X. Although in the fall of Adam (which the apostle calls "disobedience," Rom. 5:19), pride is included (as was said before), it does not follow that this was the first stage. As the first act of pride was the unwillingness to obey God, so the first fruit of pride was the unwillingness to believe God's words. For pride never could have entered the heart of man if his faith in the words of God had not before been weakened and overthrown.

XI. As in every motion, the point of commencement is prior to that of termination, so the turning away from the uncreated good (unbelief) ought to precede the turning towards the created good (pride). For as long as he adhered to the uncreated good (viz., to God), he never would have turned himself through pride to creatures and to himself.

XII. Although in a choice well disposed and by direct rationization, the end must first be presented to the mind before we can think of the means, this does not always have place in oblique rationization such as seduction (in which this order is often inverted). It is evident that Satan used the latter in the temptation of man. (2) Although the act of pride was occupied with the end, it does not follow that unbelief had the relation of cause (from which pride arose). For unless man had fluctuated in belief, the desire for deity (an act of pride) could not have entered his heart; nor could that end have been presented to the first man without great error and unbelief.

XIII. The passage of the Son of Sinach, "The beginning of pride is departure from God" (10:12), besides being apocryphal, is not repugnant to our opinion. If apostasy is the beginning of pride, unbelief (in which it is placed) must necessarily have preceded pride. Nor does what is added ("Pride is the beginning of all sin," v. 13) prove the contrary because it must not be understood simply and absolutely of every sin (even the first and that which he had said was the beginning of pride), but relatively concerning other beginnings which draw their origin for the most part from pride.

SEVENTH QUESTION
How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?

I. Two questions are involved here: the first concerns the possibility of the fall; the other concerns its true cause. Each is difficult to explain, and in the explaining of each, there are a variety of sins.

The first question concerns the possibility of the fall.

II. As to the first, the difficulty is not great in assigning the origin of all the sins which have sprung from the fall of Adam. Since men are corrupt, nothing is easier to conceive than why they sin daily. A depraved conscience can put forth no other than depraved and inordinate motions. But in innocent man, while no error had place in his mind, nor did any disorder (ataxia) in his will (in whom was original righteousness) hinder a fall (and incompatible (arystatos) with it), it is most difficult to imagine in what way at length man in a state of integrity could fall.

It cannot be explained by the opinion of Pelagians concerning the inclination to sin.

III. In order to free themselves from this difficulty, the ancient and more modern Pelagians, papists, Socinians and Remonstrants attribute to innocent man (as created by God) a headlong inclination to vice, from which arose the first sin (although not so vehement and inordinate as it is now). But this opinion is manifestly injurious to God and can easily be shown to be false. (1) If an inclination to sin was in man by nature, God must be considered its author; thus the sin will be cast upon God himself (as was proved before, Topic V, Question II, Section 9). (2) The inclination to love and worship God (such as Adam possessed by original righteousness) is incompatible (arystatos) with an inclination to sin. (3) All things were very good in man before the fall, since he was made in the image of God. Yet the inclination to sin cannot be granted which is repugnant to the law. Hence it is evident that the mutation which was in Adam without any stain is not to be confounded with such an inclination to sin (which could not but be defective).

But by his mutability.

IV. Another method of removing the difficulty must therefore be sought. No other more suitable can be granted than by returning to the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created indeed just and holy, but naturally. Thus he could indeed stand if he wished, but could also if he wished become evil. Thus the event itself sufficiently proves (if nothing else could teach it).

V. Although that mutability indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause sine quâ non (or the antecedent of the fall), still it cannot be considered its cause proper and of itself. This is so not only because it was a condition created together with innocent man by God (which was also in the elect angels before their confirmation without any defect), but also because it is indeed the negation of some good. It is not the privation of a good due to the creature, but undeserved and so did not take away any perfection required in a state of nature. So we must accurately distinguish here between the mutability itself (which is a condition suitable to the creature) and the act of that mutability (by which man inclined to a change). The former denotes a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet inclined; the latter, however, designates the actual inclination to evil itself (condemned by the law of God) and the fountain of all sin.

The free will of man the true cause of sin.

VI. The proximate and proper cause of sin therefore is to be sought nowhere else than in the free will of man (who suffered himself to be deceived by the Devil and, Satan persuading though not compelling, freely departed from God). So neither as whole properly did he fall, nor corrupt as corrupt; but as imbold with a false idea, he corrupted himself and (the habitual knowledge implanted by God being neglected) received the error suggested by Satan. Nor ought it to seem strange that man (created capable of falling and mutable) changed and fell, no more than that a beginning of motion takes place in one perfectly at rest. For where there is a power to change, the transition from power to act is easy.

VII. Although man fell, still he had the ability to stand if he wished. Otherwise God would have placed him in an impossible condition. Hence a twofold
most freely and directed it most wisely. But in whatever way occupied, he always exerted himself most holily about it. On this account, not even the slightest tint of sin can be ascribed to him, neither because he foreknew (because prescience is not the cause of things, nor do things take place because they are foreknown; rather they are foreknown because they are to be), nor because he decreed (because he is willed to decr the grace he permitted the temptation (because he neither breathed into Satan the will to tempt, nor impelled him to it). He only permitted physically by not hindering (as bound by no law to furnish it), not morally by approval and consent.

XIV. I confess that with permission here is involved the negation of the efficacious grace and help by which man might actually stand. If such help had been given, Adam would not have fallen. But neither can he be said to have come into fellowship with sin because he took away from him no internal grace given before, nor impelled nor forced him to admit or consent to the temptation. Rather, the only help he did not give the new grace of confirmation or the evil by which the grace in him might be actuated (which he was neither bound to give, nor in his wise counsel did he will to give) in order to test the obedience of the creature. If without such help, Adam could not avoid falling, it does not follow that he was free from culpability. That necessity did not destroy his liberty, nor did he receive from sinning freely and with the greatest spontaneity, for he was being impelled to it by no necessity or compulsion of nature.

XV. Some are wont to express this negation of grace by desertion; not privative (as if internal and habitual grace already given were taken away), but negative (by which means not yet given, is suspended). But sin is in the possession and the power of the soul. So suppose some antecedent culpability of the one deserted, it is better to use the word negation or "not-giving," so that God may be said to not have given to man actual grace efficaciously determining Adam to stand (from which negation sin would indeed follow necessarily by a necessity of consequence and hypothetical on the part of God, but still freely on the part of man who was conscious that he was impelled to sin by his will alone through no internal necessity).

XVI. It is not to be denied that here we truly meet the depth (bathe) of the wisdom of God—rather to be wondered at than to be praised into, far surpassing the reach of reason (viz., how God willed to deny that grace, which yet unerring wisdom, without which he could not avoid that fall) Hence there are those who (in order that God may not seem to have deserted man, before man deserted him) maintain that God was ready to bestow upon Adam the grace of confirmation, if man had wished to betake himself to it and use it; but since he did not, and so, it is objected to apply for the help at hand (against God, on which he had consented), it should not seem strange that God withheld it. The difficulty occurring here cannot be disposed of in this way. That neglected use of divine help or application to God for it was a sin or it was not. If it was not sin, the help of God ought not on that account to have been suspended. If it was sin, there is granted some sin before the first. Again, since for every act man needs God's grace, the question returns concerning the use of that help—whether for its exercise the efficacious grace of God was given by God or not. For if it was given, man could not help using it. If, however, it was denied, the negation preceding the neglect of man. It is better therefore to acquiesce here in the sole most free good pleasure of God, either giving or withholding his own
descendant; by the latter, he contracted universal corruption and impurity for himself and his. The physical effects are the miseries of all kinds (which pressed upon him in battle array) and death itself (both temporal and eternal) to which he became exposed.

II. Among the moral effects is usually placed the loss of the divine image (or original righteousness). Concerning this, the Remonstrants (following the Socinians) raise a controversy with us; therefore the orthodox truth must be briefly established against them.

Statement of the question.

III. By the divine image, we do not understand generally whatever gifts upright man received from God (spoken of in Gen. 1:26, 27) or specially certain remains of it existing in the mind and heart of man after the fall (in which sense we understand Gen. 9:6 and Jam. 3:9). Rather we understand it strictly of the principal part of that image which consisted of holiness and wisdom (usually termed original righteousness). In this sense, we treat of it in the present question.

IV. The Socinians indeed deny that image was lost in any way by the fall of Adam, maintaining that it still remains complete (Socinianus Praelectionum theologicae 3 [1627], pp. 7-10 and Smalcinius, Refutat: Thesnem D. Wifigani Francisci, Disp. VII [1634], pp. 211-71). However the Remonstrants confess that by his fall Adam deserved that God should take original righteousness away from him. But they deny that he lost it by the act itself. They assert this in order that they may not be compelled to acknowledge that man lost all original righteousness and that free will no longer remains in him.

V. On the other hand, we maintain that the loss of the divine image (or of original righteousness) followed the fall of Adam doubly—both meritoriously and morally (on account of the divine ordination) and efficiently and really (on account of the heinousness of that sin).

VI. The reasons are (1) It was a total aversion and apostasy from God as the highest good and ultimate end. Now the ultimate end being changed which in morals holds the relation of the most universal principle (on which the rest depend), all moral things must necessarily be changed. Thus man, now wholly turned away from God and drawn into himself, was absolutely driven from his happy condition; nor could he be restored to his integrity except by the singular mercy of God.

VII. Second, that sin was not particular, but universal, drawing after itself a violation of the whole law. Hence it could not but shake off every habit of rectitude and did deserve the conscience, so that no remission was left except the divine planks and rubbish of the unhappy shipwreck, allowed by God still to remain (both in order that from these the excellence of the former entire image might be recognized and to be a bond of external discipline in political society, to prevent the world from becoming a den of robbers; and that from these ruins he might erect a new work and form a new man after the same image in which we were at first created, Col. 3:10).

VIII. Third, the nakedness of fallen men denoted the loss or privation of goods in which they before rejoiced. And the sense of that nakedness and shame proved that there was something in man to be ashamed of, such as could not be thought of in a work of God without casting disgrace upon the Creator. This was not so much a nakedness of body (which was indifferent of itself, yea which might have been glorious) as a nakedness of soul (from a privation of illustrious gifts with which it had been, as it were, clothed and adorned and on account of which he ought deservedly to be covered with shame).

IX. Fourth, God threatened him with this privation. The death denounced again (sinning) embraced no less a spiritual (in the privation of original righteousness and in the state of sin) than a temporal and eternal (as will be seen in its own place).

X. Fifth, as man is now born, so was Adam after the fall; for whatever he has by nature takes its origin from Adam himself. Now he is born with universal corruption, not only privative of good before received, but also positive of superinduced evil (whether as to blindness of mind or disorder [exaspersion] of will); hence he is called not only blind, but blindness and darkness itself; he is said to be not only corrupt and sick, but "dead" (i.e., in a state of total impotence to good).

XI. The proposition "one act cannot destroy an entire habit" cannot be universally admitted, not even according to the philosophers themselves (according to whom there are granted some acts so enormous as to take away the whole antecedent habit for example, an incestuous act takes away the whole habit of chastity; a patricidal act, paternal love; and the like). (2) This is the desert of even the least sin—to remove man from communion with God and break up their mutual peace and friendship. Now man excluded from communion with God, and altogether unenlightened by the Spirit, is by this very thing most corrupt and can perform nothing good. (3) Although the axiom may be granted to other sins, yet there is a peculiar relation of that by which the covenant was broken and forthwith all the blessings of the covenant lost. (4) It is confirmed by the parity in angels who by their sin so shook off the habit of holiness and righteousness (by not standing in the truth, Jn. 8:44) as to draw upon themselves an incurable (amoton) evil. (5) The opponents themselves confess that the Holy Spirit can be lost by any very heinous sin.

XII. If in the renewed, the habit of holiness (although imperfect) is not shaken off by their sins (which was shaken off by the fall of Adam although it was perfect), this does not depend upon the nature of sin, but upon the grace of perseverance. For believers have the promise of perseverance, which Adam did not have.

Ninth Question

Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and antecedent imputation to all his posterity by nature generation. We affirm.

I. Although all Christians agree in acknowledging the sin of Adam, yet they differ not a little among themselves as to its effects; especially as to imputation, which by various persons is either called in doubt or openly denied.

II. This was the opinion of the old Pelagians who held that Adam's sin injured himself alone and not other men. Who deny the imputation of sin? (his posterity). Hence they restricted the passage of the apostle in Rom. 5:12 to an example of imitation. Their footsteps in this particular (as in almost all others) the Socinians press, who
expressly deny that the whole human race sinned and fell in Adam; or that God willed that on account of that one fall the whole human race should be guilty of sin. Socinus says: "Although all men descending from Adam are exposed to perpetual death, it is not because the sin of Adam is imputed to them, but because they are begotten by him, who was devoted to eternal death by a divine decree. And so that happens to them not on account of the imputation of sin, but on account of the propagation of the race" ("De statu primi hominis . . . Responso . . . Francisci Pucci," chap. 10 in Opera Omnia [1656], 2:347-69 and De Jesus Christo Servatore, Pt. III [1594], p. 291).

III. The Anabaptists do not differ from them. They deny that the posterty are guilty on account of the fall of their first parents. The opinion of the Remonstrants is the same. Although from the beginning they speak ambiguously (so as to leave it uncertain what they did hold), yet afterwards they plainly testify their agreement with the Socinians, retaining indeed the name of imputation, but ignoring the thing itself. They write that "the sin of Adam is imputed by God to his posterity not so as if it really makes them guilty but only as an exercise of his power", though they can hardly say it is made as much as he willed them to be born liable to the same evil to which Adam by sin had made himself liable" ("Apologia pro confessione sive declaracione . . . Remonstrantes," 7 in Episcopius, Opera theologica [1665], Pt. II, p. 151).

This, Curcellarius confirms most clearly when he rejects all imputation of sin ("De Jure Del.," in Stephani Curcellariae Opera Theolica [1675], pp. 735-38).

IV. Nor do those only of the opposite party (hoi ex enantias) impugn this imputation. Among our own men, the celebrated Joshua Placeaus, professor at Saumur, adopted this comment of the adversaries. While constituting the whole relation of original pollution in a habitual, subjective and inherent corruption, propagated to individuals by ordinary generation, he rejects that imputation and with great labor endeavors to overthrow it in "De statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam" (in Syntagma Thesiwm Theologiciam in Academia Sabartensi [1665], pp. 205-II) and in the various treatises on this argument.

V. This was opposed by the decree of the National Synod which met at Charenton in 1644, which sanctioned and confirmed the doctrine received in our churches concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin and the hereditary corruption flowing upon all. The words of the decree are as follows: "Whereas a report has been made to the Synod of certain writers (and not of the sin inherent in us) we desire to be viewed as in the same place with him, as if we had actually committed his sin (just as "uncircumcision" is said by the apostle "to be counted for circumcision," Rom. 2:26, i.e., to be viewed as in the same place as if he had been circumcised; for thus it would be treated of the comparison of different persons or of the parity between different sins with which he was charged, punishment or guilt). But it is important whether the actual sin of Adam is so in fact imputed to all on account of it all are reckoned guilty and either suffer punishment or at least are considered worthy of punishment.

VI. In order to escape the force of this Synodical decree, Placeaus afterwards distinguished imputation into immediate and antecedent and mediate and consequent. The former was that by which the action of Adam is imputed to all his posterity (Christ excepted) proximately (immediately) for the very reason that they are the sons of Adam, as much in reference to the privation of original righteousness as to eternal death, antecedently to inherent corruption. The latter was that which follows the beholding of the hereditary corruption derived to us from Adam and is made through it mediating. By the participation of the latter corruption, he maintained that we share in the sin of Adam and habitually consent to it and moreover are worthy to be reckoned with Adam, the sinner. He wishes the Synod to assert the latter (his view), but not the former. But if we look at the matter more closely, it will plainly appear that this distinction was devised to raise a smoke; retaining the name of imputation, in fact it takes away the thing itself. For if on this account only the sin of Adam is said to be imputed to us mediately (because we are constituted guilty with God and become liable to punishment on account of the hereditary corruption which we draw from Adam), there will be properly no imputation of Adam's sin, but only of inherent corruption. This the Synod wished to prescribe because it constituted two parts of original sin: inherent corruption and imputation. This could not be said if imputation were not made with Adam and whereby the same sin is imputed as by the intervention of corruption. For it is one thing to lie under exposure to the wrath and condemnation of God on account of inherent and native corruption, propagated by generation; another, on account of the sin of Adam imputed to us.

VII. On all that is left from the state of the question, it must be observed: Statement of the question.

(1) That we do not treat here of any sin of Adam, but of the first; nor of the first habitual inhering in himself, but the first actual by which he violated the primordial law and broke the covenant entered into with him by God.

(2) The question does not concern all his posterity who in any way were to spring from him, but only those who descend from him in the ordinary way of generation (so that Christ may be excluded, who not in the ordinary way, but in an extraordinary and supernatural way, was conceivcd by the power of the Holy Ghost, not in virtue of the blessing given before the fall, but in virtue of the special grace of God foreknowing the seed of the woman who should bruise the head of the serpent not according to personality, but according to humanity only and evident extraordinarily).

(3) It is not inquired whether the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to us because (on account of the Synod of certain writers in us) we deserve to be viewed as in the same place with him, as if we had actually committed his sin (just as "uncircumcision" is said by the apostle "to be counted for circumcision," Rom. 2:26, i.e., to be viewed as in the same place as if he had been circumcised; for thus it would be treated of the comparison of different persons or of the parity between different sins with which he was charged, punishment or guilt). But it is important whether the actual sin of Adam is so in fact imputed to all on account of it all are reckoned guilty and either suffer punishment or at least are considered worthy of punishment.

X. Imputation is either of something foreign to us or properly ours. Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours (in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions whom he punishes for crimes properly their own; in reference to what is good, the seal of Phineas is said to be "imputed to him for righteousness," Ps. 106:31). Sometimes that is imputed which is without us and not performed by ourselves. Thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed
to us, and our sins are imputed to him, although neither has he sin in himself, nor we righteousness. Here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, not of the former because we are treating of a sin committed by Adam, not by us.

XI. However when we say that the sin of another is imputed to anyone, we are not to understand the sin which is simply and in every way another's, but that which is in a way belongs to him to whom it is said (1 Cor. 5:18). (3) The communion of punishments (general as well as special) spreading abroad among his posterity no less than in Adam (which could not justly be inflicted, except on the supposition of a common law and a common guilt). For if the punishment of the broken covenant is extended to all, the covenant also and the law ought to be extended to all. (4) The comparison between Adam and Christ instituted by Paul (Rom. 5; 1 Cor. 15). This cannot be sufficiently carried out, except on the supposition of the imputation of sin answering to the imputation of righteousness, as will hereafter be proved.

XIV. The punishment brought upon us by the sin of Adam is either private or common. The former is the want and privation of original righteousness; the latter is death with temporal and eternal and in general all the evils visited upon the sinner. Although the second necessarily follows from the first of the nature (the misery of God intervenes), still it ought not to be confounded with it. As to the first, we say that the sin of Adam is imputed to us immediately for private punishment because it was the cause of the privation of original righteousness and so ought to precede corruption (at least in the order of nature); but as to the latter, it can be said to be imputed mediately as a positive punishment because we are liable to that punishment only after we are born and are corrupt.

XV. The question returns to these limits—whether the sin of Adam (not any, but the first; not habitual, but actual) is imputed to all his posterity naturally springing from him, by an imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent. They with whom we treat here either absolutely deny imputation or admit only a mediate imputation. However, we (with the orthodox) affirm both that imputation is granted, and that it is immediate and antecedent.

XVI. The reasons are: (1) Paul clearly builds up this imputation—"As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. 5:12ff.). From these words of the apostle, which is proved by an illustrious type the doctrine of justification by the imputation of Christ's righteousness (of which he had spoken in chapters 3 and 4). It might seem strange and unusual for one to be justified by another's righteousness. Thus the apostle (by a comparison between Adam and Christ) proves the foundation of this mystery from its opposite—the condemnation in which Adam was imputed to be derived upon all on account of the imputation of one sin. Therefore just as Adam was constituted by God the head and root of the human race (together with the guilt of his sin), and from his sin death was spread throughout all; even so might the second Adam, was made head of all the elect, so that by his obedience justification might come upon all the elect. (b) He speaks of the sin which "entered into the world" and by death passed upon all men." This cannot be referred to the original, inherent sin (which the actual already supposed), but to the first actual sin by which death in fact prevailed both Adam and his posterity. This is evident from v. 18 where the answering
clause of the similitude is given and mention is made of "that one sin." (c) That sin ought to be understood concerning which it can be said that all have sinned, since sin entered by one man into the world (and by sin death, which is the force of Paul’s reasoning): “As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men” (eph hō hypate himaton, "in whom" or “because in him we have sinned.” Now the word himaton cannot mean that he is one man (2). The similitude between Adam and Christ is in the thing, but not in the mode of the thing (i.e., that the apostle indeed teaches that Adam brought over to his posterity guilt and condemnation; Christ, however, brought justification). But it does not teach that we are done by both by imputation. Otherwise hands would be joined with the papis, and we must acknowledge with them that our justification depends upon the imputation of Christ’s righteousness and the infusion of inherent righteousness, so that our condemnation springs as much from propagated sin as from impurified sin (which Bellarmin urges in “De Justificatione,” 2.3 in Opera I [1558], 4.57, 23). Paul not only speaks of sin, but of “the transgression of one,” whose guilt has spread over all (vv. 17, 18). “As by the offense of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one grace came upon all men unto justification of life” (v. 18). “As by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous” (v. 19). Why should the apostle so often mention the one man sinning (and the offense and disobedience of one in the singular) whose guilt passed upon all men unto condemnation, not once, but five times in a few verses, unless this one disobedience (which can be no other than the actual transgression of Adam) was imputed to his posterity? For if we are guilty not by the sin of Adam’s sin but only by the propagation of corruption, it is not from one sin can guilt and condemnation be said to have passed upon all, but from innumerable inherent sins. (c) This is more strongly confirmed by the comparison between Adam and Christ, instituted here by the apostle with respect to justification, of which he treats, for the sake of which he calls “Adam the figure of him that was to come” (upon to meléontos, v. 14). We are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way in which we are constituted righteous in Christ. But in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin; otherwise the comparison is unsound. (f) The death which reigns by sin remains, inasmuch as on account of that action, another is reckoned guilty and lies under punishment. Not ought it to seem strange if the apostle meant this actual sin rather than habitual sin because he proposed to treat here of justification, not of sanctification. (4) All are said to have sinned (in Adam). The same in which sin is said to have been in the world from Adam until the law (v. 13) because he proves the former from the latter. Yet this sin which was in the world cannot be said to be the imputed actual (since the apostle adds that sin is not imputed when there is no law), but only inherent. We answer that the apostle is so far from wishing to deny that sin was imputed that he repeats as he says of the gift of grace (Rom Anaphyresis) (6) the domain of death which “reigned even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression” (to wit, infants who cannot be said to have sinned actually like Adam; cf. v. 14). However because the imputation of sin for punishment cannot be made when a law does not exist (since indeed sin is illegitimately imputed), and where there is no law, there is no transgression, Rom. 4:15), Paul thence
elicts that some law was given before the written law of Moses, according to which sin can be said to have been imputed. This can be no other than the primordial law given to Adam and in him to all his posterity. (5) "Many" not all are said to "have been made sinners" (Rom. 5:19). We answer that the "many" are equivalent to all, as is taught by the comparison of vv. 15 and 19 with vv. 12, 18 and 1 Cor. 15:22. They are called "many" not to restrict the number, as Genesis, asking Jove: "until the people pay for what they are said to be "made folly of their princes" (Works and Days 260-61 [Loeb, 22:23]). In the same place, he says, "Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man" (ibid., 239-40 [Loeb, 20:21]). And Horace says, "Whatever folly the kings commit the Achaeans pay the penalty" (Epistles I.2.14 [Loeb, 262-63]). Hence undoubtedly it is that we often read that the imputation of crimes took place among the heathen themselves. Cicero remarks that in the Grecian states the children of tyrants were punished in the same way as their oppressors (Epistulae ad Brutum 256.6 [Loeb, 28:724-251]). Curtius says a law was observed by the Macedonians that they who plotted against the king should be stoned with death together with the king. We have the same near and distant (History of Alexander 6.11.20 [Loeb, 2:304-5]). Among almost all people, it was the custom in crimes of treason to devise to punish the children with the guilty parents. Here belongs the sanction of the law of Arcadius and Honorius in reference to treason. "His sons, to whom we, with imperatorial leniency, compromised; for they ought not to perish with the father's punishment, in whom the examples of paternal, that is, hereditary, crimes are remarked" are to be esteemed aliens from the maternal and ancestral inheritance and succession. They can receive nothing from the wills of strangers, let them be in want and poor; let their father's disgrace always attend them; let them come to no honors at all, to no oaths; finally let them be deprived of being "dead" in Christ, not only efficiently by the vindicating Spirit, but also meritoriously by the imputation of his righteousness.

(3) From the imputation of the sins of others.

XIX. (3) By the just judgment of God, the sins of parents are frequently pass over upon children and are imputed to them. Therefore much more can be said of the first sin, which was both more serious than all which spring from it and not particular to the person of Adam, but universal of the whole nature. Now that such an imputation is granted is not only proved by the threatening of the law (by which God promises he will be jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation, Ex. 20:5), but also various examples give evidence: Achan (Jos. 7:24, 25); the Amalekites (1 S. 15:2, 3); the sons of Saul (2 S. 21:6-9); Jeroboam (1 K. 14:9, 10; 1 Abah (1 K. 21:12, 22) and others. Hence the strictness of the law, that she bears the punishment of the crimes committed by the fathers (Lam. 5:7). And Christ threatens the Jews that there will come upon them the punishments of those crimes which had been committed by their forefathers long before, that upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias (Mt. 23:35). Objection that not the sons properly, but the parents are punished in the sons who are part of them. We answer that although the fathers are punished in the children, this does not hinder us from saying that the sons themselves also are punished, while punishments by order of divine justice are inflicted upon them on account of the sins of their parents. He who bears the punishment of another's sin must necessarily have had that sin imputed to him.
XXI. Fourth, the immediate imputation of the first sin being denied, the principal foundation of the justice of the propagation of sin is removed. Nor can a sufficient reason be given why God willed that hereditary and inherent stain to be transmitted from the parents to their posterity. Since it holds the relation not only of base evil (mal nescii), or pollution, but also of sad evil (mali nescii) or punishment, it ought necessarily to suppose some antecedent sin on account of whose guilt it is inflicted by the justice of God. There is no punishment except from sin; for both sin alone is punished and that only which is punished is sin. Now it cannot be our proper and personal sin because we were not then actually in existence. Therefore it is the sin of Adam which is imputed to us. Hence it is evident that the law of nature alone is not sufficient to preserve the truth and justice of propagation, according to which as man generates man and a leper, a leper, so a corrupt one, a corrupt one. For not only the order of nature, but the exercise of justice must be attended to as well as the most holy, although secret and wonderful, judgment of God. For why did God (who could have hindered that propagation if he pleased) either by creating men independent of each other (like the angels) or in some other way, notwithstanding will all to be born corrupt and so to the whole human race to be separated from him by sin and to incur an eternal curse (i.e., to be subjected to the severest punishment), unless he had already willed to exercise an act of justice on man on account of some sin committed before? Thus how does it happen that the souls of men (which are not propagated by generation, but are immediately created by God) are not created with original righteousness (as the souls of the first parents), but destitute of this ornament? No reason can be assigned for this difference unless we rise to the secret judgment of God by which he wills to smite the children of Adam on account of the sin of the parent. Calvin most excellently unfolds this: “Not did it happen merely in a natural way, that all should fall by the sin of one parent” (ICR 3.23.7, p. 955). And afterwards: “The Scriptures openly declare that all men were bound over to eternal death in the person of this one man. Since this cannot be ascribed to nature, everyone plainly sees that it proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God” (ibid.). In the same place: “Again I ask, how did it happen that the fall of Adam involved so many nations together with their infant children in eternal death without remedy, unless it so pleased God? It becomes tongues otherwise so eloquent to be still here. I confess indeed the decree to be dreadful, yet no one can deny that God foreknew what exit man would have before he created him and he therefore foreknew it because he had so ordained it by his decree” (ibid.).

XXII. Now that the privation of original righteousness and hereditary taint is not only sin, but also holds the relation of punishment, is readily inferred from the following arguments. (1) The infliction of the greatest evil (both of loss and of sense) cannot be the infliction of punishment. By that propagation, the greatest evil is inflicted upon the creature, both of loss (by the privation of righteousness and good due in him and separation from God) and of sense (by a deprivation of the whole nature and dreadful disorder [stasis] of the faculties of man). (2) Both these evils hold the same relation in us as in Adam, since indeed from them they are spread over us as his heirs. It held the relation of punishment both in Adam and in us because indeed it was spiritual death which flowed from his actual sin according to God's threatening. Nor does it hinder that this privation of righteousness with respect to man holds the relation of sin because it deprives him of the rectitude due in him because it does not cease to hold the relation of punishment on the part of God ordaining it to the loss of the creature on account of sin (if not his own and personal, still public and common—as hardening which on the part of man's hardening himself is sin; on the part of God's hardening man is the severest punishment). That both however can subsist at the same time will be proved below.

XXIII. (5) Adam was the germ, root and head of the human race, not only in a physical sense and semiologically, but morally and in a representative sense. He entered into covenant for himself and his posterity (as was seen before) who just as he received the gifts which he possessed for himself and his, so he lost them for himself and his. It is evident that the things principiated are contained in the principles and announce their condition. And just as Adam had received the condition and promise of life not only for himself but also for his posterity (if he had stood) he must have contracted the guilt of death by his fall, not only for himself, but also for all his. For to whom the benefits pertain, to them also it is just most the burdens and disadvantages should also pertain.

XXIV. (6) The denial of the imputation of Adam's sin would not a little weaken the imputation of Christ's righteousness (which answer to each other and upon which is founded the principal part of the antithesis instituted by Paul between the first and second Adam). For the descent from the negation of the former to the denial of the latter is most easy. Hence there is no one of the heretics who have denied the imputation of sin who have not for the same reason opposed the imputation of Christ's righteousness (as is seen in the Pelagians, Socinians and Arminians). Hence the reasons by which the imputation of Adam's sin is opposed can no less be turned back against the imputation of Christ's righteousness; those upon which the imputation of Christ is built also serve to establish the imputation of Adam's sin. Nor is it a hindrance that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is of grace, while the imputation of sin is from justice. Grace can give to another what is not due to him, justice cannot. For grace bestows favor upon the undeserving, justice inflicts punishment upon none except the deserving. For in the imputation of Adam's sin, the justice of God does not inflict punishment upon the undeserving, but upon the deserving (if not by a desert proper and personal, still participated and common—founded upon the natural and federal union between us and Adam).

XXV. (7) As Levi was tithed by Melchizedek da Abraam (Heb. 7,9), i.e., either “by” Abraham (as an intermediate person) or “in the person of Abraham” (inasmuch as he was as yet potentially in his loins, so that he was considered as rightly tithed in him and with him then bore the person of all his offering); so much more can the posterity of Adam be considered to have sinned in him, since they were in him as branches in the root and the members in the head. Not that the foundation of imputation is to be sought in that fact (differing from it in many things), but only that it may be illustrated through analogy by a similar thing. Nor do the words adduced by the apostle (“as I may so say,” ἵνα ἐπιθέλησεν) imply a topical and figurative thing, as if Levi figuratively only (not properly) may be said to have paid tithes in Abraham. This is contrary to the design of the apostle, who wishes from that tithing to gather the inferiority of the Aaronic priesthood to that of Melchizedek (for he who pays tithes is inferior to him who
they had already suffered and even greater stil. So there is not here any definition of right, but only the declaration of a special agreement. He does not say what he can rightly do, but against the complaints of the people, what he wills to do. The scope of the prophet and the connection of the words lead us to this. Finally, the highest right differs from the forbidding (epistles) right. In accordance with the former, God can visit the sins of parents upon their children, but in accordance with the latter he extends the punishment no further than to sinners themselves. Thus the prophet, speaking of the New Testament times, says among other things: 'In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity' (Jer. 31:29, 30). He says this to teach that God would deal with them more gently than before.

XXVIII. The act of ammonia cannot be and be called that of the whole if it is a merely personal act. Of this kind are the sins committed every day by individuals. Yet it cannot be understood to be common or universal act pertaining to the whole human race, such as was the act of sinning Adam. Adam was indeed one individually, a singular person; but in this act, he is not viewed as a singular person but rather as the principle and head of the whole race (with whom, in him, God made the covenant). Therefore the will of Adam can be called singular by peculiarity of act; universal by right of representation; singular because proceeding from one among individual men; universal because that individual represented the whole human race. Thus the righteousness of Christ is the act of one and yet may well be called that of all believers by divine imputation; as what one does in justice may be considered to have done—'If one died for all, then are all dead' (2 Cor. 5:14).

XXIX. Adam in sinning bore the person of all (not equally in obtaining remission) on account of our being equally in his loins. The state from which he fell was natural, therefore his fall involved all. But his restitution ought not to pertain to all as it was supernatural and gratuitous and accordingly personal also. XXX. He who was in Adam in no way, neither in power nor in act, cannot be said to have sinned in him. But although we were not in act and personally in him, yet we were in power, both seminally (inasmuch as we were contained in him as the root of the whole species, Acts 17:26) and representatively (inasmuch as from the order of God he bore our person and God made the covenant with the whole human race in him). Thus although we were not actually in Christ when he died for us, still his death is properly imputed to us on account of the union existing between us and him.

XXXI. It is repugnant to divine justice to punish anyone for another's sin (which is simply and in every way another's); but not which (although it be another's with regard to person) is yet common in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many. That this may justly happen, the threatenings of the law and the judgments by which they are executed, and the example of Christ to whom our sins were truly imputed, demonstrate.

XXII. Although the disobedience of Adam was imputed to us, it does not equally follow that his death also should be imputed to us. By his death (which was his personal punishment), he holds no charge for us, as by his disobedience. That could not be morally imputed to us and by imputation as the latter, but only by a real and physical transmission.
XXXIII. Although the first sin was not really voluntary with respect to us (because we did not sin by our own will), still it can be called voluntary morally because the will of Adam is considered in a measure ours on account of our union with him.

XXXIV. As the righteousness (dikeauma) of Christ (which is unique) can still be communicated by imputation to innumerable others; and as the guilt of the sins of parents (imputed to their posterity) is one and equal (which passes upon all); so nothing hinders us from saying that the guilt of Adam's sin is in unique and equal, passing upon all by imputation. It does not pass to them by division, but by union inasmuch as it renders them all worthy of punishment.

XXXV. God is the author of the covenant made with Adam, in accordance with which the sharing and imputation of Adam's sin follows. On that account, he can or ought not to be regarded as the author of sin. Sin did not arise of itself from that covenant, but only accidentally on account of man's transgression (anomia). Nor can he be considered the author of that sin more than its cause, on this account—that sin took place or is propagated to us because he willed to permit it and that it should be propagated to us.

XXXVI. The other sins committed by Adam differ from the first which is imputed to us. The others were personal sins simply (as much with respect to beginning as to end) after the covenant God made with him had been violated and the public person (which he sustained) had been laid aside. For although after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be the head by way of origin, yet he did cease to be the representative head by way of covenant. Although the first was personal as to its beginning (because proceeding from a single person), still it was not as such to its end (because it was common to more).

XXXVII. The want of original righteousness can be viewed either passively (inasmuch as it is subjectively in man) or actively (inasmuch as it is judicially sent by God); either with respect to base evil (which it includes) or with respect to sad evil (which it draws after itself by reason of the deformation of the creature and its separation from God). In the former sense, it is rightly called sin because it is a privation of due rectitude, repugnant to the law; but in the latter sense, it is a relation to punishment.

XXXVIII. Since imputation to punishment is only a moral act, it ought not to seem strange if, as the first act of sinning is imputed to us, so the first act of generating (which is purely natural) should not in like manner be imputed.

XXXIX. Although the act of Adam's disobedience could be imputed to us for consideration, it does not immediately follow that the act of disobedience ought to be imputed to us for justification because guilt arises from the one act of disobedience, but righteousness requires a full complement and perseverance of obedience. Again, the righteousness of Adam as finite and due from him could not be communicated to others for their justification; especially since the condition of his posterity ought not to differ from that of Adam (who was as passable) and to whose perseverance alone justification and life were promised.

XL. But that this doctrine concerning the imputation of Adam's sin was received in our churches has been shown fully by those very celebrated men (deserving the highest regard of the church): Andrew River, in a remarkable treatise on the subject (published by him) where he proves that all Protestants agree upon this point ("Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatorum Q. IX") in "Sin in General and in Particular".

Galliae... De imputatione primi peccati omnibus Adami posteris," in Opera [1651], 3,798-826; and Professor Antony Garabolius, in an excellent book written in defense of the Synodical decree (Decreti synodici Carenontiensis de imputatione primi peccati Adae [1683]). Therefore here there is no need of laboriously gathering all the arguments from all quarters. Still because the learned men with whom here treat frequently allege the authority of the greatest theologians (and especially of Calvin, Martyr and Chamier, as if they secretly disapproved of this imputation by their silence or even openly disapproved it in express words), it will not be without use to show briefly how much they are mistaken.

XLI. Many things prove that this was the opinion of Calvin. He does not mention imputation whenever he speaks of original sin, either because it had not yet been called into controversy or because he disputed against Albert Pighius and Ambrose Catharinus (who made the entire nature of original sin to consist solely in the imputation of the first sin, recognizing no inherent corruption) where he did not labor in proving imputation (which alone he was the adherent and acknowledged), but only in asserting inherent corruption. Still it is easy to show that this doctrine was not unknown to, but approved by, this distinguished man. We cite a few of the many passages which might be adduced. In the formula of the Confession of Faith written by him and by which all of the Genevan school held themselves bound: "I confess that all our corruption and the vice under which we labor thence flowed, because Adam, the common father of all, by his rebellion, alienated himself from God; and the fountain of life and all good being forsaken, he rendered himself liable to all miseries. Hence it comes to pass that everyone of us is born infected with original sin and from the very womb we are under the curse of God and condemned not only on account of the crime of another, but on account of the depravity which is then within us, though it does not yet appear" (Formula confessionis fidei... tenetur omnes studii publicae scholae CR 37.724). And in adversus Franciscumam: "By nature we are heirs of eternal condemnation, since the whole human race was cursed in Adam." And afterwards: "We say that God by a just judgment cursed us in Adam and willed us to be born corrupt on account of his sin, in order that we might be renewed in Christ." In his reply to a calumniator concerning the secret presence of sin: "But if it is proposed by you to subject God to the law of nature, will you condemn him for justice because for the sin of one man we are all held implicated in the guilt of eternal death? One sinned; all are led to punishment; nor is that all, but from the sin of this one, all have contracted contagion; so that they are born corrupt and infected with a death-bringing pollution" (Galliae... De imputatione... adversus doctrinam Ioannis Calvini de occasione... De sententia CR 37.289). And a little further on: "although Adam lost himself and his, still it is necessary to ascribe corruption and guilt to the secret judgment of God because the guilt of one man would be nothing to us if the heavenly Judge had not deputed us to eternal destruction... hence this condition, that we are liable not only to temporal miseries but to eternal death, also [unless because] on account of the guilt of one man, God cast us together into a common guilt" (ibid., pp. 289-90). "If the cause of the curse is inquired, resting upon all the posterity of Adam, it is said to be another's sin and the sin of each one; another's because Adam fell from God in his person, the whole human race was deposed of rectitude and intelligence; again all parts of the soul are corrupted,
so that each one in himself is lost" (Commentaries on the Prophet Ezekiel [1948], 2:241 on 18:20). There are more expressions of this kind in the IRC 2.2.1, 5, pp. 242, 246-48; 3.2.3, pp. 955-56; on Gen. 9:25 (Commentary on Genesis [1948], 1:305); "Sermon 53," Sermons... on Job [1584], pp. 247-51 on Job 14); on Rom. 5:12; 17 (Epistles to Paul the Romans and Thessalonians [trans. R. Mackenzie, 2800]; pp. 111-12, 116-37) and elsewhere. They prove our point, but we omit them for the sake of brevity.

XLI. Beza followed and frequently confirmed this opinion of Calvin. "There are three things which make a guilty man in the sight of God: (1) guilt flowing from this, that all sinned in the first creature (Rom. 5:12); (2) the corruption which is the punishment of that guilt, imposed upon Adam as well as upon his posterity; (3) the sins which adults commit" (Apologia pro Justificatione [1592], p. 127). The same thing he more strongly asserts on Rom. 5:12b: "Two things should be considered in original sin, namely, guilt and corruption; which, although they cannot be separated, yet ought to be distinguished accurately" (Annotatio maior in novum... testamentum, Pars altera [1594], p. 60 on Rom. 5:12). Nor did those who followed him and taught in this church think differently. This is abundantly evident even from the vote of those celebrated theologians deputed to the Synod of Dort (John Diodati and Theodore Trenchon on Art. 11; thesis 1, when they say that "God from eternity, according to the mere good pleasure of his own will, did create in Christ to call a certain number of men from the seed and posterity of Adam, in and with him fallen, guilty and corrupted, by and on account of Christ according to the same good pleasure (audiaque) particularly designated by the Father to this end" (Acta Synodi Nationale de Dortrechtii [1619-20], 2:58-59). This opinion and belief (as they profess) belongs to the Genevan Church.

XLII. Nor did Peter Martyr hold a different opinion. For although while disputing against Figtius he is wholly occupied in establishing the corruption, denied by him, and states nothing about imputation, still with sufficient clearness he establishes it elsewhere when he teaches that our original corruption is the punishment of Adam's sin (Common Places, Pt. II [1583], p. 216). "Indeed no one doubts," says he, "that original sin is inflicted upon us as the punishment of the first fall" (In epistolam S. Pauli apostoli ad Romanos [1559], pp. 220-26). And: "Adam sinning was just as if all had been present and sinned together with him" (Most learned... commentaries... upon... Romanes [1568], p. 115 on Rom. 5:14; cf. In selectissimam D. Pauli priorum ad Corinthios [1551], pp. 408-12 on 1 Cor. 15:21, 22).

XLIV. Chamin more clearly establishes this very thing: "We deny that we could be made inherently unworthy by one man, unless the unspeakable of this one man were imputed to us" (Corpus theologicum 21.2.9 [1651], 3:850). And: "We grant that the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ do efficiently and meritoriously constitute us unworthy and righteous; for this we never denied; for we deny that they could render us righteous or unrighteous, unless they were first imputed" (ibid., 21.11.7, 3:902). And soon after: "Therefore the very sin of Adam, I say his own personal disobedience, must be imputed to his posterity. And so also in regard to the obedience of Christ: because the whole human race was considered as in Adam by nature; and because the whole multitude of believers were in Christ, by grace. Hence it comes to pass that we are not only made sinners by Adam, but are declared to have sinned in him, which is a very different thing" (ibid.).

XLV. Nor does this celebrated man alone agree here with the other orthodox, but also other learned men (who do not differ in other things from the hypotheses of the renowned Placeanis) do not recede from the common opinion; cf. the very distinguished Amyrald who lengthily proves that another's sin can justly be imputed to those connected by some bond with the author, although they have not participated in the criminality (Treatise Concerning Religions 3.7 [1660], pp. 437-59). "As in crimes of treason, the perpetrators are so punished that the misery of their punishment passes over even to their posterity, for example, the demolishing of houses, deprivation of office, loss of reputation, and other things of the same kind; so the punishment of the first man on account of his own sin ought to be extended even to his posterity in their suffering the numerous miseries following it" (Brief Traite de la Predestination 5 [1634], pp. 57-58). "Wherefore," says he, "it is clear, how the apostle understands the doctrine of justification, viz., that he means the condemnation by which we are condemned in Adam, does not signify an inherent quality, but either the obligation to punishment, or the declaration of that obligation by a superior power; so that the righteousness by which we are justified in Christ, is not an inherent quality, but either the right of obtaining absolution in the divine judgment, or the absolution itself from the Judge" (De la Justification contre les Opiions de Monseieur de la Milliere 3 [1636], pp. 34-35). He proves this more clearly still in what follows. Thus the very celebrated Mestreart: "The justice of God could not impute to us the sin of Adam unless we were in Adam, and as it were in his loins, viz., by considering Adam as the head of his posterity" (De la Communion a Jesus Christ 2 [1625], p. 5). "The corruption of Adam has descended to us really and inheres in us, but I say that the imputation of his disobedience precedes, and corruption is derived to us by generation because we sinned in Adam as in our head" (Mestreart, Discours de la Grace... adresse a Monseieur de Milliere [1636], p. 43). So the renowned Testard: "The first man was the root of the human race, both naturally with respect to species, and economically, with respect to the covenant: to wit, he owed not only human nature, but either happiness, or misery by the latter, forming by persevering in divine righteousness, or in breaking the covenant with him, not as with a private man, but as the head and surety of the whole race" (Emenikon seu Synopsis Dogmatice de Natura et Gratia, Th. 12 [1633], p. 9).

TENTH QUESTION: ORIGINAL SIN

Whether any original sin or inherent stain and depravity may be granted, propagated to us by generation. Weaffirm against the Pelagians and Socinians.

I. Although nothing is better known than original sin for discussion, nothing is more difficult to understand as Augustine says (cf. The Way of Life of the Catholic Church 22 [40] [FC 56:34; Pl. 32:1328]). Yet it is a doctrine of the highest importance to the true perception of the misery of man and the necessity and efficacy of saving grace. Thus it is deservedly placed among the primary doctrines of the Christian religion.

II. Original sin is sometimes used more broadly to embrace imputed and inherent sin, into which as two parts it is said to be resolvable (thus it is taken by
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Now to all these the orthodox church has always opposed herself and constantly retained the affirmative.

VI. Therefore, the question between us and our opponents is not whether any first sin originating in Adam can be granted, from which that Iliad of evils, resting upon the human race in the stream of nature or by propagation. Rather the question is whether there is any inherent depravity (called original sin) propagated from Adam to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. They deny; we affirm.

Original sin is proved from Gen. 6:5.  

VII. The reasons are: (1) "Every imagination of the thoughts of man's heart is said to be only evil, continually" (Gen. 6:5) even "from his youth" (Gen. 8:21). Here occurs the judgment of God himself concerning his own work (corrupted and polluted, by which is denoted not only the corruption of men, but universal corruption as much habitual of the heart as actual of the thoughts; indeed from the very beginning of life born with us and continual). Nor if these things are said of the inhabitants of the first world are they to be understood exclusively of other men and their natural constitution. Yes, that hypothesis must be transferred to the thesis, and the same must be inferred of others because all in a state of sin have the same nature in themselves (without restraining or converting grace). This is evident most clearly from Gen. 8:21 where the same things are said no more of that ancient world (which he had destroyed by the avenging waters on account of its crimes), but of the new world which he was about to produce from the surviving offspring of Noah. Not are actual sins so referred to as sin (which also may be joined with, because the things principiated cannot be corrupt without the principles themselves being also corrupt. Hence it is not only treated of evil actions and thoughts, but also of the evil figure of the heart (called by the Jews ysr hs', their usual term for original sin). On this account the term is not called evil only from some but for all time and even from infancy itself, for this term also signifies (cf. Lam. 3:27; Jer. 22:21; Ezek. 4:14; 16:22; Hos. 2:15), not only youth, as the Socinians wish. Reason favors it because it treats of the cause of the deluge in which infants also perished (to whom actual wickedness does not belong, yet who are punished without censure, guiltlessly). Therefore original depravity ought to be connoted with actual. To pretend that the Holy Spirit here by way of hyperbole exaggerates the crimes of the old world (not as if all were flagitious, but because the majority were corrupt) is to take for granted what must be proved. For hyperbole is admirable in scriptures only where the words taken literally are repugnant either to reason or sense or experience or to other parallel passages. But here all things are just the contrary.

VIII. Second, the same thing is proved from Gen. 5:3 where Adam is said to have begotten Seth "after his image" (i.e., asur or of like quality). Now this could not be corrupted in generation in any other way than by contracting original corruption. Here we must notice the antithesis between the image of God (after which Adam was formed, spoken of in Gen. 5:3) and the image of Adam (after which Seth was formed). As therefore the former morally designated both wisdom of mind and holiness of will, so from the opposition
the image of Adam ought to denote the inherent and hereditary corruption of his mind as well as of his will. The apostle expresses this in 1 Cor. 15:49 where he contrasts the image of the first and second Adam: the former, indeed, earthy and corruptible; the latter, however, celestial and incorruptible. To no purpose is this referred either to the physical and specific image of Adam or to a likeness in form, figure and external lineaments. In no other way ought we to understand (after which Adam begat his children) to be understood than in that in which it is taken when man is said to have been made after the image of God, not physically, but morally. However what need was there to relate distinctly (διακριτός) with so emphatic an expression and a repeated word, was what certain of itself and common to man with the brute? But there was a peculiar reason why he should state this concerning Seth rather than of Abel who was childless (αὐτένοις); and of Cain to whom on account of his abominably wicked life this might seem to have been peculiar (viz., in order that the Holy Spirit might designate that the prerogative of the holy seed, whose head he ought to be, did not hinder his being corrupt by nature, as begotten of the flesh of Adam). IX. Third, from Job 14:4—"Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? not one." Here purity is removed from all men (not even one being excepted), and uncleanness is ascribed to them (not simply external of the body, which can easily be taken away, but internal of the soul). The latter is invariable, cannot be purged by nature and renders one liable to the judgment of God (Job 14:3); not actual only and transient, but permanent and hereditary, derived from the parent to the offspring (which can be no other than original sin, whatever is meant by the word τῆς, whether "seed" or "man"). Nor is it an objection here that this uncleanness is not universal because Job elsewhere shows sufficiently that he was not such (Job 31). We answer that although he was not such through the grace by which he was born again, yet he was such by the nature from which he was begotten (or the uncleanness is comparative [like that attributed to the angels] not absolute). We answer that the discourse concerns such impurity as cannot bear the judgment of God, as is evident from the words immediately preceding. Now that impurity is simply sinful, not the comparative imperfection of one creature or essence with another. For God does not bring the latter into judgment, unless he would condemn his own work.

X. Fourth, from Ps. 51:5—"Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." David, by ascending from the consideration of actual sin committed by him to the first taint of evil, confesses before God that he was corrupt even from the womb and inclined to sin. Hence an invincible argument flows for original sin. One conceived in iniquity and nourished in sin cannot be without original sin. Nor does what Volckesius urges here with his associates (to escape the force of this passage) avail: either that David does not speak of his men in general, but only of himself; or simply, but in reference to his fall. We answer that although he speaks of himself, why can it not be extended to others in the same condition who are in a similar manner conceived and born (as his birth was common to him with others, so also his native corruption)? Yes (from the greater) if David, a man after God's heart, was conceived in sin, how much more others? Or he speaks not of his own original sin, but of the actual sin, either of his parents in common or principally of his mother in particular. We answer that it is certain that David makes confession of his own sin (whose pardon he seeks for himself, not of another's sin) as the whole connection clearly demonstrates (which would be entirely destroyed, if a leap was made to another's sin). Besides that, it is falsely supposed that his parents sinned in his generation (as if he was born in unlawful wedlock). Nor can the words be so distorted. The verb culpabili ("I was conceited") cannot be referred to the parents' act of begetting, but to the formation of the begotten body in the womb. Yehsedheus does not signify "to beget" or "to conceive" (which belongs to both parents), but "to be made warm and "to be cherished" (which refers to the fetus already formed and warmed in sin).

XI. Fifth, all are by nature "flesh and born of the flesh" (5) From Jn. 3:5. (Jn. 3:5, 6). For "except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Here is pointed out: (1) the necessity of a supernatural regeneration to be born again; (2) the universality of corruption infecting all because all are flesh; (3) the universality of traduction (transduction), while flesh is born of flesh. Nor can it be said that "flesh" here must be understood "physically" for frailty of nature. For although it is sometimes used in Scripture in that sense, yet it cannot be so taken here. Rather it is understood morally because he is speaking of flesh as opposed to spirit; also inasmuch as it has need of regeneration (i.e., of our unregenerate nature opposed to that as renewed) in which sense it is frequently taken. Again, physical frailty necessarily supposes moral corruption as its cause; hence it cannot be separated from it.

XII. Sixth, all (Jews as well as Gentiles) are "the children of wrath" (Eph. 2:3). "And we were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." Here are pointed out not only the actual sins by which they are said to "have fulfilled the desires of the flesh," but also original sin because they are called "children of wrath" [i.e., exposed to divine wrath not by imitation and custom, but by nature (physi) (not upright, but corrupt) to intimate that the evil is inherent from the womb and not only comes upon us after actual sins]. Nor ought it to be said that we are called children of wrath because we are begotten of Adam, since he had already become a child of wrath on account of sin. He is not speaking of Adam but of his posterity—that they are the children of wrath by nature (which could not be said except they were already by nature sinners).

(7) From Rom. 5:12. "Wherefore, as one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin" (Rom. 5:12). Here the apostle rises to the first taint of evil and unfolds the origin of sin and of death (to wit, the first sin of man which entered into the world [to wit, into men] both by imputation and by propagation). This the apostle proves from death (the necessary effect of sin) because it reigns over all: (1) both external and temporal, internal and spiritual, and eternal—not only actual death, but also exposure and obligation to death. Nor can it be said to have passed by imitation (as Pelagian held) because it could not be said to have passed upon infants (for they are not capable of imitating). (2) Thus it ought to be known to all, while yet innumerable persons have heard nothing
about Adam. (3) It could no more be said to have passed by one man, than by the Devil (who is the father of sinners).

(8) From the necessity of death; of redemption; of regeneration; of circumcision; and baptism.

XIV. Eighth, various reasons prove the same thing. (1) The universal necessity of death imposed upon all, even upon infants. For if death reigns over all, sin ought necessarily to reign over them because that is its wages; nor can death be where sin is not. To recur here to a consequence of nature (as the Socinians wish, as if death was natural, not penal) is their radical error (προτόν πασοδο), confuted before us by us in Topic V. (2) The necessity of redemption for all to be saved, there would be no need of redemption except upon the supposition of sin. (3) The necessity of regeneration without which no one can see the kingdom of God (Jn. 3:3). For why ought man to be renewed by regeneration unless he is naturally corrupt by generation? (4) The necessity of the sacrament to be administered to infants recently born, of circumcision in the old and of baptism in the new covenant (of which they would have no need at all unless, on account of the demerit and inherence of sin, there be both guilt and evil). Here belongs also the necessity of the purification prescribed to women in labor in the Old Testament (which could not have had place if there was no corruption and uncleanness connected with the generation of man). (5) The common law that everything begotten is like the begetter, as much as to qualities as with regard to the accidents belonging to the species. Generation is the communication not only of essence, but also of the qualities and accidents belonging to the species (as therefore a man generates a man, so a sinner can generate no other than a sinner). (6) Experience which teaches that depravity to be latent in infants themselves, even before the use of reason. Hence the proneness to lying, desire of revenge, love of excess, their little glories, amusing vanity and the like are so apparent in many that the parents can recognize in their children the image of their own native corruption and perverseness.

XV. What is involuntary by a positive volition cannot be sin; but what is not voluntary by a positive volition does not cease to be sin, provided it is contrary to the law (as was proved before). Although original sin is not voluntary in act, still it is in origin; in his will from whom it is, although not in his will in whom it is, inherently and subjectively because it adheres to the will and impairs it, although not explicitly because it is not drawn outward by any act of the will; radically with regard to its principle, although not formally with regard to its exercise.

XVI. If innocence is at any time attributed to infants in Scripture (as Ps. 106:38; Jn. 4:42), this is not to be understood absolutely and in itself, as if they were destitute of all sin; otherwise neither would they be liable to death. Rather it is to be understood relatively as compared with adults who actually sin. The twins of whom Paul speaks in Rom. 9:11 had as yet done no good or evil, to form a distinction between them, but still they were both conceived in sin in the mass of corruption.

XVII. Although the law prohibits no one to be born with original sin because it supposes man to be holy, yet it condemns as illegitimately (ανομία) the hereditary and inherent corruption of man (because it is opposed to that righteousness and holiness which the law demands from all).

XVIII. When Christ says that the man born blind had not sinned (Jn. 9:3) he does not absolutely assert that he was free from all sin (whose punishment this calamity of his was), but only comparatively denies that he sinned more than others that he was so affected; that his native blindness was the punishment of some special sin, either of the blind man himself (according to the false hypothesis of the Jews who supposed that infants in the womb could sin) or be borrowed by the Pythagorean metempsychosis (metempsychosis or transmigration of souls) or of his parents (according to the doctrine taught in the Jewish schools that children were often born lame and deformed on account of the sins of their parents). Therefore Christ, in order that no singular and personal sin might be imputed either to the blind man himself or to his parents, says that this happened in order that the works of God might be manifested (i.e., that God willed by this example to make known his works of justice and power in punishing and his works of mercy and omnipotence in healing).

XIX. Although sin is pardoned in the parents, still nonetheless it can be transmitted to their posterity because the guilt being remitted, the taint always remains in the account of the demerit and inherence of sin, though not in any part. Hence as a circumcised person begets an uncircumcised, so a believer and renewed man begets a corrupt and unrenewed. He does not generate by grace, but by nature (as from a grain cleared of chaff is produced a grain with the chaff).

XX. The children of believers are holy (1 Cor. 7:14), not as to immunity from all sin (in which sense no mortal lives without sin, 1 Jn. 1:8), but as to communion with the church, from which those considered unholy and unclean are excluded. This holiness therefore is rather relative and federal than inherent. And although they may be called holy inherently, the truth of original sin is not on that account overthrown because that holiness would be a blessing of grace, not a privilege of nature. They do not have it from themselves or from their parents, but from the Spirit of Christ renewing believers.

XXI. Although the blessed virgin was truly "highly favored" (kenehontoment), loved and chosen by God above other women that she might conceive and bring forth the Son of God and may truly be called "mother of God" (θεοτόκος), still that distinguished and evidently singular privilege by which she was raised to the highest degree of happiness did not hinder her from being conceived and born after the common manner of other mortals—in and with original sin. (1) That thought is in Scripture predicated of all men universally, no one but Christ excepted. He was not begotten in the ordinary way, but extraordinarily conceived by the Holy Spirit and sprang from Adam as the material principle only, not as the active principle. (2) She herself had need of a Savior, whom she celebrates as hers (Lk. 1:47). (3) She was bound to offer the sacrifices of the old law, which could not be done without the confession of sin. (4) The effects of that sin are found in her, as are actual sins. On account of this, we read that she was rebuked even by Christ (Jn. 2:4; Lk. 2:49; 8:19-21), calamity and trials (which are the fruits of sin) piercing through her soul (Lk. 2:35). How great were the contentions about this argument in the Roman church among the Dominicans, Franciscans and Jesuits. The latter asserted the immaculate conception of the blessed virgin; the former denied it. This is known to everyone. The error seems to have arisen first from the Council of Lyons about the year 1236, from the excessive worship of the virgin (refuted by Bernard, "Letter 174" [PL 182.332-36] and the Scholastics
of that age). However, the controversy was more sharply renewed afterwards about the year 1300 and onward even until the year 1439 when the Council of Basel pronounced in favor of the Franciscans (Session 36, Mansi, 29:182-83). Sixtus IV afterwards confirmed this in the year 1476. It was approved by the Council of Trent and was at length sanctioned by a new bull from Alexander VII in the year 1661, so that it might after that be held as a doctrine of the church. He who desires more should consult the celebrated Heleget ("Dissertatio B. De Conceptione B. Virginis Mariae," in Dissertationum selectarum [1675], 1:177-241), who has entered fully into the history of this controversy.

XXII. In the propagation of sin, an accident does not pass over from subject to subject. The immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature vitiated by the actual transgression of the person which, being communicated to posterity, this inherent corruption in it is also communicated. Therefore as in Adam, the person corrupted the nature; so in his posterity, the nature corrupts the person.

XXIII. Although the mode of the propagation of sin is obscure and difficult to explain, the propagation itself (which Scripture so clearly asserts and experience confirms) is not on that account to be denied. However whatever is to be thought of the mode of propagation will be discussed in a special question.

ELEVENTH QUESTION
Whether original sin has corrupted the very essence of the soul. Also whether it is a mere privation or a certain positive quality too.

I. There are two extremes to be equally avoided about the nature of original sin: (1) in excess, of those who think original sin is placed in the corruption of the very substance of the soul; (2) in defect, of those who wish it to consist in the mere want and privation of righteousness.

II. Flacus Illyricus defended the first error in a former age, the more strongly to oppose Victor Strigelus (his colleague) who extolled the free will of man in conversion and diminished corruption. Illyricus maintained that sin corrupted the very essence of man. Cyriacus Spangenberg followed him, with whom this monstrous opinion seems to have vanished. Hence not without calumny does Bellarmine attribute this error to those who have fought against it ("De Amisione Gratiae," 5:1 in Opera [1858], 4:182-83).

III. The orthodox constantly maintain that sin is to be distinguished from the substance of soul, and in it as an accident, to the sin inhering in man and a garment to be put off. (3) Thus it would follow that Christ in assuming our nature assumed also sin and corruption itself; and that man after his sanctification and resurrection is different from what he was before. (4) Sin cannot be predicated of man in the question What is it? (because it would be either a genus or species); but only in the question What is its quality?

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IV. Whatever is anomon ("lawless" in the abstract) or anomaia ("lawlessness") is really sin, but not forthwith with what is called "lawless" (anomon) in the concrete because it has sin in itself. In this sense, human nature is called "lawless" (anomos); not that it is sin itself, but because having sin in itself is well called "sinful."

V. A "new heart" is said to be made in us by regeneration not physically, but morally. The same substance which was corrupted by sin must be restored by grace. If it is said that "the old man" must be put off and "the new put on," nothing else is meant than that the corruption of sin (which is morally called "the old man" because he descends from old Adam) must be thrown aside by man in order that the work of regeneration (signified by "the new man") may be begun and carried forward. The same must be said of the other phrases connoting sin or grace, drawn from the substance itself of man. These are taken morally, not physically; nor so much in the abstract as in the concrete to express more powerfully the magnitude of our corruption.

VI. Original righteousness and sin are mutually opposed to each other, but the image of God is sometimes used more broadly (inasmuch as it is extended to the spiritual and immortal substance of the soul itself).

The opinion of the papists concerning the nature of original sin.

Opinion of the orthodox.

VII. The papists sin in defect who restrict the whole nature of original sin to the mere want or privation of original righteousness. They define corruption of nature by the loss alone of the supernatural gift without the access of any evil quality. Anselm and after him most of the Scholastics maintain this, and it is the more common opinion among the papists ("The Virginal Conception and Original Sin," 26* in Anselm of Canterbury [ed. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson, 1976], 3:176). Their design is to prove that man after the fall differs from man before the fall no more than a weak or sick from a strong and healthy man, a bound from a free man. They do this in order to establish the will free to good; that there is not so much impotency in it as a difficulty of acting rightly, especially as they make original righteousness superfluous. However we think two things are here necessarily included: first, the privation of original righteousness; second, the positing of the contrary habit of unrighteousness.

VIII. The reasons are: (1) Scripture describes that sin not only privatively (sterké, by way of negation (Rom. 3:23; 7:18; 1 Cor. 2:4; Eph. 4:18), but also positively (thaiké) and by way of affirmation, when it calls it "flesh," "concupiscence," "the law of the members," "indwelling sin," "body of death," "old man," etc. (Jn. 3:6; Rom. 7:18, 20, 23, 24; Eph. 4:12; 1). (2) In fact and subject, it signifies the quality of man and it continually excites evil desires in him. In fact, it passes over to posterity by generation, which cannot be said of mere want or privation.

X. (3) Men are not only destitute of righteousness, but also full of unrighteousness; incapable of good, but also inclined to evil, turned away from God, as the internal and eternal good, but also turned toward the creature and inclined to every vice. Disease and a bad disposition of body (producing pain) do not bespeak a mere privation of health, but also a disorder (dyskratia) of the temperament and humors. As leprosy is not only the privation of pure blood, but also a corruption of it, so sin (which is compared to a disease) is not only the privation of
rectitude, but also positive corruption. It introduces a universal disorder (asáton) into nature and all its faculties and is usually described by folly, blindness and ignorance in the mind; wickedness and contumacy or rebellion in the will; and disorder or hardness (póripei) in the affections, by which man is not only averse from good, but also prone to every evil.

XI. (6) It is not only privatively opposed to original righteousness, but also contrarily as original unrighteousness (as among philosophers vices are opposed to virtues, not only as privations, but also as contrary habits).

XII. (6) The effects of original sin are not only privative, but also positive; not only sins of omission, but also of commission, which on that account demand a cause of the same kind. Hence sinners (before grace) are called "foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts" (Tit. 3:3). "Evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, false witness" (Mt. 15:19) are said to proceed out of the heart and the flesh is said "to lust against the Spirit" (Gal. 5:17).

XIII. (6) Not a few papists hold this opinion. Thomas Aquinas calls it "a corrupt sin and in which there is something passive (viz., the privation of original righteousness) and something positive (viz., a disordered disposition of the parts of the soul)" (ST, II-II, Q. 82, Art. 1, p. 956). Cajetan on this place: "privation bespeaks negation in the aptly born subject; corruption, however, adds a positive corruptive or founding that negation." (Commentaria in Summam Theologiam Divi Thomae, I-I, QQ. LXXI-CXIV [1498], p. 61 on I-I, Q. 82, Art. 1). Bellarmine attributes this opinion to Lombard, Henry (of Ghent), Gregory of Arimini, whom moreover he charges with error and endeavors to refute ("De amissione gratae," 5.15 in Opera [1858], 4:222-23).

XIV. A positive physically (in which sense being and good are convertible, and there is nothing positive which is not from God) differs from a positive morally and logically (which is affirmed of the subject in which it inheres, whether it is good or evil). Sin is called positive, not in the former, but in the latter sense. Thus it can have a positive cause not physically (because thus it is only a deficient cause), but logically and morally (because it introduces a positive quality).

XV. Original sin (not on this account) is not a vicious (stíchos) habit because it is neither infused nor acquired. There are various innate habits, as appears from the example of conscience, original righteousness, the common notions about God and the difference between right and wrong.

XVI. Nothing prevents original sin from being a privation and at the same time a positive quality. Privation is not bare and simple (or of pure negation), but highly active and efficacious and of wicked disposition (which does not take away the subject itself, but by depriving it of the good rectitude, badly disposes and corrupts it; nor extinguishes the internal principles of action, but depraves them—as disease in the body and rottenness in an apple).

XVII. Further that hereditary taint corrupts not only the inferior part of the soul (the sensitive, to ambitus), but the papists wish (for the purpose of favoring free will), but also the superior part (or the logical [to logikón], to wit, the intellect and the will). Hence blindness and ignorance of mind, rebellion and contumacy are attributed to the will, and the whole man is said to be altogether corrupt, so that he can neither know any truth nor do any good and so needs regeneration and sanctification, as to both parts of himself.

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Sin in General and in Particular

XVIII. The word "flesh" is sometimes taken strictly for the corruption of sensuality or of the body (as 2 Cor. 7:1); other times, it is taken broadly for the universal corruption of the soul extending to the mind itself. Hence mind (phýménai) is attributed to the flesh (Rom. 8:6). Heresies are called "works of the flesh" (which however are in the intellect) and heretics are said to be puffed up by their fleshly mind (Col. 2:18). In this sense, original sin is called "flesh."

XIX. Concupiscence is used either philosophically and means the same as concupiscible appetite; or theologically and popularly, in which sense evil propensities of the will belong to it. In this sense, the flesh is said "to lust against the Spirit" (Gal. 5:17). Original sin is defined by Augustine as "concupiscence" from which (as a bad and corrupt root and tree) corrupt branches and the worst fruit are produced.

XX. Now this concupiscence is sin not only in the unbelieving and unenlightened, but also in believers and the renewed (whatever the papists may assert, who hold that it can be called a weakness and disease of nature and a depravation, the effect of sin and not the cause of sin, but deny that it has the relation of sin properly so called). This was sanctioned by the Council of Trent, Session 5, Canon 5: "If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin can be remitted through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, bestowed in baptism, or even asserts that all that has the true and proper remission of sin is not taken away, but that it is only nipped off and not imputed, let him be anathema" (Schroeder, p. 23). And a little further on: "This concupiscence, which the apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has never understood to be sin, which is truly and properly sin in the renewed, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. If anyone, however, thinks the contrary, let him be anathema" (ibid.).

XXI. Now although by regeneration we hold that the guilt and pollution of original sin is taken away as to dominion (because it is neither imputed to them anymore for condemnation, nor does it reign in them), yet we deny that it is absolutely taken away as to existence and whatever holds the relation of sin in it. Paul repeatedly gives to it the name of "sin" (Rom. 6:7), as it cannot be referred to anything else than sin properly so called. He treats of the sin for which Christ was delivered, to which we are sealed in baptism (Rom. 6:3) and crucified with Christ (Rom. 6:6), sin whose wages is death (Rom. 6:2, 6, 12, 23), sin which is repugnant to the law (Rom. 7:7), which works all manner of concupiscence (Rom. 7:8), and which becomes exceeding sinful and renders man carnal and sold under sin (Rom. 7:14), whose mind (phýménai) is enmity against God and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be (Rom. 8:7), the cause and origin of all sins (Jas. 1:15). All this belongs to sin properly so called. Hence Augustine maintains concupiscence "to be both sin, because disobedience is in it against the domination of the mind, and the punishment of sin, because it is rendered to the merits of the disobedient, and the cause of sin, by the detection of the one consenting as also by the contagion of the guilty" (Against Julian 5.3 [FC 35:249; PL 44.787]).

XXII. Although concupiscence is said to "bring forth sin" (Jas. 1:15, i.e., actual, finished and external), it does not cease to be sin. On the contrary, it ought to be sin because the offspring is of the same nature with the parent; an evil effect necessarily argues an evil cause, as a tree is known by its fruits.
XXIII. It is one thing that there should be no condemnation in the renewed; another that they are worthy of condemnation and of hatred. The former Paul states in Rom. 8:1 because actual guilt is removed by the grace of justification, but not the latter. As long as sin remains in us (as it does until our death), so long does potential guilt remain (or the intrinsic merit of sin, by which he is really worthy of hatred and of condemnation in his own nature, although by the accident of grace he is not actually condemned).

TWELFTH QUESTION: THE PROPAGATION OF SIN
How is original sin propagated from parents to their children?

The question concerning the mode of propagation difficult.

I. The wickedness of heretics and the eager curiosity of searching into all things started this question. The Pelagians have urged it the more strongly in order that from the difficulty of the proposition they might the more easily deny its truth. So hard and difficult to explain did it seem to Augustine, that in unravelling it he never could satisfy himself. Hence, two modes of propagation being proposed, either that both are faulty when derived from man or that the one is corrupted in the other (as in an impure vace), he adds "which of these, however, is true I am more willing to learn than to say, and do not dare to teach what I am ignorant of." (Against Julian 5.4*37 [FC 35:262; PL 44.794]). Therefore writing elsewhere, he goes so far as to say, we should rather earnestly examine how we may be freed from that evil by Christ than dispute how we may have drawn it from Adam, as the man who has fallen into a well ought not to be so anxious to know how he fell into it, as to ascertain the method of getting out of it (Letter 167, "To Jerome" [FC 30:33]).

To this it is answered: (1) generally that it is impure generation.

II. Now although in a question of the highest difficulty all difficulties cannot be removed, still such things can be brought forward from the word of God as can satisfy the humble mind so that we may firmly and indubitably hold the thing, although we cannot fully and clearly understand the mode. A twofold answer can be given to the proposed question, either general or special. First, generally, the mode of this propagation is the impure generation by which we are born corrupt and sinners from those who are corrupt and sinners. For as a man begets a man and a leper a leper, it ought not to seem strange for a sinner to beget a sinner also like himself. Bear both the nature and condition of all those generating demands (who beget a species similar to themselves, as to the substance and accidents of the species and the law of generation established by God, no less after the fall [Gen. 9:1] than before it) requires. As therefore before the fall God willed an upright nature to be propagated, so after the fall he willed a corrupt nature as the punishment of sin.

III. Thus sin is properly propagated neither in the soul nor in the body taken separately, but in the man because neither the soul nor the body apart, but man in Adam sinned so far as there was power in him (in the body with regard to substance, in the soul with regard to subsistence).

IV. Nor is it an objection that natural generation does not seem to be able to preserve what is moral. For that hereditary taint is so moral objectively that it does not cease to be natural originally because it is an inseparable attendant of the corrupt nature, just as original righteousness, which was moral, yet would have been propagated by natural generation, if man had persisted in integrity.

V. However although this mode of general propagation is evident and is sufficient for establishing the truth of the traduction of sin; whence since Julian sought through what chinks sin could have entered, since he does not sin who is born; he does not sin who begat; he does not sin who made—Augustine answers, "Why does he seek a concealed crack, when he has a wide open gate? By one man.... What does he seek further; what clearer; what more impressive?" (On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.28 [NPNF, 5:302; PL 44.464]). Still because the impurity of our opponents is wont to attack this mode violently as impossible (because sin can neither pass by the soul, which is created by God and is not drawn from the body, nor by the body which is brute and incapable of sin), let us see what can be said here more particularly to the knot which they think cannot be looped.

VI. Some have thought that the difficulty can be gotten rid of in no better way than by the traduction of the soul (which not a few of the ancients believed and Augustine himself sees occasionally to incline toward). Undoubtedly in this way, all difficulty would seem to be removed; but because (as we said before) this opinion is consonant neither with Scripture nor with sound reason and is pressed by great difficulties, we do not think recourse should be had to it.

VII. Others (as Lombard and most of the Scholastics) hold that the soul is vitiated by the body (Sententiarum, Bk. II, Dist. 31 [PL 92:724-26]). It is indeed created pure by God, but tainted by the body into which it is put (as when pure liquor poured into an uncleaved vessel is corrupted). But Belammine insists that this opinion on this ground especially, that it cannot be understood how flesh (which is a body) can corrupt the soul (which is a spirit) "De amissione gratiae et statu peccati", 4:12 in Opera [I58], 4:168. And we must confess that so far, it is not satisfactory, if nothing further is added.

VIII. In order therefore to explain this mode in the best way possible, we hold three degrees of that propagation: (2) Or specially, by three degrees of propagation of sin, (a) In the conception from an unclean seed.

The first is in the conception of the body from an unclean seed, for as is the material, such ought to be the product: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" (Job 14:4). "What is born of the flesh is flesh" (Jn. 3:6). Now although the body of itself is not the receptive (daktion) subject of sin (so that it may be said to be in it consummately, formally and perfectly), yet there is nothing to prevent its being said to be in us inchoatively, dispositively and radically (as in the proper residence of the soul, so to coalesce in the same person with the soul). The tincture of sin is derived in the conception itself and is impressed upon the fetus through the vital and animal spirits (as children are want to draw from parents not only diseases themselves in act, as the gout and gravel, and their seeds and certain impressions which are the principals of those diseases).
Q. XII

Sin in General and in Particular

(b) In the creation of the soul destitute of original righteousness.

IX. The second degree is in the creation of the soul. Although created without any stain by God, still it is not created with original righteousness like the soul of Adam, in the image of God, but with a want of it as a punishment of the first sin. So that we must here distinguish between a soul pure, impure and not pure. That is called "pure" which is furnished with the habit of holiness; "impure" which has the contrary habit of unrighteousness; "not pure" which, although having no good habit, still has no bad habit, but is simply created with natural faculties (such as it is supposed to be created by God after the fall because the image of God, once lost by sin, cannot anymore be restored except by the blessing of regeneration through the Holy Spirit).

X. Now although souls are created by God destitute of original righteousness, God cannot on that account be considered the author of sin. It is one thing to infuse impurity; another not to give the purity of which man has rendered himself unholy in Adam. Nor is God bound to create pure souls: yea, he can most justly deprive them of such a gift as a punishment of the sin of Adam. This privation (although on the part of man culpable because it is a privation of due rectitude) still is not so with respect to God (because it is an act of vindictive justice by which he avenges the first sin).

XI. Although souls were not in Adam as to origin of essence (because they are created by God), still they can rightly be said to have been in him as to origin of subsistence (inasmuch as they were to be joined with bodies as the constituent parts of those men who are the children of Adam and which in this respect are well considered guilty in Adam).

XII. Nor ought it to be considered unworthy of the divine goodness that the soul should be placed in a corrupt body. From the beginning, he sanctioned (by a certain and immovable law) that he would place a soul in every organized human body. This law ought not to have been abolished on account of the sin of man.

XIII. The third degree of propagation is in the union of the soul with the body. For then what had been sin only initiatively and radically becomes such formally and consummately. As man by that union is constituted in his being, so also sin is filled up; not only privatively (by a want of righteousness), but also positively (by the position of the contrary habit of unrighteousness).

XIV. Now it ought not to seem surprising if the soul is corrupted by the body, since Scripture and experience testify that the sympathy (sympathia) between the soul and body is so great that as the body is affected by the soul, so also in turn the soul is affected by the body. Hence the morals of the soul are said to follow the temperaments of the body. And Scripture asserts that the soul is weighed down by the corrupt body: "Take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting and drunkenness, and cares of this life" (Lk. 21:34). "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that useth upon many things" (Wis. 9:15).

XV. If, however, it is enquired how the soul (which is spiritual) can be corrupted by the body (which is a brute and material thing), the knot cannot be untied (as is done by some) saying that the soul needs an organized body and cannot operate except through bodily organs. Thus if the organs are well disposed, the action of the soul becomes right, but if on the contrary they are corrupt and badly disposed, the operation of the soul is also corrupted. However this might avail to demonstrate the actual corruption of the operations of the soul, still not its habitual corruption (about which it is enquired). Thus original sin would not exist in the soul of infants, but would arise only when the soul began to operate through the body.

XVI. Far more fitly and truly do they speak who maintain that this is not brought about by any action of the body upon the soul (as if the body in acting and the soul in suffering were gradually deprived because original sin is of nature, not of action). Nor can the body rise beyond the sphere of its own activity so as to act upon a spirit immediately and physically; nor even by physical contact (as of liquor in a vessel), which cannot apply to an immaterial soul.

Rather by the very strict connection of soul and body in one person, the intimate sympathy (sympathia) of both, the mutual appetite for each other and the nice balancing (rhœm) by which they embrace most closely and affect each other, and as the body tends towards the soul as its perfection and good, so the soul tends towards the body as its own proper domicile and organ of its actions; and as the soul communicates its affections to the body, so the body communicates its dispositions to the soul, whence also results the diversity of inclinations in different men.

XVII. This cannot be done the more easily because (since the soul is deprived of original righteousness) it can no longer govern the body and hold it in subjection (which it could easily do in the state of integrity), but the image of God having been lost (which principally bestowed preeminence [hierarchian] upon it), the natural order is disturbed so that the flesh (which ought to obey) now commands, while the soul (which was made to govern) has now passed in some measure into the power of the other (subjected to the flesh and drawn downwards). Here not so much the order of nature as the law of divine justice, and its most just sanction is to be recognized, avenging by this evil of punishment that evil of criminality, by which our first parent willingly subverted the power of the spirit over the flesh.

XVIII. Now in this way God cannot be considered the author, but the averger of sin. He is the author of the union as his own work; but not of the sin (another's fault). He unites the soul to the body to preserve the species; he joins the soul deprived of righteousness to a corrupt body for a punishment of sin. Nor is God the cause of the corruption, if in joining the soul to the body he carries out an established law of nature (from which man proceeds properly, but the sinner only accidentally).

XIX. However although all difficulty occurring in the explanation of this mode of propagation may not seem to be removed, still its truth (so clearly delivered in Scripture and confirmed by experience) must be retained with no less certainty. Nor if we cannot understand the how (to ὡς), must we on that account deny the fact (to ὡς), or call it in question. It is better here with Augustine to acknowledge this mode to be just (whatever it may be) and to confess that it is secret.