Edwards, Terms and Definitions:
Nature of Necessity, et alia
Metaphysical/philosophical necessity

- Metaphysical or philosophical necessity (roughly, *necessitas absoluta*): necessity where “no opposition is supposed or supposable”; e.g., God’s existence and acts *ad intra*
  - The “full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true.”
  - NB: “And in this sense I use the word ‘necessity,’ in the following discourse”

- Three types:
  - 1. “Necessity in itself,” or, “necessity by nature.” E.g., mathematical truths;
  - 2. ”Necessity of past events”
  - 3. “Real and certain connection *consequentially* [sic]”
Real and certain connection consequentially

- When “firmly connected with something else that is necessary in one of the [two] former respects”
  - All future necessities: not necessary in itself, by its nature; nor “by being made sure, by being already come to pass.”
  - “This is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.”

- NB:
  - Arguably not necessitas consequentis (or de dicto), the logical or present necessity that a thing must be that which it is, although it either could or could not be otherwise (that is, a real contingency)
  - Arguably the necessitas consequentiae (or de re): i.e., on hypothesis of antecedent, consequent could not be otherwise
  - Thus, while employing the term “necessity of consequence,” JE mistakenly intends necessitas consequentiae (Muller) or perhaps “runs roughshod” (Helm) over the classical distinction between the two (consequentis vs. consequentiae) altogether
Impossibility

■ “Negative necessity,” or ”necessity that a thing should not be.”

■ “Unable” and “inability”: no will or endeavor “is or can be supposed” in bringing something to pass
Contingency

- Contingency:
  - Either: “when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned.” “What we have no means of the foresight of.” (Apparently a “general” notion of contingency?)
  - Or: “something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which is existence has any fixed and certain connection” (More a philosophical notion?)

- NB: Traditional understanding of contingency as, rather baldly, that which could be otherwise or simply could not be
Moral and Natural Necessity

■ **Moral:**
  - 1. “Sometimes...used for a necessity of obligation”
  - 2. Connection of things which is “ground of moral evidence”
  - 3. Connection which occurs from “moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives.”
    ■ This latter sense is that which JE uses

■ **Natural (as applied to mankind):**
  - “Such necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes”
Moral and Natural Inability

- Moral: “the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives,” etc.
- Natural inability: when nature “don’t allow” it
Liberty and Moral Agency, a la Pelagians, Arminians, etc.

■ Liberty: three characteristics
  - 1. “Self-determining power in the will...whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by anything prior to its own acts”
  - 2. Indifference, i.e., that “the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibrio.”
  - 3. Contingence (employed as no fixed and certain connection with previous ground for existence)

■ Moral agent
  - A being “capable of those actions that have a moral quality”