In this paper I want to take a look at John Locke’s influence on Jonathan Edwards’ *The Religious Affections* (1748). When Edwards was a teenage student at Yale College he came across a copy of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Some have thought that this reaction was a mere adolescent infatuation on Edwards’ part. But Edwards’ first biographer, Samuel Hopkins, famously captured Jonathan’s lifelong attitude to that book:

Taking that book in his Hand [that is, Locke’s Human Understanding] upon some Occasion, not long before his death, he said to some of his select Friends who were there with him, That he was beyond Expression entertain’d and pleas’d with it, when he read it in his Youth at College; that he was as much engaged, and had more Satisfaction and Pleasure in studying it, than the most greedy Miser in gathering up handfuls of Silver and Gold from some new discovered Treasure.  

To support this, we note that John Locke’s influence was evident in the later books. Of these, *The Freedom of the Will* (1754) is a sustained philosophical treatment of that topic, and *The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin* (1758) an elaborate work against the now largely-forgotten English Unitarian, John Taylor of Norwich. In these two later books, Edwards’ attitude to Locke might be characterized as one of ‘critical deference’. In both books he cites Locke with approval, but does not place him beyond criticism or amendment. But it is generally thought that Locke’s influence is absent in the *Affections*.

However we shall see that in the *Affections* Locke’s Essay influences Edwards in various important ways. Indeed here he is much more deferential, uncritically so perhaps, to the Englishman while at the same time never mentioning Locke by name. This silence has led scholars to conclude that the influence of Locke was altogether absent. The editor of the Yale Edition of *The Religious Affections*, the late John E. Smith, in his lengthy Introduction to the work, briefly refers to Locke. Why the absence of an explicit reference? *The Religious Affections*, Edwards’ first great book, was for domestic consumption, principally for the churches of New England, and it is likely that its author decided that it would be unwise to advertise the identity of John Locke, a broad church Arminian on whom he was in fact relying.
So I shall argue that Edwards has an ally in his endeavours, in *The Religious Affections*, to chart a middle road in the revivals of his time, the English gentleman and philosopher, John Locke, even though he remained *incognito* to the reader. *Original Sin* was intended by Edwards to go beyond the churches of New England, to Europe, to the fashionable deists whose tenets were in Edwards’ view the root cause of those theological ills that were besetting New England. The book was intended as a blow at the root of these tenets, and Edwards was happy to use Locke explicitly and overtly in his project. For the deists thought of Locke as their ally, but Edwards didn’t agree. Locke was his ally. Similar things could be said of *The Freedom of the Will*. Here he shares Locke’s unitary view of the self, and something of the Englishman’s antipathy to the faculty psychology of the Puritans and others.

I shall show that *The Religious Affections* was written within the parameters of the Lockean view of the relation between reason and revelation, but Locke’s influence went much farther. On a key theme, the character and influence of the affections, Edwards paraphrases Locke extensively and approvingly, and Locke’s influence is certainly as great here as in the much-touted references to Locke in his other works, if not more so. There are also stray signs of his reading of Locke at various points. We shall look at this evidence in turn.

**Edwards’ Ally, John Locke**

When Edwards is characterizing the supernatural character of the Holy Spirit’s regenerating work on the soul, he describes it as imparting ‘what some metaphysicians call a new simple idea’ in the mind of the recipient. This is the passage referred to by John E. Smith. ‘Simple idea’ was Locke’s term of art for ‘the materials of all our knowledge’. Uninterpreted touches and tastes, for example, are instances of simple ideas. Some have embellished this connection between Locke and Edwards, myself included. According to Edwards, regeneration is the imparting of a new spiritual or supernatural sense, receiving a new simple idea, exercising a sixth sense, and the terminology is clearly Locke’s, though very similar language can be found in a Puritan such as John Owen for example, whom Edwards also quotes.

There are other, more circumstantial, signs of Locke’s influence in the *Affections*. For example, Locke uses the rare word ‘velleity’ to characterize the weakest kind of movement of the will, that ‘degree of desire that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything that it

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2 Smith, “Editor’s Introduction,” in WJE 2:152.


carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it.\textsuperscript{7} Edwards, taking up Locke’s thought, shuns Locke’s language at this point, and instead invents the word ‘woulding’ to serve the same purpose. ‘That religion, which God requires, and will accept, does not consist in weak, dull and lifeless wouldings, raising us a little above the state of indifference’.\textsuperscript{8} This is indirect evidence, it is true, but significant nevertheless.

But is the influence of Locke on Edwards (as regards \textit{The Religious Affections}) terminological and nothing more? I once thought so. But now I think the answer to that question is ‘not exactly’.

\textbf{Edwards, Locke and Enthusiasm}

To continue our examination, I now wish to look at the broader concerns of \textit{The Religious Affections}, and Edwards’ ratification of Locke’s outlook as expressed in his chapter ‘Of Enthusiasm’, which Locke added in the Fourth Edition of his \textit{Essay Concerning Human Understanding}. This chapter is situated towards the end of Book IV of the \textit{Essay}, entitled ‘Of Knowledge and Opinion’, coming immediately after Chapter XVIII ‘Of faith and reason, and their distinct provinces’. It supplements Locke’s views in that chapter. His general position on faith and reason is that faith must be ‘reasonable’, that is, it must pass the tests of ‘reasonableness’.\textsuperscript{9} For example, Scripture is authoritative because the words of prophets, Christ, and his apostles were validated by miracles, and he is generally suspicious of claims to have ‘immediate revelation’ from God and advises against placing one’s faith in such. To have such faith would be an instance of ‘enthusiasm’. Nonetheless in the course of opposing enthusiasm in these ways Locke makes comments in the direction of endorsing the idea of an immediate work of the Spirit, which Edwards appropriated, while he kept within the broad boundaries of what Locke regarded as reasonable.

Here are some of the claims that Locke makes. The enthusiasts behave as follows: ‘whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from heaven and must be obeyed’.\textsuperscript{10} Enthusiasm lays both reason and revelation to one side, and ‘substitutes in the room of them the ungrounded fancies of a man’s own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct’.\textsuperscript{11} By contrast reason is natural revelation, and scriptural revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches for the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Essay}, II XX.\textsuperscript{6} (Yolton, I:191).
\item \textit{WJE} 2:99.
\item On this, see Paul Helm, “Locke on Faith and Knowledge,” \textit{Philosophical Quarterly} 23 (Jan. 1973):52–66. The title of one of Locke’s books was \textit{The Reasonableness of Christianity}, (1695).
\item \textit{Essay} IV.XIX.\textsuperscript{6} (Yolton, II:290).
\item \textit{Essay} IV.XIX.\textsuperscript{3} (Yolton, II:289).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
from God. ‘So that he that takes away reason, to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both’.  

So according to Locke, enthusiasm has to be distinguished from true religion, which is grounded upon special revelation, validated by God’s natural revelation, by the use of human reason in validating it, in various ways. In line with his more general discussion of faith and reason, Locke proceeds to set up tests for the presence of enthusiasm. It is interesting to note some of these.

The question then here is: How do I know that GOD is the revealer of this to me, that this impression is made upon my mind by the Holy Spirit, and therefore I ought to obey it?  

If they say that they know it to be true because it is a revelation from God, the reason is good; but then it will be demanded how they know it to be a revelation from God. If they say by the light it brings with it, which shines bright in their minds and they cannot resist, I beseech them to consider whether this be any more than what we have taken notice of already, viz. That it is a revelation because they strongly believe it to be true.

The strength of our persuasions are no evidence at all of their own rectitude: crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as straight, and men may be as positive and peremptory in error as in truth.

Light, true light, in the mind is, or can be, nothing else but the evidence of the truth of any proposition; and if it be not a self-evident proposition, all the light it has or can have is from the clearness and validity of those proofs upon which it is received......For if strength of persuasion be the light which must guide us, I ask how shall anyone distinguish between the delusions of Satan and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an angel of light.

God when he makes the prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural.

If this internal light, or any proposition which under that title we take for inspired, be conformable to the principles of reason or to the word of God, which is attested revelation, reason warrants it and we may safely receive for true and be guided by it in our belief and actions.

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12 Essay IV.XIX.4 (Yolton, II:289).
13 Essay IV.XIX.10 (Yolton, II:292).
14 Essay IV.XIX.11 (Yolton, II:293).
15 Essay IV.XIX.11 (Yolton, II:293).
16 Essay IV.XIX.13 (Yolton, II:294).
So much on the negative side of things, on what does not count as reasonable faith. But holy prophets of old who had revelations from God were in a better position.

Thus we see the holy men of old, who have revelations from GOD, had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their own minds to testify to them that it was from GOD. They were not left to their own persuasions alone that those persuasions were from GOD, but had outward signs to convince them of the author of those revelations. 19

And here is what might be called, somewhat anachronistically, a concession in the direction of Edwards.

In what I have said I am far from denying that GOD can or doth sometimes enlighten men’s minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases too we have reason and the Scripture, unerring rules to know whether it be from GOD or no. 20

These extracts will be sufficient, I hope, to get Locke’s drift in his own words. Note the framework of reason and revelation; the opposition to ‘enthusiasm’, the references to the terminology of ‘internal light’ and ‘supernatural light’, familiar to readers of the Religious Affections, at least by the time they reach Part III, and above all the method of testing claims to be imbued with the Spirit of God in the light of certain criteria, those provided by reason and revelation. The idea of tests or signs is central to The Religious Affections. And the important concession.

Edwards, Affection and Pleasure

So to a large extent Edwards agrees with Locke on reason and revelation, even though their particular judgments about what is reasonable or unreasonable in religion may differ. He also makes the most of Locke’s ‘concession’ in the direction of the particular views he holds. His references to a new inward perception, etc., 21 are in accord with Locke’s recognition that God ‘doth sometimes enlighten men’s minds in the apprehending of certain truths . . . by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it’. 22 And Edwards broadens Locke’s tests to include moral and spiritual fruit. No doubt theologically-speaking Edwards offered a ‘puritanised’ version of Locke by his more developed appreciation of the connectedness of Word and Spirit which is such a feature of The Religious Affections.

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20 Essay IV.XIX.16 (Yolton, II:296).
21 WJE 2:205f.
22 Essay IV.XIX.16 (Yolton, II:296).
Nevertheless, Edwards’ doctrine of the ‘new sense’ as given to us in the *Religious Affections* deliberately meets the Lockean arguments—it is an immediate supernatural intuition from God, not from man, validated by the reason as such. Locke thinks that such experiences are legitimate, provided that they are subordinated to and informed by revelation. Edwards provides the tests, appealing to reason and revelation to do so, in (as we have seen) a broadly Lockean fashion. For Edwards, Lockean ‘enthusiasm’ is not ‘spiritual’. He dismisses the idea of new revelations, and the acquisition of new faculties. No doubt Locke would have regarded the various agitations of the body that Edwards condoned or encouraged, such as those his wife Sarah related to him, as rather unbecoming and even somewhat embarrassing, but he could hardly have argued that in and of themselves they had significant negative epistemological value. But more on Locke’s view on bodily agitations is to follow. In any case, as we know, Edwards thought that such agitations were neither here nor there as far as providing evidence of a genuine work of the Holy Spirit.

**Working Within the Lockean Framework**

Let us now see how Edwards works within this Lockean outlook on reason, revelation, enthusiasm and so on. In Part I of the *Affections* there are references to the Lockean view of human nature, particularly Edwards’ stress on the unity of the self, which indicates his inclination to dismiss the faculty psychology of his mediaeval and Reformed Orthodox antecedents. He first goes public on the overtly Lockean character of this unitary view of the self in Part 1 of *The Freedom of the Will*. According to this view, there are two ‘faculties’, understanding and will, and the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, and so are not a distinct third faculty. This follows the line of Locke in his chapter ‘Of Power’:

[...]he ordinary way of speaking is that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind: a word proper enough, if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men’s thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those actions of understanding and volition. Edwards makes similar remarks in Part I of the *Affections*: ‘God has indued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is capable to perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, views and judges of things, which is called the understanding. The other faculty . . . is sometimes called the inclination.’

The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will. Locke and Edwards sometimes use the term ‘faculties’, but other times not, indicating by this not so much inconsistency in

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23 WJE 2:132.
26 WJE 2:96.
27 WJE 2:97.
their views but an understanding of the faculties as referring to modes of the unitary self rather than essential distinctions within the self.

The affections are central to the book, of course. Despite Edwards' Puritan background, the account he gives of an affection was largely the result of direct Lockean influence. Before the long chapter XXI of Book II ‘Of Power’ in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which Edwards used overtly in his account of human action in The Freedom of the Will, Locke placed a shorter discussion, Chapter XX, ‘Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain’. I will try to display the similarity if not the identity of the views, first by quoting Locke verbatim, and then Edwards. First Locke:

1. Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied by pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure and pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple ideas of the senses, only by experience.

2. Things then are good and evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us: or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body, sometimes of thoughts in the mind.

3. Pleasure and pain and that which causes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn.

Locke then goes on to illustrate this by reference to the affections of love, hatred, and so on.

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28 Locke’s Essay, first published in 1689, went through five editions in Locke’s lifetime. Edwards is reckoned to have read the book around 1717 (George M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards, A Life [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005], 62). The fourth edition of the Essay (1700) contained, amongst other new material, the chapter ‘Of Enthusiasm’ which was retained in the fifth (1706) and subsequent editions. Locke died in 1704. A question is, was the version of the Essay that Edwards read the one that lacked the chapter ‘Of Enthusiasm’, or did he read the fourth or the fifth edition? As a student Edwards had access at Yale to the 1690 London edition of Locke’s Essay, for it was included in the collection of books donated to the Yale Library by Jeremiah Dummer. See Louise May Bryant and Mary Patterson, “The List of Books Sent by Jeremiah Dummer,” in Papers in Honor of Andrew Kegh, Librarian of Yale University, by the Staff of the Library, 30 June 1938 (New Haven: privately printed, 1938), 435. More importantly, however, Edwards purchased and used the two-volume seventh edition of the Essay (London, 1716). It is listed in his “Account Book” (a register of books that he owned and lent to others). See the WJE 26:337-38. (I am grateful to Doug Sweeney for this information.) Currently, the most direct route to the seventh edition is the fifth edition (1706) edited by John W. Yolton, 2 vols. (London: Dent, Everyman’s Library, 1961).

29 Essay II.XX (Yolton, I:189f) All the italicizations are in the original.
Towards the end of the chapter, Locke makes some remarks on the effects that pleasure and pain may have on the body.

17. The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which, not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion. For shame, which is an uncessiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.10

Locke is claiming the following: First, the ideas of pleasure and pain are important simple ideas. That is, ideas that we cannot understand by being described, but only in reference to pleasure and pain. Locke is here making a major claim about the philosophical psychology of human action, that actions of aversion are driven by the prospect of pain, and of propensity by the prospect of pleasure. So we call that good which is apt to cause pleasure, or to cause its increase. We call that evil which is apt to diminish pleasure or directly cause pain. Pleasures or pains embrace both bodily and mental states of affairs, and are the hinges of our action. Thirdly, the prospect of such pains and pleasures are what produce passions such as love and hatred, including both our love of both inanimate and animate things. So, pleasure and pain are the motivators of our actions. Fourthly, that passions may have effects on the body, and usually do, though not necessarily.

Now let us compare what Edwards asserts in the opening pages of his

*Religious Affections*

God has induced the soul with two faculties, one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns and views and judges of things; which is called the understanding. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to 'em, or is disinclined, and averse from 'em; or is the faculty by which the soul does not behold things, as an indifferent unaffected spectator, but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names: it is sometimes called the inclination: and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the will: and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart.

The exercises of this faculty [viz. the mind] are of two sorts; either those by which the soul is carried out towards things that are in view, in approving of them, being pleased with them, and inclined to them; or those in which the soul opposes the things that are in view, in disapproving them, and in being displeased with them, averse from them, and rejecting them.11

There are some exercises of pleasedness or displeasedness, inclination and disinclination, wherein the soul is carried but a little beyond a state of perfect indifference. And there are other degrees above this, wherein the approbation or

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10 Essay II.XX.17 (Yolton, I:192).
11 WJE 2:96
dislike, pleasedness or aversion, are stronger; wherein we may rise higher and higher, till the soul comes to act vigorously and sensibly, and the actings of the soul are with that strength that (through the laws of the union which the Creator has fixed between soul and body), the motion of the blood and animal spirits begins to be sensibly altered; whence oftentimes arises some bodily sensation, especially about the heart and vitals, that are the fountain of the fluids of the body; from whence it comes to pass, that the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, perhaps in all nations and ages, is called the heart. And it is to be noted, that they are these more vigorous and sensible exercises outlook, that pleasure and pain.\(^{32}\)

And later on in the book:

Nor on the other hand, do I know of any rule any have to determine, that gracious and holy affections, when raised as high as any natural affections, and have equally strong and vigorous exercises, can't have a great effect on the body . . . no such rule can be drawn from reason . . . none has ever been found in all the late controversies which have been about thing of this nature.\(^{33}\)

Though, as we have seen, Edwards used the Lockean expression ‘simple idea’ later on in the *Affections*, he does not do so here. Nevertheless, the Lockean outlook is clearly present. The inclinations or the will are of two sorts: either those by which the soul is drawn to some goal, or those to which the soul has an aversion, and is disinclined to move towards them. And secondly, when these inclinations reach a certain strength, they give rise to affections.

So for both Locke and Edwards the understanding judges what is good or evil by whether the basic ideas of sensation and reflection, their ‘simple ideas,’ are pleasurable or painful; if they are pleasurable, they are good, if painful evil. That is, of course, good or evil in the estimate of the one who has them. So our passions/emotions are moved by beliefs about the goodness or evil of states of affairs, arising from whether our sensations and reflections are painful or pleasurable. And so our various affections/emotions—love, hatred, and so on—are characterized by distinctive kinds of pleasure and pain. Edwards puts essentially this same point in terms of degrees of pleasedness or displeasedness, and notes that these positive and negative qualities have degrees and that the ‘more vigorous and sensible exercises of this faculty . . . are called the affections’.\(^{34}\) And these affections might be so strong as to affect our bodies.

Finally these mechanisms, ‘hinges’ as Locke calls them, which Edwards refers to as the ‘springs’ of action, have fundamental effects in our lives.\(^{35}\) Here’s Locke once again:

\(^{32}\) WJE 2:96.

\(^{33}\) WJE 2:132.

\(^{34}\) WJE 2:97.

\(^{35}\) In discussions such as those of Locke and Edwards, we see the beginnings of modern utilitarianism, as in Jeremy Bentham: ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure’ (*Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation* [1789]). But while pleasure of a certain kind might be signs of the moral goodness or badness of an action, Edwards no
6. The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it is that we call desire; which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of some use to remark that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action is uneasiness. 36

These words of Locke are taken up by Edwards. Here he is one last time:

Such is man’s nature, that he is very inactive, any otherwise than he is influenced by some affections, either love or hatred, desire, hope, fear or some other. These affections we see to be the springs that set men agoing, in all the affairs of life, and engage them in all their pursuits; these are the things that put men forward, and carry ‘em along, in all their worldly business, and especially are men excited and animated by these, in all affairs, wherein they are earnestly engaged, and which they pursue with vigor. 37

Why do we spring out of bed in the morning? What sets us ‘agoing’? The answer of Locke and Edwards is: the prospect of the greater pleasures of the body or the mind (or both) being enjoyed by getting up, or of pains being averted, than those pleasures to be enjoyed, or pains to be averted, by staying in bed, even though getting up, considered by itself, may not be very pleasurable. So when Edwards says that ‘True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections’, the doctrine he infers from I Peter 1:8—‘Whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory’—he intends to show the front and central place of the affections in energizing ‘true religion’. 38 ‘Joy unspeakable’ is in Edwards’ estimate joy to a high degree, perhaps to the highest degree humanly possible, an exalted pleasurable affection arising from faith in the exalted Saviour. And if these affections are strong enough they might and will result in effects on our bodies. So not surprisingly Edwards says that such affections are the ‘springs’ of our actions, as Locke had called them ‘hinges’. 39

So the prospect of pleasure and of pain are at the heart of Edwards’ account of action, as they were also for John Locke.

Assessment

One might wonder if these Locke-induced changes in Edwards’ outlook were simply skin deep, a verbal variant of the theological anthropology of Puritanism, and that of Reformed Orthodoxy, that he inherited. But to note how different the approaches of these forbears were I shall briefly sketch how different his way of thinking of things looks from a couple of Edwards’

more than Locke claims that moral goodness consists in having sensations of pleasure, or in the maximizing of them.

36 Essay, II.XX.6 (I.190-1)
37 WJE 2:101.
38 WJE 2:96.
39 WJE 2:100-1.
theological forbears. Let us look briefly at the Westminster divine Edward Reynolds, and then at one whom Edwards endorses or quotes with approval in his footnotes, John Owen, who once had a student by the name of John Locke. They had a different way of thinking of the soul, and a different estimate of the affections, a different sensibility one might say, than Edwards came to have via Locke.

Like Edwards they thought of the affections as being connected with the will, but the important thing for the Puritans and others is that reason (or the understanding), in this case the practical reason, should moderate the operation of the passions. For it is what we do or intend to do, or forbear from doing, or which unexpectedly happens to us, that bring about affections. Incidentally, Edwards uses ‘affection’ and scarcely ever ‘passion’, mentioning this word in only a handful of passages in the Religious Affections. So in one place he says that affection is ‘more extensive than passion; being used for all vigorous lively actings of the will or inclination; but passion for those that are more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, and the mind more overpowered and less in its own command.’ This is one of the few places where Edwards appears to echo the distinction between affection and passion made by the Puritans and Reformed Orthodox in terms of whether or not these phenomena were subject to the control of the practical reason.

This is because for the Puritans and Reformed Orthodox, following Thomas Aquinas, the faculty of reason or understanding has primacy, whether this is the contemplative or theoretical reason, having to do with the acquisition of truth, or the practical reason, having to do with the choice of ends and with the ways to achieve them. In this tradition—for Reynolds and Owen, and the Reformed Orthodox more generally—affections and passions are sub-rational forces and are to be moderated by reason.

So Edward Reynolds, a member of the Westminster Assembly, in his work on the passions and faculties of the soul, has much to say about this both in human behaviour generally, and in the business of Christian sanctification, while not denying the place of affection and passion in the soul. So the agitations of passions, so long as they serve only to drive forward, but not to drown virtue, —as long as they keep their dependence on reason, and run in that channel wherewith they are thereby bounded, —are of excellent service in all the travel of man’s life; and such as without which the growth, success, and despatch of virtue would be much impaired.

Nevertheless,

[T]here is in man, by reason of his general corruption, such a distemper wrought,

\*40 WJE 2198.


\*42 Reynolds, Treatise, VI:47.
that there is not only crookedness in, but dissension also, and fighting, between his parts . . . whereby passion, reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether of resistance or control, laboureth to muffle reason, and to obliterate those principles and original truths, whereby their unruliness might be restrained.\textsuperscript{43}

Note the primacy of reason in this account.

And John Owen: As in general the affections and passions should be under the control of the reason, so in mortification,

[O]ur love, desire, and delight, will produce a moderation of passions about them, as fear, anger, sorrow and the like; such will men be stirred up unto in these changes, losses, crosses, which these things are subject unto . . . When the mind is weaned from the world, and the things of it, it will be sedate, quiet, composed, not easily moved with the occurrences and occasions of life: it is dead unto them, and in a great measure unconcerned in them. This is that “moderation” of mind wherein the apostle would have us excel (Philip. 4:5).\textsuperscript{44}

Here the emphasis is on the composing of the affections, and the setting of the heart on the things above.

The difference then is between the Puritan and Reformed Orthodox view that affections are a consequence of the will, which is to be subordinated to the reason or understanding, and the Lockean and Edwardsean view that the pivotal sensations, pleasure and pain, are the movers of the will, the springs or hinges of all action. The idea of their correction by reason is quite absent. Both views, the Puritan and the Edwardsean, hold that the actions are executed \textit{sub specie boni}. But for Locke and Edwards that goodness is pleasure or the lessening of pain. For the Puritans it may be various; for example, following a sense of duty, or the dictates of conscience because you believe it is the voice of God, or the fact that the action—e.g. viewing a painting, or singing a song, pleasing you and not myself, putting out the rubbish—are goods in themselves, or a necessity. That’s another story, worth narrating in detail. Without it, the difference can still be made out starkly.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This paper has attempted to show that the influence of John Locke is pervasive in Edwards’ \textit{The Religious Affections}, even though he is not mentioned by name and never quoted in this, the first of Edwards’ three great theological works. This has been shown by providing cumulative evidence. First, evidence that the Affections is structured in a way that more or less coincides with Locke’s estimate of what is reasonable in religion, in his chapter ‘Of Faith and Reason,

\textsuperscript{43} Reynolds, \textit{Treatise}, VI:50.

and their distinct Provinces’ in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Further, Edwards broadly follows Locke’s position on the nature and weaknesses of enthusiasm in the chapter ‘Of Enthusiasm’ in that work. Enthusiasm does not meet the criteria that make religion reasonable. Finally, and most tellingly, he endorses the unitary view of the person outlined in Locke’s Chapter ‘Of Power’, and he takes the Lockean view that not the practical reason (as his Puritan forbears held), but pleasures and pains (and their prospect) are the motivators of action, and they connect with a range of affections. All these positions arise from those propounded by Locke in his chapter ‘Of the Modes of Pleasure and Pain’. *The Religious Affections* surely reveals itself as a book in the Lockean mode, the work of a convinced Lockean on these matters.