The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University

It has been said that there may be too much of devotion, and this reason has been given for it: that one man was made to be useful to the rest of the universe, was made for the common good of the whole frame; and, that there may be a degree of devotion that may hinder one from their being so useful to the rest of the creatures as they might otherwise be—neither of which are agreeable to reason.

As for the first, that the highest end of a particular creature was to be useful to the common good of creatures in general. Which I think is the same thing as to say, that the world was made that the parts of it might be mutually useful to each other; that is, that the world was made to have all the parts of it nicely hanging together, and sweetly

harmonizing and corresponding; that is, that the world might be nicely contrived, that the parts might nicely hang together; that is, that the world was nicely contrived, that when it was done it might be a nicely contrived world; that is, that the world was nicely contrived for nothing at all! So that it must be, according to that opinion of the highest end of every particular being to be useful to the whole; [it] is the same as to say that the whole, with all its parts useful to each other, is good for nothing at all. Who can't see this? For most certainly if the highest end of the world be to have its parts useful to each other the world in general is good for nothing at all.

To illustrate it by example: if the highest end of every part of a clock is only mutually to assist the other parts in their motions, that clock is good for nothing at all; the clock in general is altogether useless, however every part is useful to turn round the other parts. So, however useful all the parts of the world are to each other, if that be their highest end, the world in general is altogether useless. I am sure there is the same reason for one as for the other. Yea it is a contradiction and nonsense to say, the highest end of a particular part of the world is to be useful to the rest; for if that is the highest end, they are not useful. So it is nonsense to say of a machine whose highest end is to have one part move another, that the parts of that engine are useful to move the rest; for the whole is useless, and so every part, however they correspond together.

But as in a clock one wheel moves another, and that another, till at last we come to the hand, and there we end—the use of that immediately respects the eye of man—so it is in the world: some less perfect inanimate beings are useful to the more perfect, and they to beasts, one beast to another, and they to man. And what is man made for? where shall we go next? Surely man was not made for beasts; we must not go back again. Or is man good for nothing at all? The next immediate step is to the Creator. He was undoubtedly made to glorify the Creator, so that devotion must be his highest end. The hand of the clock was not made to move the wheels; we must not go back: after we are come from wheel to wheel, at last to the hand, the next immediate step is to the eye. In the creation, there is an immediate communication between one degree of being and the next degree of being (every wheel immediately communicates with the next wheel), but man being the top; so that the next immediate step from him is to God. Without doubt, there is an immediate communication between the Creator and this highest of creatures, according to the order of being. So that as the

intelligent being is exercised immediately about the Creator, so without doubt the Creator immediately influences the intelligent being, immediately influences the soul; for 'tis but one immediate step from the soul to God. Those that call this enthusiasm talk very unphilosophically.

As for the other thing that is said, that there may be a degree of devotion that may hinder one from being useful to the rest of the universe: I suppose they will not dislike devotion if it only hinders one for but half a minute, and makes one much more useful ever after; I mean, if it only makes us useless during our life upon earth, and much ore useful to eternity afterwards. Not that I believe that a man would be the less useful even in this world, if his devotion was to that degree, as to keep him all his lifetime in an ecstasy.