natural principles contains or limits real moral evil, even without the assistance of "restraining grace." JE returns to this topic below under par. 2 of his argument concerning similarity of effects. For a synopsis of the intricate steps in JE's account of the misleading similarity between common morality and true virtue, see Intro., pp. 54–55. By a "negative" moral goodness, I mean the negation or absence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exercise of natural conscience in such and such degrees, wherein appears such a measure of an awakening or sensibility of conscience, though it be not of the nature of real positive virtue or true moral goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness; because, in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness which causes great insensibility or stupidity of conscience. For sin, as was observed,Ch. V above, p. 594, text at n. 5. is not only against a spiritual and divine sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in natural conscience. No wonder that this sense, being long opposed and often conquered, grows weaker. All sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-love, not subordinate to regard to Being in general. AndFirst ed., no par. natural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the natural agreement between sin and misery. But if self were indeed all, and so more considerable than all the world besides, there would be no ill desert in his regarding himself above all, and making all other interests give place to private interest. And no wonder that men by long acting from the selfish principle, and by being habituated to treat themselves as if they were all, increase in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on themselves as all, and so to lose entirely the sense of ill desert in their making all other interests give place to their own. And no wonder that men by often repeating acts of sin, without punishment or any visible appearance of approaching punishment, have less and less sense of the connection of sin with punishment. That sense which an awakened conscience has of the desert of sin consists chiefly in a sense of its desert of resentment of the Deity, the fountain and head of universal existence.A fully awakened natural conscience has a sense of the desert of punishment, heightened in that conscience insofar as it is enlightened enough to apply to itself the impartial arbiter's argument. Cf. End of Creation, pp. 421–26. But no wonder that by a long continued worldly and sensual life men more and more lose all sense of the Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engrossed by sensitive objects, becomes sensual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impressions of spiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the conscience and general benevolence are entirely different principles, and sense of conscience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart.The "holy complacence of a benevolent... heart" compresses JE's understanding of the second object of a virtuous benevolence. See above, p. 6oq, n. 2. Yet wickedness may by long habitual exercise greatly diminish a sense of conscience. So that there may be negative moral goodness in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an argument of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causeth stupidity of conscience. So with respect to natural gratitude, though there may be no virtue merely in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man is come to look upon himself as all,Ed. italics. and others as nothing, and so their respect and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase of pride diminishes gratitude. So does sensuality, or the increase of sensual appetites, and coming more and more under the power and impression of sensible objects, tendFirst ed. read "tends" (Ed. italics). by degrees to make the mind insensible to anything else; and those appetites take up the whole soul; and through habit and custom the water is all drawn out of other channels in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel. In like manner natural affection, and natural pity, though not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminished greatly by the increase of those two principles of pride and sensuality;Pride and covetous self-love are cardinal vices in the charity sermons. See Intro., p. 81. Covetousness and sensuality are "concatenated," since JE did not believe people have bodily lusts. "The corruption of nature as to all that is positive in it does primarily consist in these two things: self-exaltation and worldly-mindedness. There are no other idols but self and the world; but all that is positive in the corruption of the heart is man's regard to idols. The great contest for the heart of man is between the true God and idols" (Miscell. no. 1032, c. 1744). Humility mortifies pride, which is a comparative spirit of exaltation; and "heavenly-mindedness" mortifies covetousness of the world (which includes, of course, bloated pleasures of the senses). Cf. Miscell. no. 950, and Charity, Sermon Twelve. and as the consequence of this, being habitually disposed to envy, malice, etc. theseFirst ed. begins a new sentence. lusts when they prevail to a high degree may overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles: even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to seeking his own private interest, in point of health, wealth, or honor; and yet no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning, in seeking his own personal and temporal interest, has anything of the nature and essence of true virtue. Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for true virtue is that in several respects they have the same effect,A quite different argument begins at this point, extending for only two paragraphs. Then JE returns to the sources of virtues. which true virtue tends to; especially in these two ways— 1. The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme Ruler,First ed., lowercase. that these natural principles for the most part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, etc. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a principle that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, etc. But yet nobody will assert that these have the nature of true virtue. 2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.Cf. the "negative moral goodness" discussed above. The emphasis in that context was more upon real vices restrained, while here it is more upon acts. Another sort of "negatively good influence"— setting ill will against ill will (Freedom of the Will, in Works, 1, 315–16)— may not be beyond the cunning of providence. So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons; which would be real wickedness. Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil. Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world. But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful God that men's self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts of true wickedness; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue: yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the world. Another reason why these inferior affections, especially some of them, are accounted virtuous is that there are affections of the same denominationEd. italics. See JE's account of moral language in the next and final chapter. For a comparison of JE with Thomas Aquinas on the "infused moral virtues" and the "perfection" of natural morality by charity, see Intro., pp. 54–59. which are truly virtuous. Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous pity, or a compassion to others under affliction or misery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is easy to see how benevolence which seeks another's good should cause us to desire his deliverance from evil. And this is a source of pity far more extensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are overlooked by natural instinct. AndFirst ed., no par. even in those cases to which instinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the case, the pity which is exercised may be called a virtuous compassion. SoI. e., in like manner. there is a virtuous gratitude, or a gratitude that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested general benevolence. As 'tis manifest that when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly prepossession— therefore,First ed. begins new sentence. when the superior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude. SoI. e., in like manner. there is a virtuous love of justice, arising from pure benevolence to Being in general, as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that every particular being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, consisting in the degree of its being and the degree of its virtue.Cf. Ch. I above, par. 5, pp. 548–49. Which is entirely diverse from an apprehension of justice from a sense of the beauty of uniformity in variety:Hutcheson's definition of beauty, which JE did not demean when he located it among secondary natural or moral beauty. as has been particularly shown already.Ch. III above, especially par. 4 and 5, pp. 568–74. And so it is easy to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desertEd. italics. different from what is natural and common. And soI. e., in like manner. a virtuous conscientiousness, or a sanctified conscience.On conscience and prudence, see Intro., pp. 57–58. And as when natural affections have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous, so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the sexes,I have already cited as an illustration JE's youthful encomium upon Sarah Pierrepont, Ch. VI above, p. 604, n. 1. Cf. also: "We see how great love the human nature is capable of, not only to God but fellow creatures. How greatly are we inclined to the other sex! Nor doth an exalted and fervent love to God hinder this, but only refines and purifies it. God has created the human nature to love fellow creatures, which he wisely has principally turned to the other sex... Christ has an human nature as well as we, and has an inclination to love those that partake of the human [nature] as well as we. The inclination which in us is turned to the other sex, in him is turned to the church which is his spouse... Nor is his love to God, in him more than in us (nor half so much), an hindrance or diversion to this love; because his love to God and his love to the saints are an hundred times nearer akin, than our love to God and our love to the other sex. Therefore when we feel love to anyone of the other sex, 'tis a good way to think of the love of Christ to an holy and beautiful soul" (Miscell. no. 189. LOVE OF CHRIST (written early in JE's tutorship at Yale). Cf. Miscell no. z. LOVE OF GOD, quoted in Intro., p. 20, n. 6, on the communicatio ideomatum. as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with instinct, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are agreeable to the great ends and purposes of true virtue. Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality, which tend to overbear and greatly diminish the exercises of the forementioned useful and necessary principles of nature.See p. 615 above, n. 5. And a principle of general benevolence softens and sweetens the mind, and makes it more susceptible of the proper influence and exercise of the gentler natural instincts, and directs every one into its proper channel, and determines the exercise to the proper manner and measure, and guides all to the best purposes.
CHAPTER VIII. IN WHAT RESPECTS VIRTUE OR MORAL GOOD IS FOUNDED IN SENTIMENT; AND HOW FAR IT IS FOUNDED IN THE REASON AND NATURE OF THINGS
THAT which is called "virtue" is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called "beautiful" to anyone beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say, agreeable "in itself" and "immediately" pleasant to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but for something else, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called "beautiful"; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reasonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not; but on the frame of our minds whereby they are so made that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.The meaning of the word grateful here is not contrary to JE's normal usage. See Intro., p. 13, n. 4. The reference here is toward the object, things grateful and pleasing, not toward gratitude in the mind of the subject. Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm, virtue is founded in sentiment and not in reason, that they who see the beauty there is in true virtue, don't perceive it by argumentation on its connections and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain spiritual sense given them of God,See par. 6 at the end of Ch. I. Cf. gracious affection as a new simple idea, an entirely new kind of exercises of the soul, never there before (Affections, in Works, 2, 205). whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object, this is certainly true. But if thereby is meant that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily,This word bears its ordinary meaning in this chapter, i.e., that anything decided arbitrarily could just as well be otherwise. For JE, of course, God's determinations were altogether fitting. His determinations, his laws of nature, the moral constitution governing the world are neither metaphysically necessary nor whimsical. By an "arbitrary" constitution JE means "a constitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing but the divine wisdom" (Original Sin, in Works, 3, 403). so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things, this I think is not true. Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of beingFirst ed., word capitalized. to Being in general. And, as has also been observed, that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or a universally benevolent frame of mind: because he whose temper is to love Being in general, therein must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with love to Being in general. Therefore now the question is, whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts so arbitrarilySee n. 3 above. that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things, as this? And in the first place I observe that to assert this would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition. For here 'tis supposed that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of beingFirst ed., word capitalized. to Being.First ed., lowercase. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition and contrariety to it.
I observe secondly that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect Being in general;This statement is the one place in the second dissertation in which JE conceptualizes or defines God as Being. and without all doubt it is in itself necessary (and impossible it should be otherwise)Editorial parenthesis. that God should agree with himself, be united with himself, or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature. Let it be noted, thirdly, by this temper only can created beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. be united to, and agree with one another. This appears because it consists in consent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular being,First ed., word capitalized. except such as are opposite to Being in general, or excepting such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with general existence. But certainly if any particular created beingFirst ed., word capitalized. were of a temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. one with another. Fourthly, I observe, there is no other temper but this that a man can have and agree with himself, or be without self-inconsistence, i.e. without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons. Every beingFirst ed., word capitalized. that has understanding and will necessarily loves happiness. For, to suppose any beingFirst ed., word capitalized. not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every beingFirst ed., word capitalized. who has a faculty of will must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclination repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby beingsFirst ed., word capitalized. desire the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, 'tis apparent it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery in effect loves a tendency to his own misery: and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another. And besides, it necessarily follows from self-love that men love to be loved by others; because in this, others' love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves: and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.This entire paragraph "Fourthly" restates the theme, running throughout Charity, Sermon Seven, End of Creation, and True Virtue, that self-love in the most general or universal sense of love of "one's own" happiness is equivalent to exercising will or choice. The connection between the nature of a willing being and love to its own happiness is a morally necessary one, founded in the reason and nature of things. These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense, by which those that are truly virtuous and holy perceive the excellency of true virtue,See par. 6 at the end of Ch. I, and p. 620 above, at n. 2. is in the sacred Scriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, etc. If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such names.Terms "name" notions, and are agreeable to them, in JE's realistic view of language. For, if there were no correspondence or agreement in such a sense with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a diverse or contrary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a knowledge or perception of anything besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no representation of anything without. But since it is otherwise, since it is agreeable, in the respects above mentioned, to the nature of things, and especially since 'tis the representation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the Divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being so, hereby persons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be shown, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse) in many respects assist persons to a right understanding of things in general, to understand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our interest; and assists us to see the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense, and the prevalence of those dispositions that are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's understandings. And as to that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in natural conscience, neither can this be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of things: but is established in an agreement with the nature of things; so as no sense of mind that can be supposed of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will appear by these two things— 1. This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be exercised at liberty and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere, approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; and those things only; though not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation.See Ch. V above, pp. 593–97. Therefore, as that divine sense has been already shown to be agreeable to the necessary nature of things, so this inferior moral sense, being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things. 2. It has been shown that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the supposition it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists, viz. a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly such a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper of mind. Here it may be observedThere have been several references forward to these reflections on the nature of moral language with which Two Dissertations concludes. There is little elsewhere among JE's published writings with which to compare these final pages. To find supplement, or background, of equal strength and greater refinement one has to go back in time in the "Miscellanies" to No. 782 on "signs" and "actual ideas" (and nos. 777, 628, 126, 123, on "ideas" and reality, and on spiritual knowledge); or to the notes on "The Mind" on such topics as truth, genius, rules of reasoning, words, language, material existence, complex ideas, sensation, judgment. In his twenties JE asked the question, "[W]hat is it for our ideas to agree with things as they are?" (Ed. italics), and announced that "to find out the reasons of things in natural philosophy is only to find out the proportion of God's acting" ("The Mind," nos. [10] and [34] in Works, 6, 342, 353). JE's agenda for a philosophy of language was never completed.— As the use of language is for mankind to express their sentiments or ideas to each other, so that those terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are signified, are to express those moral sentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore 'tis that moral sense which is in natural conscience that chiefly governs the use of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in these matters among mankind; 'tis indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By such words, "right" and "wrong," "good" and "evil," when used in a moral sense, is meant in common speech that which deserves praise or blame, respect or resentment. But as has been often observed, mankind in general have a sense of desert by this natural moral sense. Therefore here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered, viz.: Seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language as to what is called by the name of "good" and "evil," "worthy" and "unworthy"; and 'tis apparent that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or other is different in different persons, in different nations; that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame: how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature of things? In order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided into two: viz. Whether men's sentiments of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather casual and accidental? And, whether the way of their using words in what they call "good" and "evil" is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?JE's answer to these questions is likely to appear astonishingly optimistic to the twentieth-century reader. Not only do moral terms "name" moral notions agreeable to them. Not only are moral notions or "ideas" agreeable to qualities and characters in the nature of things. Not only docs natural conscience and a spiritual or divine sense approve, under the "same denominations," the same moral virtues which both promote— separately or mixed together. Not only is ordinary moral language an "image" of divine moral language— the former mediate to the latter's immediate foundation in reality. It is also the case that acquiring a moral language insures that men are agreeable to one another in learning to use moral terms to name the same moral qualities and characters. Even moral disputes presuppose that this is the case. JE did not look into the abyss of subjectivism, emotivism, or relativism and then draw back. His was not a world as yet fragmented into too many communities of moral discourse. Instead, JE was serenely confident in "moral man" created in the natural image of God and governed by the moral constitutions and instinctual approvals this dissertation explicates. A splendid common morality is not the same as true virtue, of course, nor the natural image the same as the restoration of the spiritual image of God. Nevertheless, a remarkable thing about JE was his confidence that the "new creation" is founded in Scripture, reason, and the nature of things, not in sentiment.
As to the first, I would observe that the general disposition or sense of mind exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment may be the same in all: though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love, or resentment, may consist in the same thing in general, viz. a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or something that some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, etc. I say, this general notion of desert may be the same: and yet occasions and objects through variety of apprehensions about these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But 'tis needless to dwell long on this, since things which have been said by others (Mr. Hutcheson, in particular)Cf. Francis Hutcheson, Moral Good, sec. IV, entitled "All Mankind agree in this general Foundation of their Approbation of Moral Actions. The Grounds of the different Opinions about Morals." The reasons that there is vast diversity of moral principles in various nations (granted that there is a universal moral sense) are these: (1) We are not to imagine "that this Sense should give us, without Observation, Ideas of complex Actions, or of their natural Tendencys to Good or Evil: it only determines us to approve Benevolence, whenever it appears in any action, and to hate the contrary." In short, people disagree over what is beneficent, from the same irreducible approval of benevolence. "Men have Reason given them to judge and compare" actions; "absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no Reason, than that they have no moral Sense of Beauty in Actions" (art. iii, pp. 200–05). So men reasonably disagree about what is happiness (or nonmoral good), about the most effectual means to it, and make mistakes in "computing" non-moral goods or evils in the consequences. (2) "The next Ground of Diversity in Sentiments, is the Diversity of Systems to which Men, from foolish Opinions, confine their Benevolence." Disagreement arises because moral sense is limited to "Parts of Mankind only," to "Cabals, Sects, Factions, Partys." Still in the "proportionable Division of their Prey" there is moral sense among thieves (art. iv, pp. 206–09). (3) "The last Ground of Diversity which occurs, are the false Opinions of the Will and Laws of the Deity." This is one of "the more importunate Solicitations" that may overcome the moral sense (art. v, p. 211). which are to be found among different persons and nations concerning moral good and evil are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind. Nor, secondly, is the use of the words, "good" and "evil," "right" and "wrong," when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views that occasion the forementioned variety of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by use, yet that which governs in the use of terms is general or common use. And mankind, in what they would signify by terms are obliged to aim at a consistent use: because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words; both that men should be consistent with themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. ButFirst ed., no par. men can't call anything "right" or "wrong," "worthy" or "ill-deserving," consistently, any other way than by calling things so, which truly deserve praise or blame, i.e. things wherein (all things considered) there is most uniformity in connecting with them praise or blame. There is no other way that they can use these terms consistently with themselves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers that bring them to justice, and call their behavior by odious names, yet herein they are inconsistent with themselves; because, when they put themselves in the place of those that have injured them, they approve the same things they condemn.See JE's example of a mutinous crew's anger at public-spirited betrayal, Ch. IV above, p. 583. R. M. Hare argues that to affirm an action to be right or good means to prescribe the same for anyone similarly situated. And therefore such are capable of being convinced that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and sword, may affix terms that signify the highest degrees of virtue to the conduct of such as show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped. AndFirst ed., no par. not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves, but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill-deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else wherein men have any notion of good or ill-desert that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard or foundation in nature for an universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil; which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in all disputes they may have one with another, about right and wrong; and in all endeavors used to evince or prove that anything is either good or evil, in a moral sense. FINIS
Jonathan Edwards [1749], Ethical Writings (WJE Online Vol. 8) , Ed. Paul Ramsey [word count] [jec-wjeo08]. |
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