SECTION 1. THE ESSENCE OF THE VIRTUE AND VICE OF DISPOSITIONS OF THE HEART, AND ACTS OF THE WILL, LIES NOT IN THEIR CAUSE, BUT THEIR NATURE
Virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the will consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts, but wholly in the origin or cause of them. JE objects to a will that acts totally by itself (uncaused) stating that “if we chose to love virtue, not in love to virtue, or anything that was good, and exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise, according to common sense, because the choice was not of a good nature” (p. 340)

SECTION 2. THE FALSENESS AND INCONSISTENCE OF THAT METAPHYSICAL NOTION OF ACTION, AND AGENCY, WHICH SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY ENTERTAINED BY THE DEFENDERS OF THE ARMINIAN DOCTRINE CONCERNING LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, ETC.
Man’s actions (Chubb) arise not from necessity but from contingency; man’s actions have no antecedent cause; the word ‘action’ is a nonentity for JE because man is unable to understand man’s actions apart cause and effect.

SECTION 3. THE REASONS WHY SOME THINK IT CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE, TO SUPPOSE THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY, TO BE WORTHY OF EITHER PRAISE OR BLAME
Arminians claim that a will that acts out of necessity is not worthy of praise or blamed. Distinction between moral and natural ability is essential. It communicates that Calvinists mean the will out of moral necessity.

SECTION 4. IT IS AGREEABLE TO COMMON SENSE, AND THE NATURAL NOTIONS OF MANKIND, TO SUPPOSE MORAL NECESSITY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PRAISE AND BLAME, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
Commonly viewed, actions derived by moral necessity may receive praise or blame. Children can recognize when an evil will is wrong. Common sense underscores the difference between moral and natural ability.

SECTION 5. CONCERNING THOSE OBJECTIONS, THAT THIS SCHEME OF NECESSITY RENDERS ALL MEANS AND ENDEAVORS FOR THE AVOIDING OF SIN, OR THE OBTAINING VIRTUE AND HOLINESS, VAIN, AND TO NO PURPOSE; AND THAT IT MAKES MEN NO MORE THAN MERE MACHINES IN AFFAIRS OF MORALITY AND RELIGION
Connection of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents makes all means, endeavors and actions toward righteousness and sin vain. Arminians assume that Calvinists’ insistence on necessity lead men to act as machines. JE objects because man behaves according to choice and to what pleases him. Man is not programmed for he, for example, suppresses reason and choose the bad instead of the good and therefore is subject to blame and praise.

SECTION 6. CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE DOCTRINE WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED, THAT IT AGREES WITH THE STOICAL DOCTRINE OF FATE, AND THE OPINIONS OF MR. HOBBES
Arminians insist that the Calvinists’ claim that there are no acts of the will or events that are unattended by necessity embodies the ancient Stoic’s doctrine of fate and Hobbes’ opinion of necessity. JE objects by stating that man do as they please and that God has appointed means like prayer which when employed can lead man to choose otherwise.

SECTION 7. CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF THE DIVINE WILL
“The will of God Himself is necessary in all its determinations” (p. 375). This makes God not worthy of praise since he acts out of necessity. Knowledge of the being God is imperfect by human standards. God acts according to what is ‘fittest and best’. It is impossible for God to act in a random manner. God is worthy of praise for he acts with supreme wisdom and holiness.
SECTION 8. SOME FURTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE MORAL NECESSITY OF GOD'S VOLITIONS CONSIDERED

God’s action did not flow out of necessity—argued by 2 arguments. (1) “No difference between various possible objects of choice” (p. 384). (2) God’s willing “one thing rather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God’s actually placing in different parts of the world.” (p. 387). JE objects by stating: (1) God did not choose from necessity when facing two possible worlds that are equally desirable. JE states that two worlds that are same are not two but one (“the figure is the same, p. 388) and (2) that this implies God is limited in his knowledge. The claim that God created two identical worlds while not occupying the same position needs to respond to God’s choice for one over the other. JE objects to the claim, as a consequence of the necessary determination of the divine will by a superior fitness, that “the freeness of God’s grace and goodness is derogated, in choosing the objects of his favor and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits” (p. 393). JE states that God’s choice is “the act of God’s goodness, [and] to answer to some wise design of his own, some end in view of God’s omniscience” (p. 394).

SECTION 9. CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE DOCTRINE WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED, THAT IT MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN

Arminians claim that Calvinists make God the author of sin. JE underscores God’s omniscience, which includes the origin of fin. JE challenges Arminians to explain what they mean by that phrase “the author of sin.” (p. 399). JE explains this issue from the perspective of God’s revealed will and secret will.

SECTION 10. CONCERNING SIN'S FIRST ENTRANCE INTO THE WORLD

JE states Arminians are unable to explain the entrance of the first sin into the world. “Nothing that the Arminians say about the contingence, or self-determining power of man’s will, can serve to explain with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of it” (p. 414).

SECTION 11. OF A SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES, WITH GOD'S MORAL CHARACTER

JE repeats arguments already explained related to commands, God as the author of sin; God’s secret and revealed will and that God’s character is consistent with his moral demands. JE states that the Scriptures (full of commands, counsels, promises, threatenings) are against the Arminians and not for them. It is the scheme of the Arminians that which is “inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness…” (p. 419).

SECTION 12. OF A SUPPOSED TENDENCY OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO ATHEISM AND LICENTIOUSNESS

Arminians claim that the “Calvinistic doctrine of necessity, saps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice … [based on] that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavors, in order to be virtuous and religious.” (pp. 420-421). JE objects by stating that it is the Arminians principles and doctrines that tend to atheism and licentiousness. “The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connections of all events, on some antecedent ground or reason of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the being of God” (p. 420). “Their [Arminians] doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because in such inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own wills. Which leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so far as natural inclination has had a hand in determining their wills, to the commission of ‘em.” (p. 421).

SECTION 13. CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE REASONING, BY WHICH THE CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE IS SUPPORTED, THAT IT IS METAPHYSICAL AND ABSTRUSE

JE responds to the claim that he metaphysical and abstruse that when talking of issues related to the soul it is inevitable to not deal with metaphysical arguments and terminology. JE acknowledges that he employs ordinary language while pointing out that Arminians are the ones who use language that cannot be meaningfully derived. “Thus, instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, in all ages, have; consisting in the opportunity to do as one pleases, they [Arminians] have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in indifference, contingence, and self determination, by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity and manifold gross inconsistence.” (p. 429).